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INTRODUCTION

Recent developments in reproductive technologies are creating a
new body of law. Adding to the means by which people create families,
these technologies have also complicated both family and inheritance
law, creating not only a social and legal environment in which as many
as five people could claim-or could be claimed-to be the parents of
one child, but one in which a child may be born without legal parents.
By reproductive technologies, this Article refers to artificial
insemination ("AI"),' especially artificial insemination by donor ("AID");
in vitro fertilization ("IVF'),2 egg and embryo donation for implantation

in a woman who is not a donor; and posthumous procreation from
cryopreserved gametes or embryos.' Also discussed in this Article are
surrogacy contractual arrangements that involve the use of these methods
of conception and gestation.' These arrangements have created noncoital
means to parenting that are increasingly used by infertile married couples
and by unmarried individuals, producing an estimate of more than 40,000
assisted conceptions a year at more than 300 clinics.5 The legal, ethical,
and social implications of their use have been said to be "amongst the
most important issues of this century."6 By permitting conception

without a sexual partner, by severing genetic contribution and gestation,
1. Al is accomplished by depositing semen in a woman's uterus with a syringe. Al is often
done by a doctor, but a woman can self-inseminate as long as she has a source of sperm. See Vickie
L. Henry, Note, A Tale of Three Women: A Survey of the Rights and Responsibilitiesof Unmarried
Women Who Conceive by AlternativeInsemination and a Modelfor Legislative Reform, 19 AM. J.L.
& MED. 285, 286 (1993).
2. IVF involves fertilization of an egg outside the body, usually in a laboratory dish. A doctor
removes eggs from a woman's ovaries and places them with sperm. The resulting preembryo is then
transferred to the uterus of the woman who will gestate and give birth. See Anne Goodwin,
Determination of Legal Parentage in Egg Donation, Embryo Transplantation,and Gestational
Surrogacy Arrangements, 26 FAM. L.Q. 275, 276 (1992).
3. Posthumous parenthood involves the use of frozen gametes or frozen embryos that are
thawed, fertilized if gametes, and implanted for gestation after one or both gamete donors dies. Thus,
one or both biological parents of a child died during gestation but before the child was born, or died
before the child was even conceived. See John A. Robertson, PosthumousReproduction, 69 IND. L.J.
1027, 1027 (1994).
4. A surrogate is a woman who contracts to gestate a child whom she will relinquish to a
couple (or a single person) soon after the child is born so that the couple can adopt the child. A
surrogate may be impregnated by AI with the sperm of the male contracting party, or with the sperm
of another male. Alternatively, the surrogate may become pregnant by transfer to her womb of a
preembryo conceived by IVF.
5. See Rodd Zolkos, Medical Miracle, Liability Minefield, Bus. INS., June 3, 1996, at 1.
6. Douglas Cusine, Legal Issues in Human Reproduction, in LEGAL ISSUES IN HUMAN
REPRODUCiTON 17, 17 (Sheila McLean ed., 1989).
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and by permitting posthumous conception by means of frozen gametes
and embryos, the use of reproductive technologies has taken the already
frequently asked question of who is a parent and transformed its context.
The impact of reproductive technologies on the creation of life has
drawn considerable discussion in journalism and popular literature, as
well as in academic literature. Less in public focus, but still immensely
important, is the impact of those technologies on the legal consequences
of death.
This Article analyzes this intriguing linkage between life and death
by analyzing the inheritance consequences to children born of reproductive technologies, especially when one of the participating individuals
dies intestate.

I1. THE BASIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A.

Inheritance

If a person dies without a valid will, the laws of intestate succession
in every state determine to whom that person's property will be
distributed. Intestacy statutes favor first the decedent's nuclear family,
descending and ascending blood lines, and then follow the decedent's
collateral blood lines.' They typically provide no discretion to the court
to choose among possible recipients.' In enacting intestacy statutes, the
state must determine its goals when deciding to whom a decedent's
property will go and how much each beneficiary will take.
Like all legislation, intestacy statutes should be based on a
community's widely shared beliefs. Thus, the stated goal of the original
Uniform Probate Code ("UPC"), adopted in 1969, was to design a statute
that reflects the "normal" dispositive preferences of the average property
owner.9 In formulating this goal, the drafters conformed to the general
policy behind default rules in that those rules should reflect what the
parties would have wanted.'" Commentators have suggested two reasons
for the UPC goal: (1) the accepted policy of testamentary freedom in this

7. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH,
TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 9, 13 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977).
8. The exception is Louisiana, where a child may be statutorily disinherited because of the
child's conduct towards the deceased parent, See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1621 (West 1987).
9. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2 cmt. (1969) (amended 1993).
10. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 115 & n.122 (1989) (discussing intestacy as a default

rule).
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country includes the right not to have a will, and (2) an intestacy statute
that does not conform to the wishes of an intestate decedent creates a
trap for those who are not aware of the statute's provisions."
Default rules, however, may also promote goals other than to
effectuate what the individual would have intended. They may have more
communitarian goals, including the promotion of social well-being. 2
For example, states have a widely recognized interest in effectuating an
orderly, accurate, and efficient transfer of property at death. 3 The

authors of a study on intestacy statutes list four other community goals
that intestacy statutes could implement: "(1) to protect the financially
dependent family; (2) to avoid complicating property titles and excessive
subdivision of property; (3) to promote and encourage the nuclear family;
and (4) to encourage the accumulation of property by individuals."' 4
An intestacy statute implementing community goals rather than an
individual's goals would not be unique among default rules. 5 In most
cases, an individual's goals for devolution of property will coincide with
community interests. Inheritance by the nuclear family reinforces family
ties and ensures that the decedent's property will go to those with whom
he or she has established the closest emotional ties and financial
interdependencies. 6 This distribution benefits those who have likely
contributed the most toward the decedent's accumulation of property and
protects the decedent's family. Because the decedent typically has strong
emotional ties to the nuclear family, he or she will be encouraged to
accumulate property to provide for them. Inheritance by the decedent's
nuclear family also makes for an orderly and efficient probate process
because the beneficiaries should be easily identifiable. Thus, rules of

11. See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About PropertyDistributionatDeath and
Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 323-24.

12. See id. at 324.
13. In equal protection litigation, the Supreme Court described this state interest as substantial.
See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268-71 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977).

14. Fellows et al., supra note 11, at 324 (footnotes omitted); see also Cristy G. Lomenzo,
Note, A Goal-Based Approach to Drafting Intestacy Provisionsfor Heirs Other than Surviving

Spouses, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 941,947 (1995) (setting out goals of intestacy legislation and concluding
that protecting the financially dependent family "best serves society's interests").
15. For example, an important commentary has argued that a default rule may appropriately

be set at what the parties would not themselves have chosen in order to effectuate an important
social interest. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 91. These authors would impose what they
call a penalty default, where appropriate, in order to encourage parties to reveal information to each

other. See id.
16. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Introductionto DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY, supra
note 7, at 5.
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inheritance have been called a genetic code of a society 7 in that "[t]hey
guarantee that the next generation will, more or less, have the same
structure as the one that preceded it.... Rules favoring wives and
children reinforce the nuclear family. Any radical change in the rules...
18
will radically change the society."'
Intestacy statutes also serve what has been labeled, in other contexts,
a channelling function: they sustain and promote certain social institutions that "serve desirable ends."' 9 For example, present inheritance law
favors marriage. Under all intestacy statutes, the surviving spouse takes
a share of the decedent spouse's estate, and in almost every noncommunity property state, the spouse has a statutory election of a fixed
share of a testate decedent's estate."0 Intestacy law also favors parenthood in that the issue of an intestate decedent take a share of the
21
estate.

B.

Parenthood

Family law classifies parenthood into categories that include

biological parenthood, legal parenthood, and social (or psychological)
parenthood, that is, the person from whom a child receives care,
nurturing, and guidance. 2 A biological parent is the genetic parent,

often called the natural parent, who establishes the child's genealogical
17. See Friedman, supra note 7, at 14.
18. Id.
19. Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 495,
498 (1992). This Author uses the channelling function construct to apply to inheritance law. See also
Judith T. Younger, Light Thoughts and Night Thoughts on the American Family,76 MINN. L. REV.
891, 899 (1992) (discussing the teaching function of law).
20. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-70 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.202 (Michie 1996); CAL.
PROB. CODE § 100 (West 1991); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 889 (West Supp. 1997); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 123.250 (Michie 1993).
21. Under the UPC, however, an intestate's issue do not inherit if the other parent survives and
neither parent has issue bom of another relationship. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(l)(i), 8
U.L.A. 98 (Supp. 1996). Except in Louisiana, descendants have no statutory protection against a
testate estate unless they come within the state's pretermitted heir statute. See Lawrence H. Averill,
Jr. & Ellen B. Brantley, A Comparison ofArkansas's CurrentLaw ConcerningSuccession, Wills,
and OtherDonative Transferswith Article II of the 1990 Uniform ProbateCode, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 631, 689 (1995). A pretermitted heir is a testator's child (in some states, also a child's
issue) who is not named or provided for in the testator's will. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1187
(6th ed. 1990). Some states' statutes limit protection to those bom after the testator executed the will.
See Averill & Brantley, supra, at 690. A pretermitted heir usually takes an intestate share of the
estate. See id. The purpose of the statutes is to prevent the decedent from unintentionally
disinheriting issue. See id. at 689-90.
22. See Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV.
269, 284-85 & n.52 (1991).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss4/3

6

Shapo: Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of Reproducti
1997]

INHERITANCE CONSEQUENCES OFREPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES

1097

ties. Until modem IVF techniques, the biological mother had always been
the gestational mother and traditionally had been presumed the legal
parent at the child's birth.' The law, however, has determined legal
fatherhood in different ways. For a child born of a married woman,
fatherhood is determined by marital status, that is, a man's marriage to
the child's mother.' If a married woman bore a child out of the
marriage, the common law of England presumed that the child was
legitimate and that her husband, although not the biological father, was
the child's legal father. The husband could rebut this presumption only
if he were "out of the kingdom" for more than nine months prior to the
birth.' Although this presumption arose in a time when nonmarital
children were severely disadvantaged legally and socially, it still exists
but is now rebuttable in nearly every state by parties other than the
presumed father.26 Evidence to rebut the presumption now includes
medical evidence that the husband is sterile or impotent or a blood test
evidencing that the child could not be his." The modem version of the
presumption would allow a presumed father (or his wife) to rebut his
paternity of a child conceived by AID,2" although a number of courts
have held that they will not overcome the presumption "if a finding of
nonpatemity would be contrary to the child's best interests." 29
Paternity of a child bome by an unmarried woman has been
determined by different rules under which biological parenthood of the
father, once established, may be considered more important. The
biological father of a child born to an unmarried woman owes a duty of
suppore but does not have full parental rights over the nonmarital
child.3 For example, he may not be granted custody or visitation. In
addition, he may also not be able to prevent an adoption of the child to
which the mother has consented unless he has played a role in rearing
the child. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that an unwed
biological father has no due process right to a hearing before his child is

23. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAw 884 (3d ed. 1990).

24. See id.
25. LESLIE J. HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 1077 (1996).

26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Andres A. v. Judith N., 591 N.Y.S.2d 946, 948 (Fam.Ct. 1992).
29. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 25, at 1078.
30. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 245 (3d
ed. 1995).
31. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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adopted unless he has established a relationship with the child or with the

family unit of mother and child and has demonstrated commitment to the
relationship.32 If, however, a biological father has demonstrated that

commitment, his rights to his children may not be terminated without his
consent or a determination of unfitness.33

Against this background, the use of gamete donors and surrogates
has required rethinking of what it is that makes a person a mother or a

father. That reconsideration has previously taken place in the context of
a long process of legal development that has assimilated both adopted
children and nonmarital children into family and inheritance law.

Adoption provides a means of achieving legal parenthood by statesupervised contract. Adoption laws, however, have evolved by

a "patchwork of legislation,"34 placing children within the adopting
family and aligning state domestic relations codes and inheritance laws.

Current adoption laws in almost every state, however, place a child into
the adopting family for all purposes and replace the child's birth parents
with the adopting parents for all purposes, including inheritance.35 These

statutes further a policy of integrating adopted children into their
adopting families.36

The law regarding inheritance by nonmarital children has also
changed significantly from the traditional common law. Under the
common law regime, the nonmarital child was considered the child of no
one and did not inherit from or through the mother or father.37 In this
country, most states held that the nonmarital child was an intestate heir

32. See Lehr,463 U.S. at 261-62.
33. See Caban, 441 U.S. at 391-94; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,248.49 (1978); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652-58 (1972). However, the biological father of a nonmarital child, whose
mother is married to another man, has no due process right to establish paternity and visitation, even
if he had established a relationship with the child. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 12130 (1989). The children in Caban,Quilloin, and Stanley were born to women who were not married
at the time.
34. Walter Wadlington, Artificial Insemination: The Dangersofa PoorlyKept Secret, 64 Nw.
U. L. REV. 777, 801 (1970).
35. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6451 (West Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210,
§ 7 (West 1987); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117 (McKinney 1988). But see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
214(C) (West Supp. 1997) (allowing an adopted child to retain inheritance rights from his or her
biological parents).
36. See Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What
and Why (The Impact of Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and Equitable Adoptions on Intestate
Succession and Class Gifts), 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 717 (1984). But see infra text accompanying
notes 189-203.
37. See JESSE DUEmINER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 106 (5th
ed. 1995).
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of the mother, but not of the father, unless the parents married and the
father acknowledged paternity. However, in the late 1970s the Supreme
Court, in Trimble v. Gordon,38 declared an Illinois statute of this type
unconstitutional as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Under
Trimble, a state may not completely disinherit a nonmarital child;
however, it may limit the means by which a child can prove paternity
because of the greater difficulty of proving paternity than maternity and
the important state interest in orderly transmission of estates.39 In Lalli
v. Lalli,4 the Court upheld a New York statute which provided that if
a child's biological parents had not married, a child could establish
paternity for inheritance purposes only by a filiation order entered during
the father's lifetime. State laws now differ as to the type of proof
required in order for a child to inherit from the father. Many states
permit a child to inherit if the man's paternity was established during his
lifetime by judicial decree4' or by his written acknowledgment of the
child as his.42 Some states permit the child to prove paternity after the
father's death,43 even if it entails exhuming his body for DNA testing."
Modem family law has been described as tending "toward
minimizing the differences in the treatment of nonmarital and marital
'
The Uniform Parentage Act ("UPA"), 4" for example,
children."45
determines legal parentage by a parent-child relationship rather than by
a child's legitimacy or illegitimacy. The UPA rebuttably presumes that
a man is the natural father of a child if he married or attempted to marry
the mother, receives the child into his home and holds the child out as
his, or files a written acknowledgment of paternity with an appropriate
governmental agency.47 The UPA presumes that the woman who gave

38. 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977).
39. See id. at 769-76.

40. 439 U.S. 259, 266-76 (1978).
41. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6453(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
512/2 (West Supp. 1997); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a)(2)(A) (MeKinney Supp.

1997).
42. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 45a-438(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1997); MICH.COMP.

LAWS ANN. § 700.11 l(4)(a) (West Supp. 1996). Many states permit proof of paternity by the alleged
father openly holding the child out as his own. See. e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6453(b)(2) (West Supp.
1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 6(a)(4) (%Vest 1987); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
§ 4-1.2(a)(2)(C) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
43. See, e.g., CONN.GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-438(b)(2)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 1997).
44. See Alexander v. Alexander, 537 N.E.2d 1310 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1988).
45. MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 30, at 300.
46. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1987).

47. See id. § 4(a)(I)-(5), 9B U.L.A. 298-99.
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birth to the child is the mother.48
49
Identifying a child's legal parents at the child's birth is crucial;
yet, the law regarding children born of reproductive technologies has
failed to do so. The designation of a legal parent "establishes fundamental emotional, social, legal and economic ties between parent and
child.""0 Parenthood has important financial consequences. Legal parents
owe a duty of support,5 ' and their parental status may assure that their
child receives insurance, social security, and health benefits. They make
important decisions such as those relating to health care. Legal parents
also have custodial and visitation rights over the child. 2
Most importantly for these purposes, legal parentage establishes
inheritance rights. 3 That relationship determines the beneficiaries of
intestate estates, of family allowance statutes, and of class gifts in private
donative instruments. It also identifies who may claim as a pretermitted
heir to a testate estate. In Professor Carl Schneider's terms, inheritance
law may perform a channelling function by the way it treats inheritance
within families created by noncoital means.54 Although the influence of
inheritance law on primary behavior is limited, and it cannot be used
punitively against the children created by reproductive practices not
favored by the community,5 inheritance law can exert important
marginal incentives when it recognizes those parent-child relationships
that best serve society's ends. Inheritance law can play a protective
function56 by imposing financial responsibility on the estates of those
who are involved in conceiving a child by noncoital means. Although

48. See id. § 3, 9B U.L.A. 297-98.
49. See George J. Annas, Redefining Parenthoodand ProtectingEmbryos: Why We Need New
Laws, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1984, at 50, 50; Jeffrey A. Pamness, DesignatingMale Parents
at Birth, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 573, 574 (1993) (discussing the importance of identifying male
parentage early in the child's life).
50. Pamess, supra note 49, at 574 (quoting U.S. COMM'N ON INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT,
SUPPORTING OUR CHILDREN: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 120 (1992)).
51. See MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 30, at 245.

52. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthoodas an Exclusive Status: The Need for
LegalAlternatives When the Premiseof the NuclearFamily Has Failed,70 VA. L. REV. 879, 884-85

(1984).
53. See Christine A. Djalleta, Comment, A Ti'nkle in a Decedent's Eye: ProposedAmendments to the Uniform Probate Code in Light ofNew Reproductive Technology, 67 TEMPLE L. REV.
335, 344 (1994).

54. See Schneider, supra note 19, at 517 n.60.
55. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769-70 (1977).
56. This phrase is again from Professor Schneider. See Schneider, supranote 19, at 497. The
protective function is one of the functions of family law, to protect from harms caused by others,
such as "economic wrongs and psychological injuries." Id.
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reproductive technologies have complicated inheritance laws, relatively
little attention has been paid to this subject when compared to the many
analyses of their complications to family law, especially with regard to
determining parenthood."
C. The TraditionalFamily and Reproductive Technologies
Reproductive technologies can be viewed as either encouraging
traditional families or as undermining them. In our society, the traditional
family is one in which parental roles are filled by two people-a man
and a woman married to each other who raise their biological (or
adopted) children. Because legal parenthood has always been an
exclusive status," under traditional law a child cannot have more than
one parent of each sex at one time, although she can have fewer than two
parents. Thus, when a child is adopted, the adoption extinguishes the
biological parents' legal ties to the child, and the adopting parents
become the child's legal parents. 9
Although reproductive technologies have increased the opportunity
of infertile married couples to conceive a child who is biologically
related to at least one of them, enabling them to raise the child within
their "traditional family," they also offer choices that make creating a
nontraditional family a more desirable option than ever before. For
example, an unmarried woman can use AI or IVF to conceive a child
without a sexual partner. Thus, reproductive technologies have also been
viewed as a threat to the traditional family.
The traditional family, however, may no longer represent the major
pattern of child rearing in this country. Child rearing is now being
accomplished in a number of ways that are considered nontraditional.
Divorce has produced increasing numbers of remarried people living in
reformulated, or blended families including stepparents and stepchildren.6" Divorce has also increased the number of single-parent fami-

57. But see Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the NontraditionalFamily, 1996
UTAH L. REv. 93; Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on Postmortem
Conception, ParentalResponsibility, and Inheritance,33 HOUs. L, REv. 967 (1996). While these
articles represent a growing analysis of the complications raised by reproductive technologies in the
context of inheritance law, they were published too late for this Author to completely integrate into
the analysis made by this Article.

58. See generally Bartlett, supra note 52.
59. If a child is adopted by a stepparent, however, the natural parent (spouse ofthe stepparent)
remains the child's other parent.
60. See BUREAU OF THE CENSuS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. P23-180, MARRIAGE,
DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE INTHE 1990's, at 9, 10 tbl.L (1992).
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lies.6 ' With more social acceptance of unmarried people living together
in sexual unions, there have been significant increases in the numbers of
families with heterosexual domestic partners raising their own children
or the children of one of them, of homosexual partners raising children
of one of them, and of single women raising children not born of marriage. 2 Some of these family situations involve complex combinations
of biological, legal, and social parents.
Indeed, reproductive technologies now make it possible that a baby
may have up to five people who could be designated as a parent at birth:
two genetic parents, a gestational parent, and one or two people not
biologically related to the resulting child who have orchestrated the
others' contributions, intending to raise the child.63 Because reproductive
technologies have accelerated the splintering of the aspects of parenthood, they have generated difficult issues in determining legal parenthood and especially strong disagreements over whom should be a child's
legal parents. For example, some authors have identified another category
of parents of children born with reproductive technologies: the preconception intended parents.'
The typical response to issues raised by reproductive technologies
has been to call for new legislation to determine parentage. 6 In 1968,
only four states had enacted AI legislation.' Now more than half the
states have AI statutes.6 7 An increasing number of states are enacting
surrogacy legislation, and a few have enacted legislation that applies to
IVF.63 Much of this legislation, however, leaves open many gaps.
Without specific legislation, the child's status in a number of situations
will be determined under common law presumptions of paternity and
maternity, under statutes determining inheritance by nonmarital children,
and under adoption statutes.

61.

See id. at 9,11 tbl.M.

62. See id. at 9, 12.
63. See Iwan Davies, Close Encounters in a Test Tube, 51 MEDICo-LEGAL J. 166 (1983).
64. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"?The Claims ofBiology as

theBasisforParentalRights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353,413-18 (1991). For a discussion of parenthood
by intent, see infra Part VII.

65. See Wadlington, supra note 34, at 800; Ellen Crabtree, Comment, ProtectingInheritance
Rights of ChildrenBorn Through In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Suggestions for a
Legislative Approach, 27 ST. LOUts U. L.J. 901, 906-10, 923-28 (1983).

66. See Crabtree, supra note 65, at 914. In 1964, Georgia became the first state to enact an
Al statute. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (1991); wadlington, supra note 34, at 793-94.
67. See Brashier, supra note 57, at 183 n.301.
68. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.13 (-West 1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 168-B (1994
& Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 14-18 (1991 & Supp. 1995).
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Three recent uniform acts are relevant to inheritance rights: the
UPC, the UPA, and the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act ("USCACA"). 9 Neither the UPC version adopted in
1969 nor the amended version of 1990 include specific provisions for
inheritance by children conceived by reproductive technologies. Section
2-109 of the 1969 UPC, still in effect in several states, determines the
meaning of "child." Subsection (1) of that section establishes a parentchild relationship for purposes of intestate succession between an adopted
parents and cuts off inheritance from the child's
child and adopting
"natural" parents.7 Subsection (2) applies to nonmarital children and
provides that the child is the child of the mother and father if the two are
married or if the child proves paternity by the required burden of
proof.7 In 1975, this section was amended to conform to the UPA72
and provide that a child is the child of its parents "regardless of the
marital status of its parents and the parent and child relationship may be
established under the [UPA]."'

This subsection includes an alternate

subsection two, retaining the original language for those states that had
not adopted the UPA.74
The 1990 UPC provisions for adopted and nonmarital children
appear in section 2-114. This section retains the former section 2-109(2)
and establishes that the legal relationship between parent and child
determines inheritance,' providing that "an individual is the child of his
[or her] natural parents, regardless of their marital status."76 The UPC
then refers to the UPA and to other applicable state law as the vehicles
for establishing the parent-child relationship. Section 2-114(b), once
fulfilled, establishes a parent-child relationship between an adopted child
and the adopting parents and severs the legal relationship with the natural

69. UNiF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, 9B U.L.A. 161 (Supp. 1995)
[hereinafter USCACA].
70. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109(1) (1969) (amended 1993).
71. See id. § 2-109(2).
72. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109(2)(i)-(ii), 8 U.LA. 67-68 (1983).
73. Id. § 2-109(2), 8 U.L.A. 66.
74. See id.
75. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a), 8 U.L.A. 107 (Supp. 1996).
76. Id.

77. See id. The comment to section 2-705 (class gifts) parenthetically defines natural parent
as a biological parent. See id. § 2-705 cat., 8 U.L.A. 181. Under the UPC, in order for an adopted
or nonmarital child to be included in a class gift in an instrument executed by a donor who is not
the natural or adopting parent, that child must have established a parent-child relationship with the
parent under section 2-114, and the parent must be the child's social parent, i.e., the child must have
lived as a minor as a regular member of the parent's household. See id. § 2-705(b)-(c), 8 U.L.A. 180.
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parents. 78 The latest comment to section 2-114 refers the reader to the
USCACA, discussed below, as a companion statute.79 However, that
statute is significantly different from the UPA.
Section 5 of the UPA,8 the only section in the UPA that applies
to children of reproductive technology, applies only to children born of
AL.8 The UPA was proposed for enactment by legislatures before the
first child conceived by IVF was born and does not refer to that more
advanced procreative technique. Even as to AID, as its commentary
makes clear, section 5 is limited in scope and was enacted as a stop-gap
measure.82 Section 5 treats a child conceived by insemination of a
married woman with sperm of a man other than her husband as the child
of the husband, not the sperm donor. The insemination must have been
performed under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the
written consent of the husband, signed by him and his wife.83
A third uniform act, the USCACA, adopted in 1988, determines
parentage under all types of reproductive technology, rather than just
AID. It has been adopted in two states.' The Prefatory Note to the
USCACA explains that the act "was designed primarily to effect the
security and well-being of those children born and living in our midst as
a result of assisted conception," 5 and to give those children "the same
rights in property and inheritance as though conceived by natural
means."86 Under section 10(b) of that legislation, the parent-child
relationship determines intestate succession, probate allowances and
exemptions, and the child's eligibility to take under a class gift
determined by relationship."
The USCACA includes two alternative provisions for surrogacy.

78. However, if a child's natural parent remarries and the parent's second spouse adopts the
child (a stepparent adoption), that adoption does not extinguish the child's relationship between the

natural parent whose new spouse has adopted the child, or the child's inheritance from or through
the other natural parent. See id. § 2-114(b), 8 U.L.A. 107.

79. See id. § 2-114 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 107-08.
80. The UPA was approved in 1973 at a time when state law treated legitimate and illegitimate
children differently, including their right to intestate succession. The UPA establishes a parent-child
relationship between a child and the natural or adoptive parents, regardless of the marital status of

the parents. See UNiF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2, 9B U.L.A. 296 (1987).
81. See id. § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301.
82. See id. § 5 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 302.
83. See id. § 5(b), 9B U.L.A. 301.
84. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to -07 (1991 & Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-156 to -165 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997).
85. USCACA, supra note 69, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 162.
86. Id., 9B U.L.A. 163.

87. See id. § 10(b), 9B U.L.A. 175.
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Under Alternative A, a surrogacy contract is enforceable if it is approved
by a court, subject to several requirements.88 If approved, the child's
parents are the commissioning couple and not the surrogate.8 9 Under
Alternative B, surrogacy contracts are unenforceable.9
Thus, of three uniform acts, the USCACA is the broadest in scope
and addresses the issue of inheritance; however, it has been adopted in
only two states. The other two uniform acts only minimally address the
issues raised by reproductive technologies, and the law in the states in
which issues have been raised is often unsatisfactory.
Many of the issues discussed in this Article also arise from coital
reproduction and adoption. Such issues include the strength of the
traditional presumptions of maternity and paternity; respect for the family
unit as manifested in the different legal treatment of married and
unmarried women and their children, and of fathers of children born to
either married or unmarried women; enforcement or lack of enforcement
of private agreements that determine parental responsibility; and whether
an adopted child should be told of her biological beginnings and allowed
to contact her biological parents. Reproductive technologies have added
even more complexity and disagreement to these already contentious
issues. If one of the possible parents dies at or soon after the child's birth
and before the parties or a court have determined the child's parenthood
and custody, the probate court may find itself in unchartered territory.
Occasionally law reviews can be relevant. A California trial judge,
in Jaycee B. v. Superior Court,91 assured the relevance of this Article
in the week that the Author had to return proofs. The judge concluded
that a man-who, with his wife, had contracted with a surrogate for the
gestation of a baby conceived through IVF from the union of a sperm
and an egg from two other persons-had no obligation to support that
child. The judge determined that neither spouse in the contracting couple
was the child's legal parent.92
This decision raised precisely the specter imaged in the conclusion
of this Article: the case of the judicially orphaned child deprived of
inheritance rights. This Article probes the legal problems inherent in a

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id. § 5 (Alternative A), 9B U.L.A. 167.
See id. § 8, 9B U.L.A. 172.
See Id. § 5 (Alternative B), 9B U.L.A. 174.
49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694 (Ct. App. 1996).
At the time this Article was published, Jaycee B. had been remanded and decided, but not

reported. For a discussion of that opinion, see Davan Maharaj, SurrogateRuling Leaves a Girl, 2.
Legally Parentless,L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 9, 1997, at Al; Judy Peres, Surrogacy CaseBreeds New Legal

Dilemma, Cm. TRIB., Sept. 11, 1997, at 1.
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situation in which a child might claim that four, or even five, persons
have parental responsibility for her, but in which the law may deny that
she is the natural object of devolution for any.
This Article also discusses the legal issues related to parenthood and
inheritance that arise with each type of reproductive technology. It then
analyzes three types of responses to the question of who should be the
child's parents and how these responses could apply to the child's
inheritance.
I.
A.

ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION

Technological and Legal Foundations

AI is technologically the simplest of the noncoital means of
reproduction, the least expensive, and the one that has been used for the
longest period of time, with the highest success rate of resulting
pregnancy.93 Yet, it presents a number of complicated legal issues. For
example, there is controversy over the methods of selecting and screening
sperm donors, over whether unmarried women may be recipients of
sperm donations, and over whether children born of AID should receive
information about their biological father, and if so, information of what
kind.94 There is also some disagreement over who should be the legal
father of the child born of AID and how that person should be determined.95 Legislative and judicial responses to issues of fatherhood,
however, do not always clearly address the question of the child's
inheritance rights.
Of the noncoital reproduction techniques, Al is the most similar to
coital conception because it involves insertion of semen into the female
genital tract. 6 Thus, fertilization occurs in vivo, that is, in the woman's
body. If a married woman is artificially inseminated with her husband's
semen, the procedure is referred to as artificial insemination by husband

93. AID results in a 15 to 20% fecundity rate (conception rate per cycle within the last two
years of attempted pregnancy). See J.K. MASON, MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF REPRODUCrION AND

PARENTHOOD 190 (1990).
94. See SHERMAN ELIAS & GEORGE J. ANNAS, REPRODUCTIVE GENETICS & THE LAW 227

(1987).
95. See Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling the
Conundrum ofLegal Maternity, 80 IOwA L. REv. 265, 284-85 (1995).
96. See Monica Shah, Modern Reproductive Technologies: Legal Issues Concerning
Cryopreservationand Posthumous Conception, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 547, 549 (1996).
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("AI").' A child conceived through AIH presents no issues of
parenthood or inheritance because the child is biologically linked to both
the husband and the wife.98 When a woman is inseminated by sperm of
a man that is not her husband, for example, because the husband is
sterile or carries a genetic disease, or because she is unmarried, the

procedure is known as AMD"9 or heterologous artificial insemination.
This method of conception has grown substantially. Recent estimates

indicate that 75,000 women a year are artificially inseminated with donor
sperm,00 and that in the United States approximately 500,000
children
01
have been born from AI, most of them from donor sperm. 1
A child conceived by AID has a known biological mother and a
biological father whose identity is usually unknown since the semen is
purchased from a sperm bank. If the inseminated woman is married,
the child is the biological child of the mother and a man that is not her
husband, although her husband usually intends to raise the child.
Similarly, a child conceived by AID of an unmarried woman will have
no known biological father if the provider of the sperm is anonymous.

Although many doctors and clinics will not artificially inseminate an
unmarried woman, 103 a woman can self-inseminate by recruiting her

own sperm donor.

4

It is in this situation that the child's biological

father is a known person who may wish to become involved in the

97. See id.
98. See People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 498 n.2 (Cal. 1968) (in bank).
99. See Shah, supra note 96, at 549. As many people have pointed out, "donor" is an
inaccurate term because sperm providers are usually paid. See, e.g., Kathryn Venturatos Lorio,
Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territoryfor Legisldion, 44 LA. L. REV. 1641, 1651
(1984).
100. See Timothy Egan, Washington AIDS CaseHighlightsa Rare Cause, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,
1996, at A10.
101. See ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFUCTNG RIGHTS 86 (1995).
102. See id. at 86, 93-94.
103. See id. at 106; Barbara Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial
Insemination: A Callfor an Expanded Definition ofFamily, 4 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 3 (1981);
Patricia A. Kern & Kathleen M. Ridolfi, Note, The Fourteenth Amendment's Protection of a
Woman's Right to Be a Single ParentThrough Artificial Insemination by Donor, 7 WOMEN'S RTS.
L. REP. 251,253 n.8, 254 (1982). If AID facilities are involved with the state such that their refusal
to offer services is state action, Kern and Ridolfi argue that the facilities violate unmarried women's
Fourteenth Amendment right to procreate. See id. at 258; see also Kritchevsky, supra, at 5-6, 26-40
(discussing an unmarried woman's right to AI).
104. See Kritchevsky, supra note 103, at 4. Some unmarried women prefer to select a man
based on particular genetic attributes.
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child's life and assert his paternity, sometimes against the wishes of the
child's mother.'0 5
Many of the early cases involving a child born of AID arose as part
of divorce actions between the artificially inseminated mother and her
husband: the husband attempted to avoid support obligations on the
ground that the child was illegitimate. Most courts held that the wife's
participation in AID was adulterous, and, as a result, the AID child was
illegitimate. 6 By the late 1960s, however, courts were beginning to
hold that husbands who had consented to their wives' AI could not avoid
child support obligations on grounds of the child's illegitimacy. Without
any statutory authority governing AID, the courts relied on theories of
implied contract of support'07 and equitable estoppel,' both based on
the husband's consent. Some courts rationalized their decisions on the
grounds that a child should have a father as well as a mother, and that
a husband's consent to fatherhood brings with it responsibilities to that
child. 1 9
Because these issues were litigated within divorce proceedings, the
courts decided only the issue of the husband's duty of support, and most
courts did not determine that the child was legitimate,"0 an issue on
which an affirmative decision would have established the child as the
father's heir."' In Gursky v. Gursky, for example, the husband argued
that the AID child was illegitimate. The court agreed because no statute
legitimated the child, but held that because the husband had consented
to the AID, he had impliedly contracted to furnish child support."' The
court also applied equitable estoppel because in having the child, the wife

105. See C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821 (NJ. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977).
106. See, e.g., Doornbos v. Doombos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Ill. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 1954), appeal
dismissed on proceduralgrounds, 139 N.E.2d 844 (111.App. Ct. 1956); Orford v. Orford [1921]
D.L.R. 251, 255-58; see also Brent J. Jensen, Comment, ArtificialInsemination and the Law, 1982
BYU L. REV. 935, 959-66 (discussing how participation in AID can be adultery under common law
or canon law). But see George P. Smith II, Through a Test Tube Darkly: ArtificialInsemination and
the Law, 67 MICH. L. REv. 127, 134-39 (1968) (concluding, after review of these cases and others,

that "[i]t is anomalous for a court to consider Al within the existing common-law framework of
adultery and illegitimacy").
107. See Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
108. See People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 499 (Cal. 1968) (in bank); Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d
at 412.
109. See Sorensen, 437 P.2d at 499; K.S. v. G.S., 440 A.2d 64, 68 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1981).
110. See K.B. v. N.B., 811 S.W.2d 634, 637 n.6 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
111. Unless mandated by the decree, a parent's child support obligation in a divorce decree does
not survive the parent's death. See KRAUSE, supra note 23, at 1072.
112. See Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
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relied on her husband's consent to be the primary source of the child's
support."' In People v. Sorensen, the court also found no authority to
legitimate the child, saying that the issue was for the legislature."
However, the court labeled the father as a "lawful father" for purposes
of support." 5
By contrast, in In re Adoption of Anonymous," 6 another New York
court held that "a child born of consensual AID during a valid marriage
is a legitimate child entitled to the rights and privileges of a naturally
conceived child of the same marriage."'1 7 In that case, the wife's first
husband had consented to her insemination and supported the child after
the couple divorced. He later refused to consent to the child's adoption
by the mother's second husband. The second husband argued that the
first husband's consent was not required because the first husband was
not the child's father. Rejecting this argument, the court required the first
husband's consent, relying on the strong public policy favoring
legitimacy."8 That policy also controlled a decision that an AID child
born to a married couple before enactment of the New York statute was
the father's legitimate issue for purposes of a class gift." 9 The parents
had not executed a written consent to the insemination as required by the
statute in force at the time of distribution. 2 '
B.

Artificial Insemination by DonorLegislation

A majority of states now have legislation that applies to AID,
several of which have enacted section 5 of the UPA.'2 Most, but not
all, of the other states have enacted legislation based on the UPA pattern.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Seeid. at412.
See Sorensen, 437 P.2d at 501.
Id. at 498.
345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973).
Id. at 435-36.

118. See id. at 435.
119. See Estate of Gordon, 501 N.Y.S.2d 969, 970-71 (Sur.Ct. 1986).
120. See id. at 970.
121. See Alexander Morgan Capron, AlternativeBirth Technologies: Legal Challenges,20 U.C.
DAviS L. REv. 679, 693 (1987).
122. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 801-818 (1993 & Supp.
1994); 750 ILL. COMw. STAT. ANN. 40/3 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1110 to -1129 (1993
& Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.51-.74 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-6-106 (1995); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 126.061 (Michie 1993); OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3111.37 (Anderson 1996); WYO.STAT. ANN. § 14-2-103 (Michie 1996).
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Two states have adopted the USCACA.Iu

Under section 5 of the UPA, if a married woman is inseminated by
AID "under the supervision of a licensed physician," the husband "is
treated in law as if he were the natural father of an [AID-conceived]

child," 24 and the man who donates semen to a physician for use by a
married woman "is treated in law as if he were not the natural father.""Is The statute does not distinguish between anonymous donors
and known donors, nor does it consider whether the parties have agreed

otherwise regarding paternity. To support a designation as the natural
father, the UPA requires the husband's written consent, signed by both
spouses, certified by the physician, and filed with the State Department

of Health.'26 The latter condition does not affect the father-child
relationship.'27 However, if all of the other conditions are not satisfied,

the child has no legal father under the statute, and a court presumably
would apply the common law to determine paternity.'28
Unlike the UPA, the USCACA applies to both married and
unmarried women. If the woman is married, section 3 of the USCACA

applies a rebuttable presumption that, except in a surrogacy situation, the
husband of a woman who bears a child conceived through assisted
conception is the father of the child. 9 Unlike section 5 of the UPA,

the USCACA does not require written consent.

31 The

husband may

123. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to -07 (1991 & Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-156 to -165 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997).
124. UNtr. PARENTAGE Acr § 5(a), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987).
125. Id. § 5(b).
126. See id. § 5(a).
127. See id.
128. When a husband and wife comply with an AID statute, the legislation, in effect, supplies
its own presumption of legitimacy. In the case of State ex rel. H.v. P., 457 N.Y.S.2d 488 (App. Div.
1982), the husband petitioned for custody and visitation of a child whom he claimed was conceived
by AID and whom his wife claimed was a nonnarital child conceived coitally. The wife had
participated in an AID program for several months with her husband's written consent, and the child
was born sometime after she discontinued the program. The husband was named on the child's birth
certificate, he had supported the child, and he had treated the child as his own. The wife alleged that
the husband had no right to custody or visitation and sought to have him ordered to take a blood
test. The court refused to order the blood test because of its potential to illegitimize the child, while
still not settling the issue of paternity. See id. at 490. This result, the court said, would offend the
strong policy behind the presumption of legitimacy. See Id. The husband's sterility would not rebut
the presumption because the court treated the situation as one that complied with the New York AID
statute which legitimized the child. See id. at 491. In addition, the court estopped the wife from
disputing the husband's paternity because she had held him out as the child's father and had
encouraged the development of their parent-child relationship. See id. at 493.
129. See USCACA, supra note 69, § 3, 9B U.L.A. 165.
130. See id.
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rebut the presumption by personally bringing an action within two years
of learning of the child's birth to determine whether he consented.'
Thus, if the husband dies within that two-year period without bringing
an action to determine whether he consented, he is the presumed to be
the father, and the child would inherit from his estate.
If, however, the husband proves that he did not consent, or if the
recipient is unmarried, the child has no legal father. This is because
section 4(a) of the USCACA provides that "[a] donor is not a parent of
a child conceived through assisted conception."'1 2 The statute "opts for
the broader protection of donors"'3 in order to provide certainty to the
donor that he will not bear the legal responsibility to support the child,
and that the child will not inherit from the donor's estate. 34 The statute
does not address whether it overrides a private agreement between sperm
donor and recipient that the donor will play a parental role toward the
child, although the Prefatory Note provides that a sperm donor is not the
child's parent "unless there has been some agreement beforehand."'3 5
In addition, the statute does not ensure anonymity of the donor. The
statute does provide, however, that under certain circumstances the child
will have access to the financial resources of only one parent.
The purpose of these statutes is to shield the sperm donors from the
legal consequences of fatherhood, that is, to ensure that the biological
father is not the legal father of the child conceived by AID and has no
duties toward that child.'36 By doing so, the statutes prevent
disincentives to donating sperm. The statutes also ensure that the husband
of the inseminated woman is protected from unwanted paternity., 7
These statutes may be interpreted as imposing a modem version of the
presumption of legitimacy, one which a husband who has consented to
his wife's insemination cannot rebut. One may also interpret the statutes
as determining a child's paternity by effectuating private agreements and
by permitting a biological father to do what a parent cannot otherwise
do: unilaterally relinquish parental rights, including the obligation to
support a genetic child."3 The AID statutes have been criticized for

131. See id.
132. Id. § 4(a), 9B U.L.A. 166.
133. Id. § 4 cmt.
134. See id.
135. Id. Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 163.
136. See Capron, supra note 121, at 693.
137. See 1d.
138. In Estes v. Albers, 504 N.W.2d 607 (S.D. 1993), the father ofa nonmarital child who was
conceived coitally unsuccessfully claimed that he was not liable for child support because he acted,
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these results by potentially valuing these private arrangements over the
best interests of the child'39 and ignoring "the relevance of legitimacy,
lineage, and individual identity tied up in kinship."'40
Very few states' inheritance statutes provide specifically for
inheritance by children born of AID. In those statutes that do, legitimization of the child occurs only if the mother's husband has consented to the
AID. 141

C. Artificial Insemination by Donor Litigation
Two sets of issues have been litigated concerning AID-conceived
children: first, litigation involving children born to married women whose
husbands did not comply with statutory requirements and dispute their
paternity and second, litigation involving an unmarried recipient whose
known sperm donor or lesbian partner wishes to obtain parental rights.
Decisions in these cases have important implications for inheritance.
1. Married Women and Artificial Insemination by Donor
These cases involve divorce litigation in which the husband denies
paternity and liability for child support for a child born of AID to his
wife. Since the husband had not consented in writing to his wife's
insemination, the AID did not comply with the state's AID statute, and,
thus, the husband should have no parental rights to the child, nor should
he owe child support. Although the courts have strictly interpreted the
statutory requirement of written consent, most courts have held that the

in effect, as an anonymous sperm donor. See id, at 609. The defendant had fathered the child at the
woman's request, and they had agreed that he would not be financially responsible for the child. The
court held that an agreement must be secured by adequate support and receive court approval. See
id.; see also Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth ex reL. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 213

(Ky. 1986) (holding that private contracts regarding custody are voidable); Walter Wadlington,Arliflcial Conception: The Challengefor Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465, 494 (1983) (discussing the
right of the mother and the donor to negotiate private agreements to release the donor from parental
responsibilities). Of course, if a woman does not reveal who fathered her child by coitus, the child,
in effect, has no legal father and no paternal support.
139. See ELIAS & ANNAS, supra note 94, at 227.

140. Id.
141. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-209(c) (Michie 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-774
(West 1993); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRusTs § 1-206(b) (1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 700.111(2) (West 1995 & Supp. 1996).
The Arkansas inheritance statute presumes that the husband consented unless he rebuts the
presumption by clear and convincing evidence. The Arkansas family code, however, requires that

the husband consent in writing in order to legitimate the AID child. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-10-201(a) (Michie 1993).
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statutes are not the exclusive means of determining paternity. If a
husband has not consented in writing, and the AID statute does not
apply, courts place the couples in the same position they would have
been had there been no statute. Although the husband could rebut the
presumption of legitimacy on the ground of his sterility, courts order
child support if the husband orally consents to the insemination and estop
the husband from denying his obligation. These cases, however, establish
only that the husband is liable for support.
For example, in R.S. v. R.S., n2 the husband had given oral consent
to the physician. The applicable Kansas statute provided that a child born
of AI would be considered "at law in all respects the same as a naturally
conceived child of the husband and wife,"'43 if the husband and wife
had consented in writing.'" The court held that because of the
husband's oral consent he was "estopped to deny that he is the father of
the child,"
and had "impliedly agreed to support the child and act as its
145
father."'
In Anonymous v. Anonymous,'" the court also required strict
compliance with the AID statute. It concluded that a child born of AID,
but without the required written consent, did not come within the New
York statute which provides that a child born to a married woman by AI
"shall be deemed the legitimate, natural child of the husband and his wife
for all purposes.', 147 Although the court could not find the child
legitimate, and the wife could not establish the elements of estoppel, the
court held that the husband was bound by a written agreement to support
the child-which the court would enforce because of the strong public
policy of ensuring support for children.
By comparison, without deciding the question of the statute's
149
exclusivity, the Illinois Supreme Court, in In re Marriage of Adams,
noted that the Illinois statutory requirement of written consent is a
mandatory one. The Illinois statute is patterned after section 5 of the

142.

670 P.2d 923 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983).

143.
144.
145.
146.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-129 (1995).
See id. § 23-130.
R.S., 670 P.2d at 928.
1991 WL 57753 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1991).

147. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73(1) (McKinney 1988).

148. See Anonymous, 1991 WL 57753, at *16-17.
149. 551 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Ill. 1990); see also In re Marriage of Witbeck-Wildhagen, 667
N.E.2d 122, 125 (Il1.App. Ct. 1996) (holding that the husband was not the legal father of an AID-

conceived child and not liable for child support, where the wife underwent AID without his
knowledge and consent and filed for divorce before the child was born).
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UPA 5 ° In Adams, the couple had not consented in writing, but the
Illinois court held that Florida law applied because the child was
conceived and born in Florida. The only connection to Illinois was that
the couple litigated the divorce in Illinois.' Under the Florida statute,
a child born to a married woman is "irrebuttably presumed to be the
child" of both parents if they "consented in writing."'52 The court
opined that the Florida statute, unlike the Illinois statute, might not be the
exclusive means of determining legitimacy. Lacking her husband's
written consent, the wife lost the advantage of the irrebuttable presumption.'53 The court provided, however, that she could still establish the
child's legitimacy outside of the statute or, at least, the husband's support
obligation,'54 since the husband had been involved in the decision to
use AID, had been supportive of his wife during her pregnancy, and was
designated as the child's father on the birth certificate. 5
Another legal shading appears in a Texas decision that a divorcing
husband not only owed child support but had a parent-child relationship
with a child conceived by AID because he had ratified that relationship.'56 The husband knew about and participated in the Al process,
acknowledged the child, and held him out as his own child from the time
of birth until the divorce. Under these circumstances, the court held that
he was the child's legal father even without complying with the AID
statute. The court's ratification theory was determined, in large part, by
the husband's conduct towards the child.'57
There is no litigation concerning an AID child's inheritance rights
from the mother's deceased husband. If the state has an AID statute, and
that statute has been complied with, the child should inherit from the
husband as the husband's legal issue. If the state has no statute, or if the
couple has not complied with the statute, the inheritance situation is
uncertain. The courts, in applying estoppel and implied contract theories,
have held only that the husband must pay child support, not that the
child is legitimate.'58 Thus, the child most likely could not inherit from

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See 750 ILL. CowP. STAT. ANN. 40/3 (West 1993).
See Adams, 551 N.E.2d at 639.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (west Supp. 1997).
See Adams, 551 N.E.2d at 638.
See id.
See id.
at 636.
See K.B. v. N.B., 811 S.V.2d 634, 638-39 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
Seek!.

158. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11. But see Brashier, supra note 57, at 186
("Under the reasoning of such opinions, it seems clear that the child would also qualify as an
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the mother's husband. In K.B. v. N.B.,5 9 the court held that the child
established a parent-child relationship with the mother's husband, despite
the couple's failure to comply with the AID statute's requirement of
written consent. 6 In that case, however, the father had been a social
parent to the child. 6 ' Yet, even under this decision, the child would not
have inherited from the husband if he had died soon after the child's
birth. Only the language in In re Baby Doe62 may support the child's
inheritance rights if the father had died before becoming a social parent.
There, the court said that the husband, who had orally consented to his
wife's AID "with the understanding that the child [would] be treated as
their own," was the "legal 63father" of the child with "all the legal
responsibilities of paternity."'
Without an AID statute, there is no law that terminates the sperm
donor's paternity."6 The resulting child is the nonmarital child of the
donor 6' unless the mother is married and the state's presumption of the
husband's paternity is not rebutted. A nonmarital child conceived by
coitus may inherit from a deceased biological father if the child proves
paternity (or establishes a parent-child relationship) under state law."6
Those inheritance statutes are not limited by their terms to children
conceived by coitus and could apply to an AID child if the child is
considered a nonmarital child. However, many statutes require either an
adjudication of paternity or some affirmative acts by the biological father
acknowledging his paternity. 67 If the sperm donor and the recipient had
privately agreed that the donor would not play a parental role, the
6
agreement would likely not be enforceable as to child support; 1
however, the agreement could determine inheritance from the father

heir....').
159. 811 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See id. at 637-39.
See id. at 639.
353 S.E.2d 877 (S.C. 1987).
Id. at 878.
See Welborn v. Doe, 394 S.E.2d 732 (Va. Ct. App. 1990). In Welborn, the court interpreted

the Virginia statute, which is specific as to inheritance, as establishing a presumption "that the

husband is the natural father for purposes of inheritance," but as not otherwise cutting off the rights
of a sperm donor or establishing a parent-child relationship with legal certainty. Id. at 733. The court
approved a married couple's adoption of the child born to the wife through AID. Although the
husband had complied with the statutory requirement of consent, the couple wanted to adopt the
child in order to completely cut off the sperm donor's paternity. See id. at 733-34.

165.
166.
167.
168.

See Wadlington, supra note 138, at 490-91.
See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
See Wadlington, supra note 138, at 494 & n.113.
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because the contract would acknowledge the donor's biological paternity.
Yet, the agreement would also demonstrate that the donor did not
publicly hold out the child as his own. If no party had litigated the
donor's paternity during the donor's life, however, in many states that
69
issue could not be litigated after the donor's death.
Realistically, it is unlikely that an AID child would be able to
inherit from a sperm donor since most sperm donors act anonymously.'70 The child's chances of identifying the donor and claiming an
interest in his estate are remote, unless the child has access to the
physician's or the sperm bank's records, or unless state laws are amended
to otherwise permit identification. It is also likely that not only has the
donor's identity remained a secret, but also that the child's conception by
AID was a secret. Therefore, the child's paternal inheritance may never
be questioned. Parents can easily conceal the circumstances of the child's
conception. The mother has gone through pregnancy and childbirth, the
child's birth certificate most likely names the husband as the father of the
child, and neither the child nor anyone else may have been told that the
woman's husband is not the child's genetic father.'' The issue of
inheritance from the sperm donor will arise only if the child knows that
he or she was conceived through AID, or the parents know of the
donor's death and no longer wish to keep secret the means of the child's
conception.
2. Artificial Insemination by Donor and Anonymity
The issue of anonymity within the AID context has recently come
into focus because secrecy in AID births has become increasingly
controversial, especially with respect to the anonymity of the donor.
Under current practice, sperm banks buy sperm from men, often medical
students, and agree to preserve the donor's anonymity.'72 Indeed, a
1983 presidential commission recommended that the donor's confidentiality be protected "to the greatest extent possible.""7 Similarly, several

169. See Hayes v. Smith, 480 A.2d 425, 431 (Conn. 1984); In re Estate of Kidd, 435 So. 2d
632, 635 (Miss. 1983); Mary Ellen C. v. Joseph William C., 435 N.Y.S.2d 738, 738 (App. Div.
1981).
170. See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 101, at 86, 93-94.
171.

See GILLIAN DOUGLAS, LAW, FERTILITY AND REPRODUCTION 132 (1991).

172. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL
CHOICES 248 (1988) [hereinafter INFERTILITY); George J. Annas, Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the

Best Interests of the Sperm Donor, 14 FAM. L.Q. 1, 6 (1980).
173. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS 70 (1983)
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states' statutes require that the recipient's and the husband's consent and

the physician's records be kept confidential. 74 Not all AID statutes
require that doctors or sperm banks keep medical information, and many

physicians performing insemination on their own do not keep adequate
medical records."

Yet, there is general agreement that the best inter-

ests of AID children require that the child learn at least nonidentifying
relevant medical information about its male genetic parent and its family

history, which may be needed for future diagnosis and treatment. 76

There is much less agreement, however, over whether AID children
should learn their biological father's identity for psychological and social

reasons in order to know their roots and place themselves within their
genetic families. The phrase "genealogical bewilderment," used to

describe adopted children's identity confusion resulting from not knowing
their genetic origins,'

of AID.'

is also used to describe possible consequences

Some studies indicate that genealogical confusion causes

psychological problems in adopted children.'79 As some commentators
have explained, "[o]ur sense of who we are is bound up with the story
we tell about ourselves."'8 0 If the biological parents are not known, it
"is like a novel with the first chapter missing."''

The legal controversy has its basis in the historic secrecy of
adoption law, effectuated through sealed record acts that require courts

(emphasis omitted).
174. Those states include Alabama, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See INFERTILrY,
supra note 172, at 249.
175. See LoIU B. ANDREWS, MEDICAL GENETICS: A LEGAL FRONTIER 171-72 (1987); Capron,
supra note 121, at 691; Kern & Ridolfi, supra note 103, at 253. Professor Wadlington has written
that the "lack of donor recordkeeping is perhaps unparalleled anywhere in medical practice,"
Wadlington, supra note 138, at 500, which "reflects a near obsession with confidentiality,
particularly with regard to donor identity," id. at 472. The American Fertility Society guidelines
recommend that confidential medical records be kept about all donors and made available on a
nonidentifying basis. See Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations
of the New Reproductive Technologies, 53 FERTILITY & STERILITY IS, 44S (Supp. 2 1990).
176. See ANDREWS, supra note 175, at 171-72; Capron, supra note 121, at 691; Ethics
Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 175, at 44S.
177. Elizabeth L. Gibson, Artificial Insemination by Donor: Information, Communication and
Regulation, 31 J. Fain. L. 1, 16 (1991).
178. See Lucinda Ann Smith, Note, ArtificialInsemination:DisclosureIssues, 11 COLUI. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 87, 90-91 (1979).
179. See Gibson, supra note 177, at 16-20 (discussing the findings of researchers of adoptees
and their psychological development).
180. JONATHAN GLOVER ET AL., ETHICS OF NEV REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: THE GLOVER
REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN COimiSsION 37 (1989).
181. Id.
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to seal birth and adoption records so that the child's biological parents
cannot be identified, unless for good cause. 2 One purpose of the
sealed record acts is to protect the privacy of the biological birth parents.
That protection is considered especially important if the child was a
nonmarital child. The sealed record acts also shield the adoptive parents
from intrusion by the biological parents or others and provide the child
with a fresh start within a new family unit--the adoptive home.
Recent criticism of secrecy in adoption law has led rather swiftly to
important changes in parental anonymity. Over the past few decades,
adoption policy has undergone a significant, if not seismic, change in
favor of disclosure. Adoptive parents are advised to tell their children
that they were adopted, and many adopted children have sought to learn
the identity of their genetic parents.'83 Although many states still do not
allow adopted persons of any age to access sealed adoption records
without good cause,' several recent statutes provide guidelines for
determining when sealed records may be opened.'85 Access is most
often granted for medical reasons. Nonmedical reasons for access, which
tend to be disfavored, include the following: the prevention of psychological harm which may result from being denied access to family information'86 or permission from the natural parents for the child to identify
them after the child has reached the age of twenty-one.'87 Beyond
opening sealed records, a new paradigm in adoption law is open
adoption, the antithesis of the traditional secret adoption. Open adoption
encompasses "a range of possibilities from open records and exchange
of identifying information to birth parents visiting the adoptive family
after the adoption, whether by agreement or court order."' 88
In states where adopted children still inherit from their natural
parents, some have claimed the need to identify their natural parents in
order to determine if they were heirs to their estates.'89 Only in one
case, however, did a court open sealed records to reveal the parents'
182. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-311 (1997); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/18 (West
1993).

183. See Pamela Smith, Regulating Confidentiality of SurrogacyRecords: Lessons from the
Adoption Experience, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 65, 67-68 (1992).
184. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-311; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/18.
185. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-14.5 (1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.16A (West 1996).
186. See GLOVER ET AL., supra note 180, at 37.

187. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9203 (West 1994).
188. Annette Ruth Appell, BlendingFamiliesThroughAdoption:Implicationsfor Collaborative
Adoption Law and Practice,75 B.U. L. REv. 997, 1002 (1995).

189. See Aimone v. Finley, 447 N.E.2d 868, 869 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983), appealdismissed, 465
U.S. 1095 (1984); In re Estate of Dodge, 413 N.W.2d 449, 454 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
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names. The court held that the child's statutory right of inheritance from
the biological parents would have otherwise been thwarted. 9 '
The similarities between AID and adoption have led to analogous
issues in AID literature: whether children should be told of the nature of
their conception, and whether those children who learn that they are AID
children should be able to learn the identity of their genetic father.
According to a recent article, a number of adult AID offspring are
intensively searching for their genetic fathers 19 and are speaking out
against the practice of keeping secret the means of their conception. 92
Some factors, however, may make identification of the sperm donor
less compelling than identification of the birth parents of an adopted
child. In AID, the child knows the identity of one biological parent, the
mother, who has participated in raising the child. 93 In adoption, the
birth parents of the adopted child may feel more need for contact with
the child than does a sperm donor because they have experienced the
birth and then the loss of their child. Conversely, the sperm donor most
likely does not know if a child was born from his sperm. 94 An adopted
child may feel rejected by his or her biological parents and may want to
establish contact with them in order to alleviate those feelings of
rejection. AID children, however, were not rejected by their biological
mothers and rearing fathers, if any. It is also much easier to keep AID
a secret than is adoption because the mother is actually pregnant and
gives birth to the child. Indeed, the mother may not tell her obstetrician
how the baby was conceived. 95 Other reasons that AID may be kept
secret are that the woman's husband may fear being stigmatized as
sterile, or the couple may wish secrecy for their child's sake so that he
or she does not feel like the product of a commercial and uninspired

190. See Spillman v. Parker, 332 So. 2d 573, 575-76 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
191.

The stories of a few AID children are told in Peggy Orenstein, Looking for a Donor to

Call Dad, N.Y. TffEs, June 18, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 28. One person born an AID child, now
49 years old, describes his search as "obsessive." Id.
192. See id.
193. See Smith, supra note 178, at 92; see also MASON, supra note 93, at 197 (discussing the
arguments in favor of disclosure in the context of AID).
194. See Smith, supra note 178, at 93.
195. See ANDREWS, supra note 175, at 168 (stating that the mother is "often expressly advised
by the infertility specialist not to tell the obstetrician that the child is a product of artificial
insemination"). The little empirical data available discloses that a large majority of AID parents do
not intend to tell their children about the circumstances of the children's conception. See Lori B.
Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 623, 638 n.54 (1991).
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contractual act performed by the biological father.'96 Some argue,
however, that children who are not told of the manner of their conception
are raised in a deception197 that is both morally indefensible and
difficult for the social parents to sustain. Further, the information may

come out inadvertently.
No statutes require that AID children receive information to identify
the sperm donor. In fact, the statutes are written to shield donors from
the consequences of fatherhood,' The donors may fear the risk that

the children may later seek them out, and, as a result, that they may
suffer uncertain legal consequences.' For those who favor giving the
child identifying information as well as medical information, one solution

is for state statutes to require identifying information while clearly
establishing that the sperm donor is not the legal father of the child." 0

However, for those who would not absolve the biological father of
responsibility towards his child, this solution would be inadequate. Thus,
until identifying information is made available, the end result is that

children conceived by AID will not inherit from the sperm donor's estate
unless the mother knows the donor's identity.

196. See Stephen Rodrick, Upward Motility, NEW REPUBLIC, May 16, 1994, at 9 (describing
a sperm bank that solicits Harvard and MIT donors). One donor was quoted as describing his
relationship with the sperm bank as "'a business deal."' Id. at 10.
197. See John Eekelaar, Parenthood, Social Engineering and Rights, in CONSTITUTING
FAmmS: A STUDY INGOvE NANCE 80, 94 (Derek Morgan & Gillian Douglas eds., 1994); see also
J.M. Eekelaar, Reforming the English Law ConcerningIllegitimatePersons, 14 FAM. L.Q. 41, 57-58
(1980) ("fW]here it is doubtful whether revelation or suppression of truth has the more desirable
consequences, one should choose the practice which involves revealing the truth.").
198. See Gibson, supra note 177, at 25-26; see also USCACA, supra note 69, § 4 cmt., 9B
U.L.A. 166 (describing the protection state statutes offer to sperm donors); ELIAS & ANNA, supra
note 94, at 233 (describing the protection of sperm donors as almost "obsessional").
199. See Gibson, supra note 177, at 30-32. Gibson surveyed a few empirical studies in this
country and abroad and concluded that the studies "suggest that most donors have serious misgivings
about their legal responsibility for AID offspring that might cause them to stop donating if their
identities were revealed." 1d at 31-32. However, another study found that 60% of the donors
surveyed would donate even if their identity was to be revealed to the resulting children. See ELIAS
& ANNA, supra note 94, at 234. Andrews and Douglass report that 75% of donors to a California
sperm bank agreed to make their names and addresses available so that the resulting children could
contact them after the children reached the age of eighteen. See Andrews & Douglass, supra note
195, at 661. A 1985 Swedish law requires that AID children over the age of eighteen be able to
obtain identifying information about their biological father. As a consequence, the number of donors
temporarily declined. The type of donor then changed to a larger number of older married men,
rather than younger men. See DOUGLAS, supra note 171, at 134.
200. See Gibson, supra note 177, at 34.
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3. Unmarried Women and Artificial Insemination by Donor
The other group of AID cases involves unmarried women who
conceived children by AID in order to raise the child as a single parent
or with a lesbian partner. The mothers in these cases receive semen from
known donors, and either successfully inseminate themselves or are
inseminated by a doctor.2"' If donors initiate litigation to establish their
paternity of the child, it is usually for the purpose of achieving visitation
rights. The cases often turn, first, on whether the state's statute applies
to unmarried women in addition to married women. 2 If the state's
AID statute applies only to insemination of married women, then the
statute does not cut off the donor's paternity. If the statute applies to
unmarried women, the dispute is whether the statute also applies to a
known donor, and if so, whether it bars the donor's parental status if the
parties had previously agreed on the sperm donor's parental role. Second,
some cases turn on whether the court treats the sperm donor analogously
to an unmarried father by coitus. In states without an AID statute, the
courts rely on a variety of theories to determine the donor's parental
status. Unlike the divorce cases, these decisions directly adjudicate the
donor's paternity which, if established, would determine the child as a
potential heir to the donor's estate.
Courts have had great difficulty interpreting the AID statutes that
include unmarried women. In Jhordan C. v. Mary K,20 3 the court held
the California AID statute inapplicable and found the donor to be the
child's legal father because, although the statute includes unmarried
women, the donor provided semen to a woman who was not under a
physician's supervision.2 ' Under the California Civil Code, only a
donor who provides semen to a licensed physician is not the child's
natural father.2 ' In Jhordan C., the parties did not know about the
statute and did not have a preconception agreement regarding the donor's

201. In In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989) (en bane), the sperm donor gave his semen to the
recipient, who then took the semen to her doctor and was artificially inseminated by the doctor.
202. Most statutes apply to AID by married women only. See Barbara K. Padgett, Note,
Illegitimate Children Conceived by Artificial Insemination: Does Some State Legislation Deny Them
Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment?, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 511, 511 (1994);
Brad Sears, Recent Developments, Winning Arguments/Losing Themselves: The (Dys)functional
Approach in Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 559, 562-63 (1994).
203. 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986).

204. See id. at 535.
205. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005(b) (west 1983) (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b)
(West 1994)).
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role. The donor, who had visited the baby several times soon after he
was born, filed a paternity action nine months later when the mother
refused more visitation. The donor had been supporting the child
pursuant to a separate support action initiated by the county, which had
been providing the mother public assistance.2"'
By contrast, in McIntyre v. Crouch, °7 an Oregon court held that
state's AID statute. 8 applicable but proceeded to hold that the statute
could be unconstitutional as applied to the donor if certain facts were
established. The mother had inseminated herself with the semen of a
known donor and had not used a physician.2" The court declared that
the statute's provisions, that the donor had "no right, obligation or
interest" with respect to the AID child21° and that the child had no
"right, obligation or interest with respect to [the] donor," '' applied to
a known donor as well as to an anonymous one. The court then
explained that, because the statute would have overridden the agreement
that the donor allegedly gave him a parental role with the child,"' the
statute was unconstitutional as applied to the donor because it imposed
an absolute bar to his assertion of paternity in violation of due process-denying him the opportunity to assert the rights and responsibilities
of fatherhood.213 The court reversed summary judgment for the mother
and allowed the donor the opportunity to prove the existence of the
alleged agreement that he would be involved with the child and would
be given a definite visitation schedule.
However, in Leckie v. Voorhies,214 another Oregon court held that
a sperm donor was not a parent where he had explicitly waived in
writing all parental rights and reaffirmed that waiver when the child was
three years old. Although the donor had maintained a visitation schedule
with the child and had provided child support, the court enforced the
waiver and did not apply the Oregon AID statute or McIntyre. Instead,
the court permitted the biological father to relinquish parental rights

206. See Jhordan C, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 532-33.
207. 780 P.2d 239 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
208. See OR. REV. STAT. § 109.239 (1995).
209. The Oregon statute permits Al to be performed by physicians only. See id. § 677.360.
210. Id. § 109.239(1).

211. Id. § 109.239(2).
212. See McIntyre, 780 P.2d at 243.
213. See id. at 244. The court relied on Lehr v. Robertson,463 U.S. 248 (1983), which involved

a child conceived by coitus. See McIntyre, 780 P.2d at 244-45.
214. 875 P.2d 521 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
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through a private agreement.215
In an Ohio case, C.O. v. WS.," 6 the donor alleged that he and the
mother had agreed that he would establish a relationship with the child.
The Ohio statute applied to unmarried women. 2 7 Given the agreement,
the court held that a parent-child relationship existed between the donor
and child; however, it was not clear whether the court would have held
as such if there had been no agreement.2 8 The court said that "[t]he
statute does not prevent a paternity adjudication where an unmarried
woman solicits the participation of the donor, who was known to her,
and where the donor and woman agree that there would be a relationship
between the donor and child." 219
In states where AID statutes apply only to married women, or where
the state has no statute, known donors of semen to unmarried women
who petitioned to establish paternity have been successful, regardless of
whether there existed a preconception agreement. In C.M.v. C.C.,22 the
donor successfully sued for visitation based on what he thought was an
agreement by which he would assume parental responsibility. The state
had no AID statute at the time. The court likened the donor to an unwed
father by coitus and concluded that since an unwed father is entitled to
visitation with his illegitimate child, so too should the sperm donor."
In Thomas S. v. Robin y., the petitioner sperm donor, Thomas
S., supplied sperm to Robin Y. to conceive a child who would be raised
by Robin and her lesbian partner. The New York AID statute applied
only to married women.' The parties orally agreed that Thomas would
not have a parental role, and he was not listed on the child's birth certificate.' u He saw the child only a few times for the three years after the

215. See id at 522. It is doubtful, however, that the waiver would have freed the father of his
support obligation. See Wadlington, supra note 138, at 494 & n.l 13.
216. 639 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994).
217. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.37(B) (Anderson 1996).
218. See C.O., 639 N.E.2d at 525; see also In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989) (en banc)

(concluding that the AID statute yielded to an agreement between the donor and recipient as to the
donor's parental role).
219.

C.O., 639 N.E.2d at 525.

220. 377 A.2d 821 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977).
221.

See id. at 824-25. New Jersey has since enacted a statute providing that the donor of sperm

to a physician is, in law, not the father of the child unless the donor and the recipient woman had
contracted otherwise. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West 1993); see also N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-11-6(B) (Michie Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050(2) (West 1986).
222. 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994).

223. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 73(1) (McKinney 1988).
224. See Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
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child's birth, and he did not contribute child support. When the child was
five years old, her mother arranged for visits with Thomas, which
occurred somewhat frequently over the next six years, even though Robin
and her family lived in New York and Thomas lived in San Francisco.' When Thomas asked to take the child to visit his family and
revealed his wish to establish himself as the child's legal father, Robin
stopped the child's visits. Thomas then filed for an order of filiation and
visitation, which the family court denied on grounds of equitable
estoppel. 6 However, the appellate court reversed. Deciding only the
filiation issue, the court held that Thomas had established his biological
paternity as required by statute, and that Robin was estopped from
denying legal recognition of his relationship with the child which she had
initiated and encouraged. 7 The court ordered an entry of filiation and
left the issue of petitioner's visitation rights for further determination. 8
If the child had been conceived through coitus, Thomas would have
had standing to seek visitation, and his involvement with the child would
likely have afforded him due process protection against termination of his
parental status. 9 An unwed father's due process rights are weakened,
however, where the child is already part of a family unit. In Quilloin v.
Walcott,"0 the biological father could not prevent the child's adoption
by the child's mother and her husband, with whom the child lived. The
child had never lived with the biological father, and the father had never
played a parental role in the child's life." In addition to this distinction
from Thomas S. is the fact that the New York court did not consider
Robin's lesbian partnership as a family unit. In this instance, Jhordan C.
is analogous. In that case, the child's mother and her lesbian partner were
also raising the child. Although the court stressed that its decision was
not based on a preference for the traditional family or for providing a
father for a child born of a single woman, 2 the court rejected the
mother's constitutional argument that the father, Jhordan, infringed on the
225.
226.
227.
228.
Thomas

See id.
See id.
See id. at 362.
See id. It is reported that when the New York Court of Appeals agreed to review this case,
S. withdrew his petition. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Brief, The Social Construction of

Parenthoodin One PlannedLesbian Family,22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 203, 203 (1996).
229. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654-58 (1972).
230. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).

231. See id. at 249, 255-56.
232. See Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 537 (Ct. App. 1986). According to the
court, the California legislature had determined that issue by including unmarried women in the AID
statute. See id.
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family autonomy of her family unit.3 Instead, the court included
Jhordan within the family unit because of his social relationship with the
child, 4 but the court never referred to the lesbian partnership as its
own unit.
Supporting these views is the consideration that filiation is an
advantage for the child, both in terms of providing the child with a male
parent and bringing the child increased financial support and a potential
inheritance. In Thomas S. and C.M., the courts expressed approval of the
donors as financially capable people. Thomas S. offered an additional
potential of a substantial inheritance 35 In C.M., the donor, who was a
teacher, could help the child's development3 6 In C.O., the court
rationalized that it would have held the AID statute unconstitutional if it
were applied in such a way that it denied the father an opportunity to
establish paternity since it was against public policy to deny a child the
right to child support and an inheritance.3
In Anonymous v. Anonymous,s however, the court recognized the
increasing number of single women head households. It saw no particular
detrimental consequences to the child besides a possible loss of
inheritance, which it noted is always possible if the child is disinherited
by a parent's will.3 9 Indeed, the court recognized that a single-parent
unit has some advantages over a two-parent family; for example, it is not
subject to interference from the other adult who could prevent the
custodial parent from moving to another state.2' 4
4. Adoption by a Same-Sex Couple
An important development for inheritance law appears in the rules
governing adoption by homosexual adults. The lesbian couples in
Thomas S. and Jhordan C. could not have constituted a family unit under
traditional law. If the couple is a lesbian couple, one or both of whom
has had a child by AI, or if the couple is a homosexual couple that has
used a female surrogate to provide them with a child from the sperm of
one of the couple, parental rights and inheritance issues will depend upon
the very volatile state of the law regarding adoption, custody, and

233.
234.
235.
236.

See id. at 536.
See id.
See Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 362 (App. Div. 1994).
See C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 825 (N.J. Juv. & Doam. Rel. Ct. 1977).

237. See C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 525 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994).

238. 1991 WL 57753 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1991).
239. See id. at *9 & n.32.
240. See id. at *4 & n.21.
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visitation rights of same-sex households.
Where a lesbian couple in an ongoing relationship raises a child, the
child has two social parents, both of whom are women, but only one of
whom is the biological and legally recognized parent.24' The
nonbiological mother often seeks to adopt the child, wanting to establish
a legal relationship in addition to a social one, in order to protect her
right to custody or visitation if the couple separates and to give legal
recognition to her de facto parental status. 242 Adoption, however,
normally extinguishes the parental rights of the biological parent.243
Therefore, in order for the biological mother not to lose her parental
status, the adoption must be treated as a second-parent adoption, similar
to stepparent adoption. In stepparent adoption, the stepparent and the
biological parent adopt the child, but the biological parent retains her
status as the child's legal parent. Unless a statute provides otherwise,2'
adoption cuts off the child from inheritance from or through the child's
other biological parent (the deceased or divorced first spouse of the
remarried biological parent) and that parent's blood line.24
However, a few courts have recently held that the domestic partner
of a biological parent could adopt the other partner's child without
severing that parent's legal status. In Adoption of Tammy, 2"1 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a lesbian couple could
jointly adopt the daughter of one of the partners who had been inseminated with the sperm of a cousin of the other partner. The court held that
the Massachusetts statute, which provided that "a person" may petition
for adoption,247 included the plural term "persons," so that the statute
did not terminate the natural parents' legal relationship to the child.24
Tammy presented compelling facts supporting the view that adoption
would be in the best interests of the child. Both women were doctors,
members of the Harvard Medical School faculty, and committed parents
in a long-term relationship. First, the court emphasized that the child's
241. No case has yet arisen in which both women are biological mothers, in that one woman
provides the egg and the other gestates the child.
242. Some states forbid adoption by homosexuals. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63:042(3) (West
1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (1994).
243. See In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 683 & n.9 (Wis. 1994).
244. See, e.g., UNIt. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(b) & cmt., 8 U.L.A. 107 (Supp. 1996).

245. See Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d at 683 & n.9. But see, e.g., In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397,
404 (N.Y. 1995) (concluding that section 117 of New York's Domestic Relations Law does not
require termination of a biological parent's rights in all cases of adoption).
246. 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993).

247. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § I (West Supp. 1996).
248.

See Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 319.
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legal relationship with the mother's partner would bring significant
practical financial advantages. The child would be eligible to inherit from
the new parent and from class gifts in her family trusts, and she would
be entitled to financial support, including benefits from insurance and
social security.249 Second, the court emphasized the stable family unit
that the three had formed, pointing out that adoption would allow the
child and the nonbiological mother to retain their ties if the women were
to terminate their relationship."0 The court cited evidence from psychiatric and psychological literature that "children raised by lesbian parents
develop normally."'"
Analogously, a divided New York Court of Appeals held in In re
Jacob, 2 in two consolidated cases, that both the domestic partner of
an unmarried heterosexual woman and the domestic partner of a lesbian
had standing to adopt under New York Domestic Relations Law. In the
first case, the heterosexual woman's child had been born in a previous
marriage. In the second case, the child was conceived by AI using an
unknown sperm donor. The court concluded that each petitioner came
within the statutory language: "[ain adult unmarried person or an adult
husband and his adult wife together may adopt another person." 3 The
court analogized the two cases to other situations in which New York
law does not sever the parental bond of the consenting biological parent
upon adoption by the second party 4
The court remanded the cases to determine whether adoption was in
each child's best interests. 5 That policy would be furthered by
permitting a child's social parent (the domestic partner of the child's
biological mother in this instance) to become a legal parent so that the
child would be advantaged socially by having two permanent parental
figures and economically by benefits from the second parent such as
social security and inheritance. 6 In addition, the court recognized the
realities of the large number of nontraditional families. It stated that a
249. See id. at 320.
250. See id. at 317, 320.
251. Id. at 317. In In reK.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), another court also held, as
a matter of statutory interpretation, that a lesbian coparent had standing to petition to adopt the Al

conceived child of her partner. See id at 898-99; see also id. at 898 (citing cases holding that
second-parent adoption by same-sex couples is permissible).

252. 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995).
253. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney Supp. 1997); see also Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at
400-01.

254. See Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 403-04.
255. See id. at 399.
256. See id.
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result that would not give standing to domestic partners would mean that
thousands of children in homes headed by unmarried partners would not
have the advantage of a second legal parent, even if the second parent
wanted to establish a legal relationship.5 7
Thus, Massachusetts and New York cases provide the means for a
nonbiological social parent to become a legal parent and fulfill not only
a continuing rearing role, but also to undertake financial responsibilities
to the child that are not available under present law. It is not clear,
however, whether the child would be able to inherit from both parents,
at least under a statute like that of the UPC for stepparent adoption."'
That section preserves the child's potential inheritance from the natural
parent, but only when the parent's spouse adopts the child."sO The
lesbian partner, however, is not the natural parent's spouse.
If a gay man wants to raise a child for whom he is the biological
father, he must contract with a woman who will bear the child for him
and agree to relinquish the child after its birth. In other words, he wants
to enter a form of surrogacy agreement in which a woman is artificially
inseminated with his sperm and agrees to relinquish the child to him.26 °
Their agreement would change the typical legal result of AI so that the
sperm provider becomes the sole legal and social parent. If this result
were accomplished, the child would inherit only from the father.
The legal status of children conceived in this manner, however, is
unclear.26 In many states, surrogacy contracts are illegal, or at least
unenforceable.262 Even where a surrogacy contract is enforceable, under
some state statutes the man would have no parental rights because the
intended parents must be a married man and woman. 63 An Arkansas

257.
258.
259.
260.

See id. at 398.
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(b), 8 U.L.A. 107 (Supp. 1996).
See id.
This situation has been called a "surro-gay" arrangement. See Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay

Men Creating Families Through Surro-GayArrangements:A Paradigmfor Reproductive Freedom,
3 Am. U. J. GENDER & L. 183, 200 (1995). It is one method used by the "gay-by boom"-gays and

lesbians who are increasingly arranging for the birth of children to raise "through adoption, artificial
insemination and surrogate motherhood." Id. at 186 n.8.

261. See id. at 207-08; see also Fred A. Bernstein, This Child DoesHave Two Mothers ... And
a Sperm Donor with Visitation, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 16-17 (1996) (pointing out

that some gay men consider surrogacy "morally unacceptable" because it involves "exploitative
relationships" and would prefer instead a coparenting relationship with the child's mother).

262. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
263. For example, Virginia permits the formulation of surrogacy contracts by "[a] surrogate, her
husband, if any, and [the] prospective intended parents." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-159(A) (Michie
1995). Intended parents, however, are defined as "a man and a woman, married to each other." Id.
§ 20-156; see also USCACA, supra note 69, § 1(3), 9B U.L.A. 164 (employing a similar definition
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statute, however, uniquely provides that a child born as a result of a
surrogacy agreement is the child of the biological father even if he is
unmarried. 2"
Only if the agreement is enforced and the surrogate's parental rights
(and those of her husband, if she is married) are terminated will the legal
results be as the participants intended. The case law indicates that the
courts will not terminate the donor's parental rights where he and the
recipient were in agreement as to their preservation. In these cases,
however, the inseminated woman did not agree to be a surrogate but,
instead, intended to be the child's parent, and the issue was whether she
and the sperm donor had agreed that the donor would play a parental
role. No case has yet decided that the woman's parental role would be
cut off, leaving the child with no mother. In addition, underlying some
of the decisions on this issue was the policy that the child's best interests
lay with having two parents, each of a different sex. Thus, under statutes
and common law, a woman, but not a man, may be the sole legal parent
of a child conceived by AID, unless the woman relinquishes her status
by putting the child up for adoption. If the woman dies before the
adoption, the child should inherit from her estate.26
IV.

IN VITRO FERTILIZATION

Another principal reproductive technology is IVF. Where a couple
would use AID if the male is infertile or suffers from a genetic disease,
it would use IVF if the woman suffers reproductive dysfunction, genetic
disease, or if the male has a low sperm count.266 IVF involves fertiliza-

of intended parents).
264. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(b)(2) (Michie 1993).
265. This state of the law---reognizing an unmarried woman's right to be the single parent of
a child, but denying an unmarried sperm donor's ability to establish single parenthood-has raised
equal protection concerns on the ground that unmarried men are denied "procreative opportunities"
available to married couples and to unmarried women. See Hollandsworth, supra note 260, at 218.
One commentator, however, has argued that the USCACA's requirement that the intended parents
in a surrogacy agreement be married is constitutional because the operative distinction is between
married and unmarried intended parents, not between the two genders. See Ann MacLean Massie,
Restricting Surrogacy to Married Couples: A Constitutional Problem? The Married-Parent
Requirement in the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, 18 HASTINGS CONST.

L.Q. 487, 525 (1991). It also should be pointed out that men and women are not similarly situated
as to childbirth, so that statutes that designate the unmarried mother as the sole legal parent of a

child born by AI would not deny equal protection on those grounds to an unmarried male sperm
donor, even one who had donated sperm for the purpose of becoming the sole legal parent of the
child so conceived. See Capron, supra note 121, at 699-700.
266. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE 98 (1994).
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tion of eggs with semen in an environment outside the woman's body,
usually a laboratory dish. For the IVF procedure, physicians remove eggs
from a woman's ovaries which previously were hormonally stimulated
to superovulate, that is, to produce several eggs.267 The eggs are
fertilized in vitro, and after they have started to divide, typically after
two or three days, the early embryos are transferred to a woman's uterus
where they must implant in order for pregnancy to occur.268 Thus,
women undergo drug therapy, invasive procedures, and the risk of
multiple pregnancies in the hopes of successfully bringing a child to
term. 69 Unlike AID, the IVF procedure is technically difficult, expensive,
and cannot be performed without the services of a physician.
The first IVF child was born in England in 1978.70 Since that
time, it is calculated that over 30,000 children worldwide have been born
using IVF, with over 8,230 being born in the United States between
1986-1990.27 Nationwide, IVF success rates are estimated at one in
five couples.272 More than 300 clinics in the United States now perform
more than 40,000 in vitro and'similar procedures a year.273
A. Egg Donation
IVF can involve several combinations of genetic and gestational
contributors. For example, IVF can be accomplished with the gametes of
a husband and wife and gestation by the wife. Legally, this is the
simplest IVF procedure. It is used for women who produce healthy eggs
but cannot conceive because of damaged or diseased fallopian tubes
preventing eggs from traveling to their uterus,274 or because the

267. See id. at 98-99.
268. See id. at 98.
269. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 591-92 (Tenn. 1992) (describing the procedures that
Ms. Davis underwent in the couple's six attempts at IVF).
270. See ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 98.
271. See id. at 99.
272. See Trip Gabriel, High-Tech PregnanciesTest Hope'sLimit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1996, at
1 (noting that a New York hospital, Cornell Medical Center, reports double that figure as its success
rate). Authors caution that IVF clinics' statistics are unreliable and manipulated. See BARBARA KATZ
ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY

148 (1989); Note, In Vitro Fertilization:Insurance and ConsumerProtection, 109 HARV. L. REV.

2092, 2102 (1996).
273. See Gabriel, supra note 272, at 1.
274. An estimated five percent of infertile couples include women that produce healthy eggs.
See Michael Kirby, Medical Technology and New Frontiersof Family Law, in LEGAL ISSUES IN
HUMAN REPRODUCTION, supra note 6, at 3, 6. Thirty percent of infertile women in marriages result
from a defect in the fallopian tubes. See MASON, supra note 93, at 204; PETER SINGER & DEANE
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husband's sperm count is low. 275 However, IVF becomes more legally

complicated if conception is accomplished using IVF with gametes from
one or more donors and gestation by a woman who did not provide the

egg. Where this occurs, IVF not only allows reproduction divorced from
sex, but conception divorced from birth, and genetic contribution
divorced from gestational contribution. Where an egg "donor" provides
eggs for another woman who cannot produce healthy eggs, 76 and the
recipient woman gestates the fetus, the resulting child has two mothers:
a genetic mother who is the egg donor and a gestational mother. 7
Often, in this situation, the donated eggs are fertilized with sperm from
the gestational woman's husband,278 and the parties usually intend that
the gestating woman and her husband will keep and rear the child. 9
Their intent creates the difference between IVF with donor eggs and
surrogacy arrangements. In egg donation, at the time of implantation, the
gestational mother intends to raise the child; in surrogacy, the gestational
mother does not.28 In egg donation, the child is genetically the child
of the husband and the egg donor, but is biologically, by pregnancy, also
the child of the wife.281 The first pregnancy from IVF of a donated egg
was achieved in 1983.282

Egg donation has been described as creating the most "stable rearing
and family situation" 3 of any noncoital reproduction because each
rearing parent has a biological relation to the child, the woman by

WELLS, MAKING BABIES: THE NEW SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF CONCEPTION 15 (1985).
275. See ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 98.
276. Egg "donors" are paid approximately $3000, although the fees are increasing. See Gabriel,
supra note 272, at 1. Egg donation has become an increasingly commercial enterprise. Donors are
sought through advertising, including college and university newspapers, seeking donors in their
twenties and early thirties. The recipients tend to be older in their less fertile years. See Jan Hoffman,
Egg Donations Meet a Need and Raise Ethical Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1996, at 1.
277. See R. Brian Oxman, Maternal-Fetal Relationships and Nongenetic Surrogates, 33
JURIMETRICS J. 387, 424 (1993).
278. An alternative procedure is gametic intrafallopian transfer ("GIFT'), in which a mixture
of sperm and egg are inserted into a woman's fallopian tubes for fertilization in vivo. A related
procedure is zygote intrafallopian transfer ("ZIFT') in which eggs are fertilized in the laboratory and
the resulting embryo is transferred to a woman's fallopian tubes. See Andrews & Douglass, supra
note 195, at 642-43.
279. See R. Alta Charo, BiologicalDeterminism in Legal Decision Making: The ParentTrap,
3 TEx. J. WO,,MEN & L. 265, 300 (1994).
280. See infra Part VI.
281. See John A. Robertson, Technology and Motherhood:Legal and Ethical Issues in Human
Egg Donation, 39 CASE IV. RES. L. REV. 1, 12 (1988).
282. See ANDREWS, supra note 175, at 163.
283. Robertson, supra note 281, at 12.
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gestation and the man by genetics.284 However, egg donation has, for
the first time, made possible a separation of the female genetic role from
the gestational one. Two women may each be considered the biological
mother, although this fact need not be publicly known because the birth
mother will register the child as hers, and, because of her pregnancy, is
usually perceived as the natural mother of the child. If the donor is a
known donor, however, there may be a contest between the two women,
each claiming to be the mother. This issue is not analogous to the more
common question of who is a child's father that may arise with a
nonmarital child; the issue of who is a child's father is a question of fact
whereas the issue of who is the mother is one of law.
Unlike sperm donation, egg donation is a difficult and painful
procedure that requires treatment of both the donor and the recipient,
whose reproductive cycles must be chemically synchronized.28 The
donor receives daily hormonal injections in order to overstimulate her
ovaries to produce a large number of eggs; the recipient receives daily
injections to prepare her uterus. The donor then must undergo a
procedure under anesthesia to remove her eggs.286 Extra eggs may be
donated to others or may be fertilized in vitro to conceive an embryo.287
Extra embryos, often called preembryos, may be donated to others or
frozen for later use by the couple or for later donation.288
B. Embryo Donation
If IVF occurs using both donor eggs and donor semen and the
resulting fertilized egg is then implanted in a woman, the process is
known as embryo donation.289 Embryo donation, where the gestating
woman and her husband intend to raise the child, is used where both
intending social parents are either infertile or carry a genetic disease, but
the woman is able to gestate the embryo.2 ° In embryo donation, the
only rearing parent that the child is biologically related to is the gestating
mother. The child has no genetic relationship to that woman or, if she is
married, to her husband. A donated embryo may have been created for

284.
285.
286.
removed
287.
288.

See i.
See id. at 4.
See Andrews & Douglass, supra note 195, at 653. Eggs may also be nonsurgically
by using ultrasound. See id.
See id.
See id. at 654-55.

289. See ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 9.

290. See MASON, supra note 93, at 219.
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particular recipients or may be an extra embryo from another couple's
IVF procedure given to unknown recipients. Embryo donation could also
be used by unmarried women, for example, lesbian couples, if they want
to raise a child together, each as a biological parent. One of the women
will donate eggs to be fertilized in vitro with donor sperm. The fertilized
eggs will then be implanted for gestation into the other woman of the
couple.
An alternative procedure not involving IVF is embryo transfer,
accomplished by uterine lavage. In this method, the egg donor conceives
by AID or coitus and the embryo is flushed out of the donor's womb.
The embryo is then implanted in the womb of another woman who is
physically unable to conceive but is capable of gestating the embryo and
intends to raise the resulting child. If this woman is married, her
husband's sperm may have been used to impregnate the donor woman.
Thus, in effect, the donor woman acts as a surrogate for conception. The
first birth after lavage occurred in 1984.291
C. Statutes and Precedents
There is little law settling the legal status of the parties to IVF, egg
donation, and embryo donation and transfer. Most commentators suggest
that egg donation and sperm donation should be treated similarly: the
donor should have no parental rights or obligations towards the resulting
child, and the gestational mother and her consenting husband should be
the legal parents. 92 This result is supported not only on the ground that
a gestational mother should always be the presumed mother,293 but also
because she intends to raise the child.294 The few statutes that apply to
IVF designate the gestational mother and her husband as the child's legal
parents. 9 Yet, the situations may not be completely analogous.296 A
woman donor, unlike a male donor, undergoes invasive, lengthy

291. See ANDREWS, supra note 175, at 163.

292. See Larry I. Palmer, Who Are the Parentsof BiotechnologicalChildren?, 35 JURIMETRICS
J. 17, 20 (1994); Robertson, supra note 281, at 18-19.
293. See EuAs & ANNAS, supra note 94, at 238-39 (stressing that the legal mother should be
easily identifiable at the child's birth).
294. See, e.g., ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 125. Professor Robertson bases this choice on
the grounds of procreative liberty. See id. at 126.
295. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 742.11(2)

(West 1997); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.102(b)

(West 1996); see also USCACA, supra note 69, §§ 2-3, 9B U.L.A. 165; infra text accompanying
notes 319-28.
296. See Andrews & Douglass, supra note 195, at 679 n.275.
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treatment with possible physiological side effects. 97 Consequently, it
may be more likely that some egg donors undergo the treatment
intending to play a parental role. Embryo donation also may not be
completely analogous to sperm donation because it involves two gamete
donors whose intentions regarding parenting may differ. In addition, the
progenitors of the embryo may have been unsuccessful at procreating a
child themselves or may have lost a child and may want to play a
parental role to the child born of their embryo. The IVF statutes do not
take account of these differences between donors, and, as described
below, they leave other issues unanswered.
1. In Vitro Fertilization Statutes
AID statutes do not apply to IVF or to egg or embryo donation
unless the statutes explicitly include them because, unlike AID,
conception does not occur by insemination in IVF.2 98 For example,
while section 5 of the UPA applies only to AI,2 ' the USCACA applies
to IVF as well as AID. In the USCACA, "assisted conception" means
any pregnancy (except by fertilization of egg and sperm of husband and
wife) that results from fertilizing an egg with sperm other than by coitus,
or pregnancy resulting from implanting an embryo."° The USCACA
includes in the definition of donor, "an individual ...who produces [the]
egg ...used for assisted conception."' ' Like a sperm donor, an egg
donor is not a parent. 3 2 Instead, the birth mother is the child's legal
mother,30 3 and the birth mother's husband is the father unless, within
two years of learning of the birth, he proves that he did not consent to
the assisted conception."° Under the USCACA, if the birth mother is
not married, then the child has no legal father since the sperm donor is
not considered a parent.0
Only a handful of states have enacted IVF statutes in order to
legitimize the IVF child and sever the legal relationship between the
297. See id. at 635-36.
298. But see Emily McAllister, Defining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of
Reproductive Technology: Implicationsfor Inheritance, 29 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 55, 69
(1994) ("There is a strong case for construing 'artificial insemination,' as used in these statutes, as
encompassing other methods of assisted conception.").
299. See UNi. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301-02 (1987).
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

USCACA, supra note 69, § 1(I), 9B U.L.A. 164.
Id. § 1(2).
See id. § 4(a), 9B U.L.A. 166.
See id. § 2, 9B U.L.A. 165.
See id. § 3.
See id. § 4(a), 9B U.L.A. 166.
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donors and the child.3 6 The Florida and Texas IVF statutes purport to
apply only to married couples. 3 7 The Florida statute, which extends to
both Al and IVF, provides that a child born in wedlock, conceived by
donated gametes or preembryos, is "irrebuttably presumed to be the child
of the recipient gestating woman and her husband, provided that both...
consented in writing."3 8 The donor, however, may not automatically
lose his or her parental rights. Section 742.14 of the statute provides that
the donor "shall relinquish" all parental rights and obligations, but does
not explain if the donor must perform some affirmative act in 3order
to
0
do so.3" 9 Further, it does not limit donation to a married couple.
Thus, like AID statutes, the Florida IVF statute leaves gaps in
determining parenthood. First, if both members of the recipient couple
have not consented in writing, the statute's irrebuttable presumption that
the child is the child of the recipient wife and her husband does not
apply.31' Yet, the donor may still relinquish all parental rights and
obligations. This may leave the child without legally recognized parents.
The Florida code also does not require that the recipient be married in
order for the donor to relinquish parental rights.' Marriage is required
only for the recipient to be irrebuttably presumed as the parent.3" 3 Thus,
an egg donor may relinquish parental rights, but under the statute, if the
recipient is an unmarried gestating woman, she is not irrebuttably
presumed to be the mother and will have to prove her maternity under
the common law.314
If the recipient is not married and has received a donated embryo,
the statute's irrebuttable presumption again does not apply.3" 5 The
donors of the donated embryo may still relinquish parental status. If so,
the child will have one legal parent under common law: the gestational

306. See Schiff, supra note 95, at 272.
307. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11(2) (West 1997); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.102(b) (West

1996).
308. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11(2).
309. See id. § 742.14.
310. This latter section of the Florida legislation does not apply if the donor is one of a
"commissioning couple." Id- A commissioning couple is the intended father and mother, not limited
by the statute to married couples, who conceived by assisted reproduction using the eggs or sperm
of one of them. See idL § 742.13(2).
311. See id. § 742.11(1).
312. See id. § 742.14.
313. See id. § 742.1 1(1).
314. For an interpretation of the Florida statute, see In reMarriageof Adars, 551 N.E.2d 635,
638 (Ill. 1990).
315. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11(1).
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mother.3" 6 If the donors do not relinquish parenthood, the child has
three potential legal parents.
The Texas egg donation and embryo donation statutes apply only to
married couples who receive the donation. The Texas legislation,
however, is not consistent regarding its consent requirements. It provides
that the egg donor is not the parent of the child if the egg is fertilized
with the sperm of the husband of the recipient woman." 7 The husband,
whose sperm was used, and his wife, who receives the fertilized egg, are
the parents of the resulting child if each consents in writing." 8 Under
section 151.102(b), however, the child is not the child of the egg donor
and does not first require the recipient and her husband's written consent
to the IVF and implantation as a condition precedent to extinguishing the
donor's parental status. Even if neither spouse consents in writing, the
donor's parental status is still extinguished, and the child has no legal
parents under the statute. Presumably, the common law presumptions of
paternity and maternity would then apply.
The Texas statute may also produce some difficult situations
concerning embryo donation. One section provides that a child born of
a donated embryo that had been implanted into the uterus of a woman,
who with her husband consents in writing, is the child of that husband
and wife.3 19 Under another subsection, the child is not the child of the
embryo donors if the recipient husband and wife consent to the
implantation,3 20 though such consent is not required to be in writing.
The wife most likely would have consented in writing to the implantation
procedure, but if her husband did not consent, it is possible that both
donors, along with the recipient woman, would be the parents of the
resulting child. If the husband consented orally, then the parental status
of the donor is extinguished but the husband would still not be considered the child's parent under the statute since that requires written
consent. It is also possible that if each member of each couple is treated
as replacing the one of the same gender, then the sperm donor and the
consenting gestating mother would be the child's parents, thereby
rendering the child illegitimate.

316.
317.
318.
the wife
319.
320.

See Hill, supra note 64, at 370.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.102(b) (West 1996).
See id. § 151.102(a). The husband consents to provide sperm to fertilize a donated egg and
consents to the implantation of the fertilized egg in her uterus.
See id. § 151.103(a).
See id. § 151.103(b).
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2. Parenthood of In Vitro Fertilization Children Under Common
Law
Without a statute determining parenthood for egg or embryo
donation to a married woman, a court would probably apply the common
law presumptions that the woman who gives birth is the child's mother,
and her husband is the father.32 ' This would clearly be so if the
husband's sperm were used. However, where the wife gestated a donated
embryo, or if donated sperm were used for IVF of her ovum, her
husband may raise the same issues regarding the child's legitimacy as
have been raised when married women conceive by AID. In such a case,
the husband was under a duty to furnish child support, but was not
declared the child's legal father.3" If an IVF statute does not provide
otherwise, and state law permits the husband to rebut the presumption of
the child's legitimacy, and the sperm donor is unknown so that the child
cannot establish its paternity, the child could be left fatherless. However,
if the husband dies before or just after the child's birth, and the
presumption of the child's legitimacy was not rebutted, the husband
should be considered the child's legal father.
In embryo donation, if a male provides sperm for IVF for the
benefit of an unmarried woman, without a statute providing otherwise,
the male provider of sperm should be the legal parent. In addition, if he
is known, he should be subject to a parent's obligations, and his estate
subject to the child's inheritance if the child can prove paternity. Of
course, if the sperm donor had donated anonymously to a sperm bank,
the bank would have had to keep records in order to trace the donor. The
law in some states would treat sperm donors differently depending on
whether their sperm were used for AID or for IVF. The sperm bank
would have to inform all donors of these differing results and comply
with their instructions for using their sperm for either procedure.
Differing results may also occur between the sperm and egg donors
to the donated embryo. The egg donor would not likely be considered the
child's parent because the gestational woman would be the presumed
mother.3" However, if the sperm donor could be designated the legal

321. See Hill, supra note 64, at 370, 372-73.
322. See supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 116-20 and

accompanying text.
323. There are no precedents for this situation since the egg source and the gestator have, in the
past, always been the same woman. See John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of
Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 478 (1990). There exist precedents in which the woman who
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parent of an embryo donated to an unmarried woman but the egg donor
could not, then the two gamete donors to a donated embryo would be
treated differently in terms of whether either was the child's legal parent.
This would mean, for example, that the child might inherit from the
sperm donor if his identity were known and proven, but not from the egg
donor to the same embryo.
In the only case to deal with the issue of IVF and egg donation, the
court did not apply the presumption of maternity but, instead, determined
maternity by the parties' intent. In McDonald v. McDonald,24 a
married couple conceived using the husband's sperm and donor eggs.
The fertilized eggs were implanted in the wife, who bore twins. The
husband later sued for divorce and sought custody of the children as their
sole natural parent."z New York does not have an IVF statute. The
husband based his claim on a California surrogacy case, Johnson v.
Calvert, in which the California Supreme Court held that where the
genetic parent (the egg donor), and the gestational surrogate could each
claim to be the child's mother under California law, the genetic parent
was the child's legal mother. 26 The California court based its decision
on the parties' intent before conception took place, deciding that the
genetic mother was the woman who intended to bring about the birth of
the child and raise the child as her own. 27
McDonald, however, did not involve surrogacy, but, instead, egg
donation for which the parties have the opposite intent than they do when
they enter a gestational surrogacy agreement. Since the gestational
woman, not the egg donor, intends to rear the child, the McDonald court
distinguished the case from the surrogacy situation in Johnson. The
McDonald court used Johnson's own distinction of egg donation-that
in an egg donation situation, the gestational mother, whose intent was to
raise the child as her own, is the child's "natural" mother. The court
concluded that Ms. McDonald was entitled to temporary custody during
the divorce proceedings.328
McDonald also differs from Johnson because, in McDonald, the
dispute was not between two possible mothers, but, instead, between a

supplied the egg and the woman who gestated the child under a surrogacy contract contest the
maternal designation. See infra text accompanying notes 582-614.

324. 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1994).
325. See id. at 478.

326. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (en banc). For further discussion
of Johnson, see infra text accompanying notes 582-600.

327. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
328. See McDonald,608 N.Y.S.2d at 479-80.
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husband and wife for child custody. If the court had held that the
defendant wife was not the child's mother, the child would have had no
mother because the egg had been donated anonymously. Yet, the
defendant had not only gestated the twins, but was their social parent,
having raised them from birth through the time of the divorce proceedings 329
Even if the egg donor had been known and had been the contesting
party, the court could have resolved the issue of maternity without
relying solely on the parties' intent, but according to the legal consequences of its decision. If the egg donor were the legal mother, then the
child would have been the illegitimate child of the egg donor and the
sperm donor, the gestational woman's husband. The egg donor would
have had to agree to the child's adoption by Ms. McDonald, unless Mr.
McDonald's consent to his wife's adoption would have been enough. The
father's consent might be enough if the egg donor were analogous to an
unmarried father by coitus, who had played no role in his nonmarital
child's upbringing or in the child's family unit. In that situation, the U.S.
Supreme Court has said that the father is not entitled to a hearing before
the child is adopted by others.33 In circumstances such as those in
McDonald, the egg donor would not have developed any relationship
with the child. If the situation instead were analogized to AID, where the
consenting husband of the genetic mother is treated as the child's father,
the gestational woman who is the wife of the genetic father should be
presumed the child's mother.3
3. Anonymity
The problem of a donor's anonymity may generate issues in egg
donation and embryo donation. It has been speculated that children born
of egg donation will not feel either the same genetic bewilderment
attributed to children of sperm donation and to adopted children, or the
sense of abandonment attributed to adopted children because their female
rearing parent was their birth mother and their male rearing parent is
their genetic father.3 Children of embryo donation, however, may feel

329. But see supra text accompanying note 93.
330. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,266-67 (1983); see also Michael D.A. Freeman,
The UnscramblingofEggDonation, in LAW REFORM AND HUMAN REPRODUCTON 273,278 (Sheila
A.M. McLean ed., 1992).
331. See Freeman, supra note 330, at 278.
332. See id. at 280; Robertson, supra note 281, at 15. But see Katheryn D. Katz, Ghost
Mothers: Human Egg Donation and the Legacy of the Past, 57 ALB. L. REV. 733, 780 (1994)
(concluding that, because of the importance of genetic ties, identifying information should be
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more impact because they do not know either of their genetic parents.
Although they are raised by their gestational mother, they are otherwise
more like adopted children whose rearing parents are not their genetic

parents. There is, however, no conclusive information about the impact
of donation on any of the parties?33 The importance of genetic information for health reasons, however, remains the same as in sperm donation
and adoption. 34 The importance of identification of the sperm donor
remains the same as in AID with respect to the child's ability to inherit

from the biological father.
V.

CRYOPRESERVATION OF GAMETES AND EMBRYOS

Along with the increased use of IVF procedures to conceive
children, there has been a large number of cryopreserved human gametes
and embryos that are extracorporeal while they await fertilization or

implantation. Many IVF programs cryopreserve early embryos33 that
were not implanted in the woman of the couple undergoing IVE336
Sperm banks also routinely freeze sperm from donors, and more recently,
IVF clinics freeze human eggs.337 A man may freeze his sperm at a

clinic for his own use33 if he anticipates becoming sterile because of

available to the children, and gamete donors should know that the children born of their gametes
may eventually find them).
333. See Katz, supra note 335, at 737.
334. See Ann T. Lamport, Note, The Genetics of Secrecy in Adoption, ArtificialInsemination,
and In Vitro Fertilization, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 110 (1988) ("It is time... to create a system
allowing each person access to his or her own medical records by the age of majority, if not
before.").
335. In cryopreservation, embryos are frozen in liquid nitrogen and stored. The medical term
"embryo" refers to the fertilized egg (or conceptus) before eight weeks of gestation. After eight
weeks of gestation, the embryo is called a fetus. See Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the
Embryo, 32 LoY. L. Rav. 357, 358 n.7 (1986). The legal literature often refers to the fertilized egg
in its earliest stages as a preembryo. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594 (Tenn. 1992).
336. See John A. Robertson, PriorAgreementsforDisposition ofFrozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 407, 408 (1990).
337. Sperm banks freeze sperm for later use because it is the only way to test effectively for
HIV infection. See INhERTILITY, supra note 172, at 249. Ova, however, are less successfully frozen
and are usually first fertilized, and then the preembryo is cryopreserved. See Andrews & Douglass,
supra note 195, at 654.
338. Doctors at the School of Veterinary Medicine of the University of Pennsylvania have
announced that they are able to remove the cells that produce sperm (stem cells), freeze them for
an indefinite period of time, and implant them in the testes of a laboratory animal such as a mouse,
or in a man's testes to develop into sperm. This procedure allows men who are too ill to produce
semen, or young boys who have not yet begun producing sperm, to store cells and later reproduce
from those cells. The stem cells would provide a never-ending source of sperm because, unlike the
sperm cells, they replenish themselves. See Gina Kolata, Study Finds Way to Produce an Animal's
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a disease or a medical treatment such as chemotherapy or a vasectomy.3 39 For some of the same reasons, a woman may freeze surplus eggs
that have been removed and fertilized by IVF. A woman may also freeze
eggs so that she will not have to repeat the procedures for their removal
and to permit implantation without hormonal stimulation. The
preembryos are frozen at the two, four, or eight cell stage."4 Many
frozen preembryos are thawed and implanted in a woman within a
" ' IVF clinics
reasonably short period of time; others are kept for years.34
in this country and abroad now have thousands of embryos in storage. 42 Given the number of embryos now stored and the length of time
they are being stored, a pressing problem for clinics is how to keep track
of the inventory and avoid implanting preembryos in the wrong people. 43

Sperm Cells in Another Species, Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1996, at A24. In response to this
finding, Professor Robertson was quoted as stating that '"[it's the kind of research that sends shivers
through people."' Id.
339. See E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of
Post-Mortem Insemination, I J.L. & HEALTH 229, 235 (1986-1987).
340. "The best results ... occur with embryos of one to four cells." Andrews & Douglass,
supra note 195, at 642. The first child born from a frozen embryo was born in 1984. See Paul
Coelus, InheritanceProblemsofFrozen Embryos (The Child En Ventre Sa Frigidaire), 7 PROB. L.J.
119, 120 (1986).
341. See Coelus, supranote 340, at 127. Many programs keep frozen embryos for a maximum
of two years, believed to be the limits of safe storage. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598
(Tenn. 1992). A baby girl, however, was born in England to a surrogate from an embryo that had
been frozen for slightly more than four years and thought to be the oldest frozen embryo
transplanted. See Jill Serjeant, Birthfrom Frozen Embryo Casts Doubt on British Policy, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 9, 1995, § 6, at 6. British legislation limits storage of embryos to five years, after which they
must be destroyed. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37, §§ 14(1)(c), 14(3).
British fertility clinics caused a furor by destroying about 3,000 abandoned embryos after the
statutory five-year period for the first batch of frozen embryos expired in August 1996. See British
Clinics, Obeying Law, Destroy Thousands ofEmbryos, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1996, at A3; Youssef
M. Ibrahim, EthicalFurorErupts in Britain: Should Embryos Be Destroyed?,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. I,
1996, at Al. Section 14(4) of the British legislation now substitutes a storage period that depends
on the age of the woman being treated. Commentators note that the extended period in England will
now "increaseo the possibility of the spouses/partners divorcing or one or both of them dying while
their embryos are in storage." Mary Hibbs, Any Frozen Embryos, Mrs Robinson?, 26 FAM. L. 553,
553 (1996).
342. See John A. Robertson, Ethicaland Legal Issues in Cryopreservationof Human Embryos,
47 FERTILrrY & STERILITY 371, 371-72 (1987); Gina Kolata, Medicine's TroublingBonus: Surplus
of Human Embryos Is the Fruit of Doctors' Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1997, at Al.
343. Recently, two fertility clinics associated with the University of California at Irvine were
closed because, between 1988 and 1992, the clinics used patients' eggs without their consent for IVF
and implanted the resulting fertilized eggs or embryos in other women. Approximately thirty women
unknowingly received other women's eggs or provided eggs for others, and several couples have
raised the biological children of other couples, instead of their own. See Fertility Clinics Scandal
Expands, CH. TRIB., July 7, 1995, § 1, at 6. Some of these patients have filed suits against other
patients for custody of children born from frozen embryos that they claim are biologically their
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The issue that receives the most attention, and which has been raised
in some well-publicized litigation, is who has authority to decide what
will be done with extracorporeal embryos or gametes if they are not used
by their progenitors. The choices include donating them to another
infertile couple, discarding them, or allowing them to be used in
scientific research. Most, but not all, storage facilities either ask or
require the depositors to designate how to dispose of the embryos or
gametes if they are still in storage at the depositor's death or if other
contingencies occur." Disposition issues involve whether the law
classifies the extracorporeal preembryos and gametes as property or as
persons, or as something other than these traditional categories. The
clearly emerging view is that preembryos and gametes are neither
persons nor property, but a special category, over which their progenitors
have decisionmaking authority.'
The new technology permitting extracorporeal storage of gametes
and embryos has created two issues specifically involving inheritance.
The first of these issues is whether a decedent's frozen gametes or
embryos, to which he or she has genetically contributed, form part of the
decedent's estate if they are still frozen at the time of the decedent's
death. The second is whether a child born of frozen embryos or gametes
that were implanted after the genetic parent had died can inherit from the
deceased genetic parent's estate.3" Resolution of these two issues
requires determination of how frozen gametes and embryos are classified.

children. See Calvin Sims, Fertility Clinics in Chile: A Tale of a Doctor Fleeing U.S. Law, N.Y.

TIMES, Apr. 26, 1996, at A14; see also Fertility Clinic Is Sued over the Loss of Embryos, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1995, at 26 (discussing a suit against a Rhode Island clinic for loss of embryos).
344. See Robertson, supra note 3, at 1035; Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 339, at 243.
345. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594-97 (Tenn. 1992); Andrews, supra note 335, at
402; Robertson, supranote 324, at 459. In Professor Robertson's view, a progenitor can argue that
he or she has dispositional authority as a matter of constitutional right. See id. at 460; see also
Chester, supra note 57, at 980-82. For a summary of these issues and the consequences of
classifying a preembryo as a human life, see Jean Voutsinas, In Vitro Fertilization, 12 PROB. L.J.
47, 50-66 (1994), and Colleen M. Browne & Brian J. Hynes, Note, The Legal Status of Frozen
Embryos: Analysis and ProposedGuidelinesfor a Uniform Law, 17 J. LEGIs. 97, 113 (1990).
346. Although the latter issue involving inheritance by a posthumous child has traditionally
arisen with regard to a child conceived before the father's death, with cryopreservation the issue can
also arise with regard to a deceased woman if the recipient of her gametes or embryos either gestates
the child or uses a surrogate to do so. However, because eggs are usually fertilized before they are
frozen, far fewer women will leave frozen eggs with a storage facility than will deposit frozen

preembryos.
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Classification of Gametes and Embryos

For those who believe that human life begins at fertilization, the
preembryo is a life; thus, IVF and cryopreservation raise the same
divisive issues as does abortion. There is no specific legal authority,
however, for this position. In Roe v. Wade, 47 the Supreme Court held
that a fetus in the first trimester is not a person within the Fourteenth
Amendment. 48 Yet, after Roe, several states enacted legislation limiting
research and experimentation on fetuses, or on fetuses in connection with
an abortion, and defined fetus to include an embryo. These statutes could
potentially apply to IVF if it is considered experimentation on an embryo
or could apply to embryo transfer if it is considered abortion?' 9
Moreover, preambles to some states' legislation include language that life
begins at the moment of conception. 50 If the preembryo is a human
being, then it has rights and cannot become part of a deceased genetic
parent's estate. Furthermore, if it is implanted and born alive after a
parent's death, it should inherit from its legal parents.35 1 This description of an embryo as a human being, however, would not apply to frozen

347. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). One court held that Roe was conclusive as to extracorporeal embryos.
See Doe v. Shalala, 862 F. Supp. 1421, 1426 (D. Md. 1994) (holding that an extracorporeal embryo
had no standing to seek an injunction against the National Institutes of Health Human Embryo
Research Panel).
348. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
349. For a summary of these statutes, see Lori B. Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the
New Reproduction Technologies, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1984, at 50, 53-55.
In 1990, a federal district court held that the Illinois abortion law was unconstitutionally
vague. See Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Il1. 1990) (interpreting ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 81-26 (current version at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 510/6 § 6(7) (West 1993))). The statute
banned selling or experimenting upon a fetus "produced by the fertilization of a human ovum by a
human sperm unless such experimentation is therapeutic to the fetus." Id. The statute also provided
that "[n]othing in this subsection (7) is intended to prohibit the performance of in vitro fertilization."
Id. The court agreed that, despite the last sentence in the statute, the statutory terms "experimentation" and "therapeutic" were vague; moreover, experimentation could apply to newly
developed IVF techniques that would not be considered fertilization itself. See id. at 1369. It could
also apply to technologies similar to, but not the same as IVF, such as embryo transfer---removal
of an embryo from one woman's uterus and transferral of that embryo to another woman's uterus
for gestation. See id. at 1367.
350. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205.1(1) (West Supp. 1997). This statute was held
constitutional in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, however, said there was no possibility that the preamble could be applied to prohibit IVF.
See id. at 523 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
351. If the extracorporeal preembryo is a life, then it maybe a life in being for purposes of the
Rule Against Perpetuities. Thus, the Rule would be ineffective as to the preembryo. See McAllister,
supra note 298, at 100; Voutsinas, supra note 345, at 56.
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sperm since fertilization has not occurred.
There is some support in the case law for considering the embryos
as property, although no court faced with the progenitors' use of the
3 52 a doctor
preembryo has so held. In Del Zio v. PresbyterianHospital,
destroyed a culture containing the plaintiffs' sperm and ovum. The judge
left to the jury the question of whether the defendant was liable for
conversion.353 The jury, however, awarded damages only for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 3 54 One commentator describes the case
as implicitly recognizing the couple's ownership interest in the in vitro
gametes.355 However, another concluded that the lesson from Del Zio
is that "the property approach [conversion] has not been accepted as a
satisfactory framework within which to analyze the legal status of the
embryo. 35 6
In York v. Jones,357 the couple sued for custody of its frozen
embryo from an IVF clinic that refused to release the embryo for transfer
to another clinic. 358 The court referred to the contract between the
couple and the clinic as a bailment, and the clinic's retention of the
embryo as conversion;359 thus, in effect treating the embryo as property.
One should note, however, that the consent form between the couple and
the clinic effectively treated the embryos as property by requiring that,
if the couple divorced, the ownership of the preembryos would be
determined in the couple's property settlement.360
Arguably, a frozen embryo or frozen gametes subject to the
procreator's dispositional authority is, in effect, their property since an
aspect of ownership is the right to control and alienate.3 6' Gametes are
routinely sold to sperm banks and fertility clinics by "donors." Embryos
are also sold, except where the practice is prohibited by statute. 362 If

352. No. 74 Civ. 3588 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978) (LEXIS, N.Y. Library, NYMEGA File).

353. See id. "Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel" of
another. RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965).
354. See Del Zio, No. 74 Civ. 3588.
355. See Robertson, supra note 324, at 459.
356. Andrews, supra note 335, at 368.
357. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
358. See id. at 422.
359. See id. at 427.
360. See id. at 424.
361. See Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1986, at 28,
29; Ian Kennedy, The Moral Status of the Embryo, 34 KING'S CouNs. 21, 27 (1984-1985).
362. Several states do not permit the sale or transfer of fetuses or embryos for experimentation
purposes. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAW eb. 112, § 12J(a)(IV) (West 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-02.2-02(4) (1991); RI. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(f) (1994). Some states ban all transfers. See, e.g.,
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preembryos and gametes are property, then not only may they be part of
a divorcing couple's property settlement, but they may also be divided
as community or marital property, held in joint tenancy with the right of
survivorship, or held as tenants by the entireties.363 At the death of the
spouses, they may be part of an estate to be inherited by the progenitors'
heirs." If the frozen preembryo is property and an IVF clinic mistakenly or intentionally transfers a frozen embryo to the wrong woman's
uterus, the progenitors could arguably sue for custody or conversion.365
Thus far, most commentators and courts have used a middle ground
that considers the preembryo as a potential person entitled to "profound
respect" but not entitled to the full legal and moral rights of a person,
and not treated as property.366 This categorization has not clarified how
the progenitors may treat their frozen gametes or preembryos, that is,
what is permissibly within their decisionmaking authority over
preembryos. The concept of "profound respect" appears in a 1979 report
of the Ethics Advisory Board of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare ("HEW"), which was issued to provide guidelines for
research proposals involving human IVF.367 While the report does not
consider issues involving private agreements to dispose of embryos or
inheritance, it recommends that the secretary of HEW encourage the
enactment of a uniform law to clarify an embryo's legal status.36 The
reports of the American Fertility Society369 and of committees in other
countries studying reproductive technology have also employed this

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.05 (West 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West 1991); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-311 (1995). In England, by statute, embryos may be sold by licensed authorities. The
controlled trade has been described as treating embryos as chattels. See DOUGLAS, supra note 171,

at 34-35.
363. See ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 105.
364. For a summary of other consequences of classifying the frozen preembryo as property, see

George P. Smith II, Australia'sFrozen 'Orphan' Embryos: A Medical, Legal and EthicalDilemma,
24 J. FA1M. L. 27, 31 (1985-1986), and Voutsinas, supra note 345, at 64-66.
365. See Voutsinas, supra note 345, at 64; Sims, supra note 343, at A14.
366. See ETHICS ADVISORY BD., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, REPORT AND
CONCLUSIONS: HEW SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND

E BRYO TRANSFER 101 (1979); see also Davis v. Davis, 824 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (discussing
the special status of preembryos); Voutsinas, supra note 345, at 50-66 (same); Browne & Hynes,
supra note 345, at 113.

367. See ETHICS ADVISORY BD., supra note 366, at 101.
368. See id. at 113-14.
369. See Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 175, at 49S.
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description of the special status of the extracorporeal preembryo with
regard to research."'
The Tennessee Supreme Court, in Davis v. Davis, 37' adopted this
middle ground and described frozen preembryos as neither property nor
persons, but as occupying a special status entitled to "special respect
because of their potential for human life."372 The Davises had frozen
and stored several preembryos during their marriage, but had not
executed an agreement specifying how to dispose of the unused embryos.
The couple divorced and could not agree on who would have custody of
the embryos, or how they would otherwise be disposed. At the time of
the divorce, the wife wanted custody in order to bear children. The
husband wanted to keep the embryos frozen in order to decide their
ultimate disposition.373 The trial court decided that the embryos were
human beings and that their best interest required that they be awarded
to the wife so that they could be given life.374 The appellate court
reversed and awarded joint custody to the couple for them to agree to
their disposition.375 Yet, as the Tennessee Supreme Court later said, the
appellate court's decision "left the implication" that the Davises' interest
in the preembryos was "in the nature of a property interest."376
The couple could not agree, and when the case finally reached the
Tennessee Supreme Court, the parties had each remarried. The ex-Ms.
Davis (then Ms. Stowe) no longer wanted to implant the embryos but,
instead, intended to donate them to another couple.
Mr. Davis,
however, wanted to discard them.378 The court first made clear that it
considered the embryos as neither persons nor property but, instead, as
possessing a special status. That status gave the progenitors full
decisionmaking authority over the use of the embryos, an authority which
the court would have enforced if it was exercised by the couple.379
Because they had not, and their choices now conflicted, the court

370. See, e.g., ROYAL COMM'N ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHS., PROCEED WITH CARE: FiNAL

REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 635 (1993); MARY
WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LiFE: THE WARNOCK REPORT ON HUMAN FERTILISATION AND
EMBRYOLOGY 63 (1985).
371. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
372. Id. at 597.
373. See id. at 591-92.
374. See id. at 589.
375. See id.
376. Id. at 596.
377. See id. at 590.
378. See id.
379. See id.at 597.
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balanced, what it labeled Davis's constitutional right not to procreate
with Stowe's right to procreation.
The court then concluded that Davis's right outweighed that of his
ex-wife, taking into account the facts that Stowe did not intend to gestate
the embryos to raise as her children, and that she had, what the court
considered, a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood either by
future IVF or by adoption."' The court evaluated Davis's interest in
avoiding procreation against the background of his childhood. Davis's
parents divorced and he was raised in a boys' home. Davis did not want
to have a genetic child who would be raised either by him or his ex-wife
as a single parent, or by another couple.38' The court also alluded to the
3 82
financial consequences to Davis if a preembryo was brought to term.
Although the court put it in the context if Stowe and not a donee had
borne the child, the court indicated that the child would be a child of the
Davis marriage. 83 Thus, Davis would be both the genetic and the legal
father-liable for the child's support-despite the fact that the child
would have been born within Stowe's second marriage. 3 Unless
Stowe's second husband adopted the child, the child would also be
Davis's heir.
In Kass v. Kass,385 another divorce action, a New York court
reached a different result from that in Davis. Kass differed from Davis
in that the wife in Kass wanted custody of the frozen preembryos for
implantation in herself. The court held that the wife's interests were
paramount to the husband's and awarded her custody and exclusive
decisionmaking authority over the preembryo 86 The court equated the
male's role in fertilization by IVF with that in coitus, after which the
male cannot prevent fertilization, implantation, and birth.387 However,
if coitus results in pregnancy, the woman bears the risks of the pregnancy, which she does not if the embryo remains frozen. In IVF, unlike
fertilization in vivo, the fertilized egg need not be immediately gestated;

380. See id. at 604.
at 603-04.
381. See id.
382. See id. at 603.
383. Presumably, the same would apply if a surrogate bore the child for Stowe.

384. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603.
385. 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995). The parties had signed a consent form
with the IVF clinic which provided that if the parties divorced, ownership of the stored preembryos
would be determined in a property settlement, and the clinic would release the preembryos as

ordered by the court. See id. at *3.
386. See id. at *5.
387. See id. at *3; see also Voutsinas, supra note 345, at 58 n.62.
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thus, the Kass court said that in IVF the male impliedly agrees to permit
delayed implantation.388 Under Kass, the male progenitor would be the
child's legal parent,389 presumably subject to the same parental duties,
and his estate subject to the child's inheritance as would a father of a
child conceived through coitus. This result would also have been
achieved in Davis if the court had awarded the embryos to Stowe and
she had gestated one or more of them to raise as her children.39
B.

Gametes and Embryos as InheritableProperty

Inheritance issues did not directly arise in either Davis or Kass, but
if any progenitor had died during the time that his or her embryos were
extracorporeal, then the question could have arisen whether the embryos
became an asset of that decedent's estate. The issue of whether a
decedent's frozen genetic material is part of the estate has been litigated
with regard to a decedent's frozen semen, but not with regard to a frozen
embryo. In Hecht v. Superior Court ("Hecht r),,,' the decedenttestator, William Kane, had frozen several vials of his sperm and signed
a storage agreement instructing the storage facility that, in the event of
his death, it should continue storing the sperm or release it to his
executor at the executor's option.392 In his will, executed just prior to
storing the sperm, he bequeathed his sperm to his companion Deborah
Hecht, saying that if she desired, it was his wish that Hecht use the
sperm to conceive a child.393 He left the remainder of his estate to
Hecht and his two adult children. Although Kane named Hecht as the
executor of his estate, she was not serving as executor at the time of the
litigation and may never have served.39 Kane had committed suicide,
and his adult children contested the will on grounds that Kane had lacked
mental capacity and had been subject to undue influence. Hecht and the
children attempted settlement agreements. Eventually, the children sought
the destruction of Kane's frozen sperm, which a lower court ordered but

388. See Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2.
389. See id. at *4-5.
390. Israel's Supreme Court recently awarded custody of a couple's frozen embryos to the wife,
against the husband's wishes. The wife planned to use a surrogate for gestation. The husband had
initiated divorce proceedings and presumably will contest whether he must support whatever children
are born of their embryos. See Joel Greenberg, IsraeliCourt Gives Wife the Right to HerEmbryos,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 13, 1996, at AIO.
391.

20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993).

392. See id. at 276.
393. See id.
394. See id. at 276 n.I.
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an appellate court reversed.3 95
The appellate court first determined that the probate court had
jurisdiction because, although the frozen sperm was not personal
property, Kane had decisionmaking authority over the sperm. The court
characterized the decedent's authority over his frozen sperm as "in the
nature of ownership."3' 96 Thus, the sperm constituted the decedent's
property for purposes of jurisdiction for the probate court.397 The court

noted, however, that Kane's ownership interest was not a property
interest that allowed him to transfer his sperm as an inter vivos gift or a
gift causa mortis."' Indeed, the court later held in Hecht v. Superior
Court ("Hecht II") that the sperm was not an asset of the estate subject
to the beneficiaries' property settlement. 99 The court in Hecht I court
did not explain why the decedent could transfer his interest in his sperm
by means of a posthumous gift in his will or by a storage agreement with
the sperm bank, but not by means of a lifetime gift, except to say that
the sperm was reproductive material.0 0 In other words, the frozen
sperm occupied a special status. The court likened frozen sperm stored
with the intent that it be used for AI to the Davises' frozen preembryos
because of the sperm's potential to create a child."'
However, in Hecht II, the court did explain that Kane's sperm was
not subject to division under the property settlement because "[a] man's
sperm or a woman's ova or a couple's embryos are not the same as a
quarter of land, a cache of cash, or a favorite limousine" but, instead,
must be used only as the decedent intended. 2 The court ultimately
based this decision on its unsupported view that the decedent, who could
have procreated coitally with Hecht while he was alive, had a "'fundamental right' to procreate with the woman of his choice." 3
It was on those grounds of categorization that a Louisiana court, in
Hall v. Fertility Institute,4 4 treated a decedent's frozen sperm more like
property than did the court in Hecht I and Hecht II. The decedent, Hall,
had frozen several vials of sperm before he underwent chemotherapy. His

395.
396.
397.
398.

See id. at 279-80.
Id. at 281.
See id.
See id.
at 283.

399. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 226 (Ct. App. 1996).

400. See Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283.
401. See id. at 281.
402. Hecht, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 226.

403. Id. at 227.
404. 647 So. 2d 1348 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
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intended donee, St. John, began preparations for AI before Hall died, but
then discontinued them, and the sperm remained on deposit. After Hall's
death, St. John claimed ownership of the sperm as the donee of Hall's
inter vivos gift by a written act of donation. 5 Hall's executrix claimed
the sperm as property of the estate.' The lower court granted a
preliminary injunction which prevented release or use of the sperm, and
St. John appealed. 7 The court did not classify the sperm as holding a
special status4. 8 and accepted the framing of the issue as whether the
sperm had been given to St. John by inter vivos gift or whether it was
part of the probate estate. The court affirmed the preliminary injunction
preventing the use and release of the sperm to St. John.409 It referred
to the fact that Hall had left nothing in his will to St. John, nor had he
made other financial arrangements for a future child, as possible evidence
410
of his lack of donative intent.
Except for the Hecht II decision, the consequences of classifying
frozen gametes as a status different from a person or property, deserving
special respect, do not seem significantly different from labeling them as
property. That may also be the case as to preembryos, at least if
experimentation is not involved. If progenitors can transfer frozen
preembryos at their deaths by a dispositional agreement with a clinic,
then they also should be able to bequeath their frozen embryos. Like
Kane's frozen semen, the frozen embryos would have to be considered
property of the decedent's estate. In both Hecht decisions, the court
likened Kane's frozen semen to frozen embryos when it labeled the
semen as deserving special status.41 In Davis, the court awarded the
frozen preembryos to the husband, in effect treating them as property that
could be destroyed.4 12
Thus, it is not impossible that frozen embryos be classified as
property of a decedent's estate, although there exist important differences

405. See id. at 1349.
406. See id.
407. See id.
408. In Louisiana, viable embryos are considered persons and they may not be discarded. See
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 1991). However, the court did not analogize the decedent's
sperm to an embryo.

409. See Hall, 647 So. 2d at 1351.
410. See i. at 1351-52.
411. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222,226 (Ct. App. 1996); Hecht v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 281 (Ct. App. 1993).

412. The ABA Journalreported that, on June 10, 1993, Davis removed the frozen embryos from
the IVF clinic, "took them home and disposed of them," but would not say what he did with them.
Mark Curriden, Embyos' End, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1993, at 42, 42.
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between gametes and embryos. Without fertilization, gametes are one
very important step back from a preembryo, not yet containing the
chromosomes to develop into a particular person and not capable of
being gestated. Several states recognize the distinction between gametes
and embryos, assigning higher value to the embryo in that they forbid the
sale of embryos, but not the sale of gametes." 3 Gametes are more
analogous to renewable body tissues like blood, which is often sold.
Embryos, however, are closer to human life, and their sale may be
considered analogous to baby selling. Yet, the American Fertility Society
guidelines treat gametes4 14 and embryos415 identically, although recommending that "donors" not receive substantial payment, but only
41 6
compensation for their expenses and time, including inconvenience.
Another difference between preembryos and gametes is that the
frozen preembryos are the creation of two gamete donors and cannot be
divided. The donors' interests would be difficult to sever if the decedent
had not bequeathed his or her interest in the embryos to the other
progenitor, or if the progenitors had not executed contractual joint or
mutual wills417 bequeathing the embryos. Yet, testators who had
thought about executing contractual wills would most likely also have
thought to make arrangements for post-death disposition with the storage
facility. If not, the survivor should succeed to sole dispositional authority.
A court's options here could include viewing the embryos as the
progenitors' joint property or as tenants by the entirety's property that
passes to the survivor.418
If both progenitors die, however, without arranging for disposition

413. See ANDREWS, supra note 175, at 166. Professor Andrews argues that a ban on payment
to embryo donors may be unconstitutional as an infringement on potential recipients' rights of

procreation. See Lori B. Andrews, RegulationofExperimentationon the Unborn, 14 J. LEGAL MED.
25, 45 (1993). But see Annas, supra note 49, at 51-52 (posing arguments against a commercial

market in human embryos).
414. See Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 175, at 49S.
415. See id. at 47S; see also Andrews, supra note 361, at 32 (referring to embryos as

regenerative bodily products arguably similar to blood, sweat, and semen); John Dwight Ingram, In
Vitro Fertilization:Problemsand Solutions, 98 DicK. L. REv. 67, 75 (1993) (discussing the privacy

interest in the "use and disposition" of in vitro embryos).
416. See Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 175, at 49S.
417. Contractual wills, usually entered into by a husband and wife, are executed pursuant to a

contract not to revoke. They may take the form of a joint will, which is one instrument signed by
two (or more) testators as the will of each, or of mutual wills, which are separate wills that contain
almost identical provisions. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 37, at 306-07. Where the
wills are contractual, the courts will enforce their provisions even if the survivor has revoked and

executed a new will. See id. at 291.
418. See Djalleta, supra note 53, at 358.
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of the embryo or embryos, the executor would have to determine the
embryos' disposition. Hecht II is limited to the situation in which the
progenitor names the beneficiary who is alive at his death and willing to
accept the gift.419 If both progenitors of a frozen embryo die, and
neither has left instructions that the embryo be donated to a willing
recipient, orhave left no instructions so that the executor or facility can
give the embryo to others, the embryo is then considered donated.
Although at the time of cryopreservation the progenitors may have
intended to raise the child, like a sperm donor who makes a posthumous
gift, the progenitors of the embryo would not have intended to raise the
child if the conditions of the gift occurred. Most commentators would
analogize the situation to embryo donation so that the recipients would
be the child's parents.42
If a decedent's frozen gametes and preembryos are property of a
testate decedent's estate for purposes of a probate court's jurisdiction,
then the question arises whether they should also pass by intestate
succession or to a testate decedent's residuary beneficiary. The Hecht I
court decided the jurisdictional issue on the basis that the decedent had
decisionmaking authority over his frozen sperm.4 2' On that basis, frozen
sperm would be property, for jurisdictional purposes, in an intestate
estate, as well as a testate one. As a result, the frozen reproductive
material of any person who died, who had not otherwise provided for
their disposal, would be distributed to the person's intestate heirs or to
a testate decedent's residuary beneficiaries. Besides the moral issue
involved in treating gametes and preembryos as administered property,
this outcome would raise difficult valuation and division issues and could
require the administrator of any estate to determine whether the decedent
had left frozen reproductive material at any clinic. If both progenitors of
frozen embryos died intestate and their embryos were inheritable, the
embryos would have to be divided among their heirs, a distribution that
would be more difficult if they left only one embryo." On these
grounds, the Hecht I decision might be limited to a decedent who had
exercised decisionmaking authority and devised the gametes or

419. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222 (Ct. App. 1996).
420. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 342, at 377.
421. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 281 (Ct. App. 1993).
422. See Brashier, supra note 57, at 211 n.399. There are proposals that if both progenitors die,
their embryos still in storage should be destroyed. See Annas, supra note 49, at 51; Developments
in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HAIt. L. REv. 1519, 1546 (1990). The Wamock
Commission, however, recommended that the embryos pass to the storage authority. See VARNOCK,
supra note 370, at 56.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss4/3

62

Shapo: Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of Reproducti
1997]

INHERITANCE CONSEQUENCES OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES

1153

preembryos to specific beneficiaries.
C. InheritanceRights of Postmortem Children
If both frozen gametes and preembryos are to be treated no
differently from property in terms of their alienability as part of a
decedent's estate while they remain frozen, their "special" status must
come from the possibility of successful fertilization (for gametes),
implantation, gestation, and birth. It is evident that once implanted, the
embryo will no longer be property but, instead, a fetus developing during
gestation into a person, subject to the gestating woman's right to
abort.4" Thus, the progenitors will have lost their property interest in
the embryo; for example, they could not get an injunction against its
destruction by the gestator. Since inheritance law recognizes gestation
and birth as triggering events, the legal focus then changes from the
preembryo as property of the progenitor to the child's property rights in
the parent's estate. One type of recognition would be to treat the posthumous child as a potential beneficiary to the decedent parent's estate, even
if the child had been implanted after the progenitor's death. Otherwise,
the designation of "special status" means only that the reproductive
material can be alienated before implantation, but after implantation and
birth, the child cannot take from its progenitor's estate. This latter
conclusion is the result under current law.
1. Present Law
Under present law, posthumous children of a deceased married man
are treated as "in being" and are able to inherit if the child is born alive
within either 280 or 300 days after the father's death,424 and it is to the
child's advantage to be treated as "in being" from the time of conception.
This rule protects both the posthumous child's inheritance from the
deceased parent's estate and the parent who presumably would have
wanted all his children to receive support from the estate.4" The 280300 day period in utero presumes that the child is the legitimate child of
a married decedent. A child born after being cryopreserved as a
preembryo falls within the first part of the definition of a posthumous
child because the child would have been conceived before the

423. See Voutsinas, supra note 345, at 65.
424. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(1), 9B U.L.A. 298 (1987) (providing that a child born
within 300 days of death of the husband is presumed the child of the husband).

425. See Coelus, supra note 340, at 137.
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progenitor's death. However, the embryo may not have been implanted
and born until years after the progenitor died. This holds true even if it
is the mother who dies, because the embryo could be gestated by a

surrogate. However, if the decedent left frozen gametes, rather than
embryos in storage, a child born from the gametes would be conceived
after the decedent's death, and thus, could not satisfy any part of the
current definition of a posthumous child.426

The 1969 UPC and many state statutes provide for inheritance by
the decedent's relatives who were "conceived before [the decedent's]

death but born thereafter." 27 The 1990 UPC changed that language to
read the following: "An individual in gestation at a particular time is
treated as living at that time if the individual lives 120 hours or more
after birth." The 1990 UPC, therefore, excludes a child born of the
decedent's embryo implanted after the decedent's death because the

cryopreserved embryo is not then in gestation.
The USCACA also completely excludes posthumously implanted
embryos from inheritance. Under section 4(b) of the USCACA, the child
would not inherit from the deceased parent because "[a]n individual who
dies before implantation of an embryo, or before a child is conceived

other than through sexual intercourse, using the individual's egg or
sperm, is not a parent of the resulting child.""29 The drafters chose to
provide finality in determining parenthood and in closing the decedent's
estate.43

Similarly, citing the USCACA, the Hecht I court said that it would

426. The most famous story of possible inheritance for children born of frozen embryos is the
1984 Rios episode. Ms. Rios froze two preembryos, conceived of her eggs and sperm from an
anonymous donor. The embryos were cryopreserved at an Australian IVF clinic at the time Mr. and
Ms. Rios died in an airplane crash. They had left no instructions for the embryos. The couple were
residents of California and left no will. Because the Rioses were wealthy, there was speculation that
if children were born of the embryos they would be intestate heirs. However, the estate was
distributed to other relatives. As to the fate of the frozen embryos, the Victoria legislature rejected
a proposal from a specially appointed committee to discard the embryos, and instead required that
the embryos be given to a suitable recipient. There was no suggestion that the embryos should form
part of the Rioses' estates. See Smith, supra note 364, at 27-29.
427. UNiF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (1969) (amended 1993). For examples of states that have
followed this model, see ALA. CODE § 43-8-47 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.106 (West 1995);
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (1991).
428. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108, 8 U.L.A. 104 (Supp. 1996).
429. USCACA, supra note 69, § 4(b), 9B U.L.A. 166. This is the only nonsurrogacy section
of the USCACA that applies to a child born of both parents' gametes. See also N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-18-04(2) (1991) ("A person who dies before a conception using his sperm or her egg is not a
parent of any resulting child born of the conception.').
430. See USCACA, supra note 69, § 4 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 166.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss4/3

64

Shapo: Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of Reproducti
1997]

INHERITANCE CONSEQUENCESOF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES

1155

not have kept Kane's estate open for the posthumously conceived
child.43 The California Probate Code defined posthumous children as
those "conceived before the decedent's death but born thereafter." '32
That definition would not have included a child conceived of Kane's
sperm after he died. Citing the importance of finality in closing an estate
for a decedent's heirs and for the courts, the court opined that if Hecht
gave birth to children conceived with Kane's sperm, they could not be
beneficiaries in Kane's estate.433 Neither the comment to the USCACA,
nor the Hecht I court explains why finality should outweigh other
concerns regarding the estate of a decedent who intends posthumous
reproduction. In that situation, the person very consciously did not opt
for finality of lineage.
2. Testate Decedent
Most authorities believe that under present law, if a person provides
by will for a posthumously implanted child ("postmortem child"), 434
then that gift should be valid.435 The estate could be kept open or the
child's share could be held in a statutory trust until the child's birth.
Indeed, there exists some specific statutory authority for testamentary
gifts to postmortem children. The Florida Domestic Relations Code
specifies that a postmortem child is not "eligible for a claim against the
decedent's estate unless the child has been provided for by the decedent's
will."436 The commentary to the USCACA is similar.437
If posthumously conceived children are to be assimilated to children
conceived by coitus for purposes of taking from a testate procreator's
estate, they also should be considered pretermitted heirs if they are not
mentioned in the will, or as members of a class of the decedent's
children, issue, heirs, or similar terms. Professor Barton Leach, for
example, recommends a standard will clause in order to include "sperm-

431. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 290 (Ct. App. 1993). In Hecht II,
however, the court said that it did not decide whether Kane's potential future child could inherit as
Kane's heir. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 228-29 (Ct. App. 1996). This second
decision postdated an amendment to the California Code that may have permitted the child to prove

paternity. See infra text accompanying notes 449-50.
432. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6407 (West 1991).
433. See Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290.
434. This is a term used by Djalleta, supra note 53, at 335.
435. See Ingram, supra note 415, at 77-78; Robertson, supra note 347, at 371; Winthrop D.

Thies, A Look to the Future:PropertyRights and the Posthumously Conceived Child, 110 TR. &
EST. 922, 922 (1971).
436. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West 1997).

437. See USCACA, supra note 69, § 4 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 166-67.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

65

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1091

bank children.., in such class designations as 'children' or 'issue.'' 438
One mischief in the pretermitted heir situation is that some
pretermitted heir statutes apply to a decedent's grandchildren, as well as
children. Thus, all parents' estates may have to be kept open awaiting

birth of their children's postmortem children. Therefore, the application
of the pretermitted heir statutes may have to be limited to a decedent's
own children. Of course, one other consequence of a rule recognizing the
child as a pretermitted heir is that every testator who has stored frozen
gametes or embryos would probably be advised to include a statement
of intent as to a possible postmortem child's inheritance or disinheritance

in order to avoid the possibility of a postmortem pretermitted heir.439
Another result of including postmortem children in class gifts is that the
gift may then violate the Rule Against Perpetuities." °

438. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank and the Fertile
Decedent, 48 A.BA.. J. 942, 944 (1962). Professor Robertson, however, would not include
postmortem children in class gifts or under intestacy statutes in order to bring finality to estate
administration. See Robertson, supra note 342, at 375; see also Brashier, supra note 57, at 220-21
(defining a posthumously conceived child as a child of a surviving parent but having no claim as
a postmortem, pretermitted child); Chester, supra note 57, at 984 (maintaining that the law of wills
should not be stretched to include postmortem children absent the testator's express intent to do so);
cf Thies, supra note 435, at 923 (including posthumously conceived children in class gifts only in
instruments made by third parties after passage of a uniform act conferring inheritance rights).
439. See Leach, supra note 438, at 944; see also Chester, supra note 57, at 995 (arguing that
a testator should not be able to omit postmortem children); Djalleta, supra note 53, at 365
(suggesting amendments to the UPC so that postmortem children would not be pretermitted).
440. The postmortem child may be excluded as a class beneficiary, however, if the gift comes
within the Rule of Convenience as to the closing of classes. The rule is that "a class closes to futureborn members when any member can call for a distribution of principal (absent expression of a
contrary intent by the testator or settlor)." Leach, supra note 438, at 944.
If the child is excluded by the class closing rule, that will avoid another problem with class
gifts, namely the Rule Against Perpetuities, a problem foreseen by Professor Leach in 1962. A
postmortem child born many years after the progenitor's death may easily raise the possibility that
property will vest in that child after the time period required by the Rule (property can be subject
to contingent interests for the period of "lives in being" plus 21 years). Gifts by a donor "to my
children" or "to my grandchildren" may be void under the Rule where the parent has cryopreserved
gametes or preembryos. For analysis of these issues and suggested solutions, see Leach, supra note
438, at 944. Professor Leach would have defied the duration of a male life in being as "the period
of his reproductive capacity, including any post-mortem period during which his sperm remains
fertile." Id. For discussions regarding the Rule Against Perpetuities and its relation to posthumous
reproduction, see Brashier, supra note 57, at 214-18; Chester, supra note 57, at 982-83; Carolyn
Sappideen, Life After Death-Sperm Banks, Wills and Perpetuites, 53 AUSTL. L.J. 311, 318-19
(1979); and Thies, supra note 435, at 923, 960,
The UPC would disregard the possibility that "a child will be born to an individual after the
individual's death" for purposes of the Rule Against Perpetuities. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-901(d),
8 U.L.A. 208 (Supp. 1996). The comment, however, offers no opinion about the legal status of those
children.
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3. Intestate Decedent
An Australian court, the Supreme Court of Tasmania, has recently
decided that a child born of a frozen embryo, conceived by IVF of the
gametes of a husband and his wife while both were alive and intended
to be gestated by the wife after the husband had died, would be the
decedent's child and have the same status as would a posthumous child
conceived coitally." If born alive, the child would be the decedent's
intestate heir." 2 In this case, however, the decedent's estate would not
have remained open for a long period of time because the wife intended
to implant the embryos immediately. 3 The court also held that the
child would not have to prove paternity because it was conceived during
marriage.' 4
It seems less likely that a child born postmortem from an intestate
decedent's frozen gametes, rather than a frozen embryo, would be
considered a posthumous child. Besides the hurdles that the policy of
finality presents from postmortem conception, the child born of a male
decedent's frozen sperm may have difficulty proving paternity unless
state law permits proof of paternity after the alleged father's death. Even
a child born to the decedent's widow may not be a marital child because
the child was not conceived during marriage and may have to prove
paternity in order to inherit."5 Moreover, if the decedent's widow is no
longer considered his wife, under a state's AID statute, the decedent
could be considered a donor and not the child's legal father.
In Hecht I, where the recipient of the decedent's sperm would not
have been his widow but, instead, was identified in the decedent's will,
the court pointed out that if the decedent had left property to his
children, the postmortem child would not likely have been included."
The child would not have been able to prove its paternity under the then
existing statute-which allowed a nonmarital child to establish a parentchild relationship with the father only by a judgment of paternity during
the father's life or by a father's openly holding out the child as his
own."7 The court saw no policy issues regarding the child's possible

441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.

See In re Estate of K, 1996 TAS LEXIS 479, at *18-20 (Tas. Sup. Ct. Apr. 22, 1996).
See id. at *10.
See id. at *2.
See id. at *18-19.
See Sappideen, supra note 440, at 312.
See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 290 (Ct. App. 1993).
See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6408(f)(2) (West 1991).
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need for support. According to the court, it was "entirely speculative"
that a child born to Hecht of the decedent's sperm would require public
support because its mother might not be able to support the child, and
the child had not received any resources from its biological father's
estate.
The section of the California code determining paternity has since
been amended to permit a child to establish paternity if "[i]t was
impossible for the father to hold out the child as his own and paternity
is established by clear and convincing evidence." 9 This language
should now permit a postmortem child to prove paternity even if the
child were conceived after the alleged father died.45 0 Thus, if frozen
gametes could be property of an intestate estate, or if the decedent had
left a directive with the clinic naming the intended recipient, the
administrator of the estate would have to investigate extensively, not only
to determine whether the decedent had left frozen gametes, but also
whether the decedent might become the posthumous biological father of
future claimants.
4. Survivor Benefits
Despite the Hecht I court's dubiety about the economic vulnerability
of children in those circumstances, children of single parents are often in
need of public support or, at least, are economically disadvantaged. A
recent decision of the Social Security Administration may encourage
states to examine the issue of whether a postmortem child is an heir of
the deceased biological parent so that the child will be eligible for social
security survivor benefits. The Social Security Act provides survivor
benefits for an insured decedent's marital children and nonmarital
children if they would take as heirs under the state's inheritance law; the
decedent had been the child's regular source of support; or the decedent
had openly acknowledged the child.45' The situation at issue involved
a Louisiana law which did not determine whether a posthumously
conceived child born to a decedent's widow of the decedent's frozen
sperm was entitled to social security survivor benefits as the decedent's
child.

448. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290.
449. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6453(b)(3) (West Supp. 1997).
450. See DUKEMInER & JOHANSON, supra note 37, at 91. But see Chester, supra note 57, at

986 (arguing that section 6407 of the California Probate Code could still be interpreted to require
the child to be conceived before the decedent's death).
451. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A)-(3)(C) (1994).
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The child, Judith Hart,452 was conceived by GIFT453 performed
on her mother three months after the husband's death, using the deceased
husband's frozen sperm.454 Under Louisiana law, Judith was not
considered her father's intestate heir but, instead, was an illegitimate
child.455 The mother's application for social security benefits for Judith
was initially denied. Judith's mother pursued her claim through agency
procedures, as well as by filing suit in federal court to declare the
Louisiana statute unconstitutional.4 6
An administrative law judge ruled that Judith was the legitimate
child of her deceased father.4" An appeals panel reversed,458 but the
Social Security Commissioner ("Commissioner"), stating publicly only
that the Administration is reviewing the issues, awarded the child
survivor benefits, and the suit was withdrawn.4 9 Even though the child
could not have been conceived by Ms. Hart's "husband's" sperm because
she was then a widow," the Commissioner must have determined that
the child was the Harts' marital child and not illegitimate since the
statute's requirements for survivor benefits for a nonmarital child had not
been met: Mr. Hart had not been a regular source of support for his
postmortem child, and the child was not his intestate heir under
Louisiana law.
If the Commissioner's decision holds, it may carry important
implications for future legislation and creates an incentive for states to
enable postmortem children to receive survivor benefits. It may permit

452. For a discussion of Hart's case, see Chester, supra note 57, at 988-92.
453. GIFT is a procedure in which a mixture of sperm and egg are inserted into a woman's
fallopian tubes for fertilization in vivo. See supra note 278.
454. See Rick Bragg, CheatingDeath, and Testing a Reproductive Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 22,
1994, at A16.
455. "Illegitimate children are those who are conceived and bom out of marriage." LA. CIr.
CODE ANN. art. 180 (West 1993). The Federal Social Security Act relies on state laws in determining
eligibility for benefits. Since Louisiana did not recognize that Judith had a father, benefits were
originally denied to her. See Bragg, supra note 454, at A16.
456. See Mark Curriden, A Dadfor Judith Hart, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 30, 30; Bragg, supra
note 454, at A16.
457. See Curriden, supra note 456, at 30.
458. See Joseph Wharton, 'Miracle'Baby Denied Benefits, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 38, 38.
459. See Girl to Get Benefits in Death of FatherBefore Conception, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
1996, at A13.
460. NV.Barton Leach proposed that a child conceived postmortem by the decedent's widow
of the decedent's frozen sperm be declared the decedent's legitimate child if the widow had not
remarried. See Leach, supranote 438, at 944; see also Sappideen, supranote 440, at 312 (suggesting
that the courts would likely rule in favor of legitimacy where a posthumously conceived child is born
to the deceased father's widow who has not yet remarried).
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all children conceived of posthumously implanted embryos, or embryos
conceived posthumously of gametes of a married couple, and perhaps of
the sperm of an unmarried man, to collect social security survivor
benefits of an insured decedent if they can prove biological paternity or
maternity under state law. The child may be entitled to benefits
regardless of the decedent's intent to be a parent. Indeed, if the sperm or
eggs were surgically removed from a dead person, the decedent may not
have intended to freeze his or her gametes for later use. A postmortem
child also may be entitled to benefits if the state has redefined posthumous children to include embryos either conceived or implanted after the
insured's death. As a result, a decedent's biological child born more than
300 days after the decedent's death may take from the decedent's estate.
Lastly, any amendments should specify how the statute relates to other
statutes, especially the state's AID and IVF legislation, under which a
male decedent who left frozen sperm may be considered a donor, and not
the child's parent.
VI.

SURROGATE CONTRACTS

Surrogate motherhood, another seedbed of issues for inheritance law,
is not itself a reproductive technology. Rather, it is a term used to
describe a private contractual arrangement by which a woman agrees,
before pregnancy, to gestate a child whom she will relinquish for
adoption by the other contracting party or parties. In the typical
surrogacy arrangement, termed traditional surrogacy,"' a woman, who
is usually designated a surrogate or a surrogate mother, contracts with a
married couple, the wife of which cannot produce eggs or bear a child.
The surrogate undergoes AI, using the semen of the husband of the
contracting couple, and if she becomes pregnant, the contract provides
that she is obligated to relinquish the child to its biological father after
childbirth. In addition, she must consent to the child's adoption by the
father's wife. The surrogate is, in effect, a surrogate wife and the child's
biological mother.
An alternative form of surrogacy, gestational surrogacy, may be
used when the wife of the commissioning couple is able to produce eggs
but cannot gestate a child. The wife's eggs are fertilized in vitro by her
husband's sperm, and a fertilized egg is transferred to the surrogate for

461. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 894 (Ct. App. 1994). This type of
surrogacy has also been called partial surrogacy. See DOUGLAS, supra note 171, at 142.
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gestation." This form of surrogacy may also be accomplished by
embryo transfer, where the wife conceives by coitus and the embryo is
taken by lavage and transferred to the surrogate. In both of these
situations, the child has two different mothers: a genetic mother and a
gestational mother. People may also arrange surrogacy with donated
gametes or a donated embryo from other parties.
Surrogacy is often arranged through commercial surrogacy brokers
who recruit women and match them with intending parents for a fee.'6
Some of these services are staffed with medical and psychological
personnel, as well as with lawyers, to screen and counsel the surrogate. 46 A surrogacy contract provides for payment to the surrogate,
usually about $10,000 plus expenses," which is now frequently
designated not as payment for the child but, instead, as payment for her
services, time, expenses, and inconvenience. Typically, most of the
payment is not due until after the surrogate relinquishes the child to the
biological father's custody and consents to the adoption of the child by
the father's wife.466 Some contracts also limit the surrogate's activities
while she is pregnant, such as requiring that she not smoke or drink
alcohol, or that she undergo medical procedures such as amniocentesis
or electronic fetal monitoring.'
If the surrogate is married, her husband is often a party to the
contract.46 His participation, however, may take different forms
depending upon the particular state's laws. For example, the surrogate's
husband may consent to the surrogacy arrangement; however, if the state
has an AID statute, but no surrogacy statute, he may also explicitly not
consent to his wife's AL.469 This is so because under an AID statute, a
consenting husband is considered the child's legal father, and the
contracting male remains only a sperm donor who is not considered the

462. This type of surrogacy has been called full surrogacy. See DOUGLAS, supra note 171, at
142.
463. See id. at 152-54.
464. See INFERTiLITY, supra note 172, at 270.

465. See id. at 275.
466. See id. at 276; see also Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong,
704 S.W.2d 209,210-11 (Ky. 1986) ("The surrogate mother receives a fee from the biological father,
part of which is paid before delivery of the child and the remainder of which is paid after entry of

a judgment terminating the parental rights of the surrogate mother.').
467. See INFERTLrrY, supra note 172, at 278.

468. See USCACA, supra note 69, § 5 (Alternative A), 9B U.L.A. 167 (providing that the
surrogate's husband may enter into the agreement, but must join in the petition for the court's

approval of the contract).
469. See, e.g., Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 362 N.W.2d 211,212 (Mich. 1985) (per curiam).
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child's natural father.47 ° If the state has neither a surrogacy nor an AID
statute, the surrogate's husband may be the presumed father and would
then be required to rebut the presumption that the child is his marital
child.
The primary statutory hurdles to enforcement of a surrogacy contract
are adoption laws. These statutes typically forbid an adopting parent to
pay for the adopted child;47 they forbid preconception adoption agreements;472 and they require a waiting period after the child's birth,473
during which the child's mother may revoke her decision to place her
child up for adoption. Most litigated surrogacy disputes have arisen when
the surrogate changes her mind and does not relinquish the child.474
However, even in cases where the surrogate relinquished the child,
litigation has sometimes been required in order to effectuate the intended
result.47
A.

Arguments For and Against Surrogacy

Besides the legal problems related to surrogacy, there exist profound
ethical issues related to the question of whether the state should permit
a woman to contract and receive payment for gestating a baby whom,
before conception, she agrees to relinquish to other people. Advocates of
surrogacy would enforce the agreements by contract remedies such as
specific performance against the surrogate. 476 Because the literature on
this topic is enormous, only a brief summary follows.477
The strongest support for surrogacy comes from those who argue
that an essential aspect of a couple's procreative liberty, a liberty which
may be infringed upon only to protect against overriding harms, is the

470. For a discussion of AID legislation, see Part III.B.
471.

Baby selling is a crime in every state. See MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD

17 (1990).
472. See id. at 84.
473. See id. at 90-91.
474. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,778 (Cal. 1993) (en banc); In re Baby M, 537
A.2d 1227, 1236-37 (NJ. 1988).

475. See, e.g., Jaycee B. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694 (Ct. App. 1996) (designating
paternity where contracting male is not the biological father); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio
Ct. C.P. 1994) (ruling on which woman's name should appear on the child's original birth
certificate).

476. See Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: Should the Adoption Model Apply?,
CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTs. J., Fall 1986, at 13, 18; Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Casefor Full
ContractualEnforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2337 (1995).

477. For a more complete discussion of all these issues, see generally FIELD, supra note 471,
and SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY (Larry Gostin ed., 1990).
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ability to use and to pay for another woman's gestational services. Since
the harms attributed to surrogacy have yet to be proven, state regulations
prohibiting compensation to the surrogate would unconstitutionally
infringe upon that couple's liberty.478 A more limited view of the
constitutional rights involved is one that recognizes that commercial
surrogacy potentially involves harms such as commodification of the
surrogate's reproductive services and its resulting violation of human
dignity.479 Advocates of this position restrict a person's procreative
liberty to utilizing noncommercial surrogacy where payment is limited
to the surrogate's expenses." 0 Criticisms abound of the position that
procreative liberty extends to noncoital, assisted reproduction,"Hl and
constitutional arguments in favor of surrogacy have not met with success
in the courts. 2
A different constitutional argument favoring surrogacy is one based
on equal protection principles which equate a surrogate with a sperm
donor. Just as a donor substitutes for an infertile male, a surrogate
substitutes for an infertile female. Under this theory, a state that permits
AID, but either does not enforce or heavily regulate surrogacy contracts,
denies equal protection to those to whom surrogacy remains their only
means of reproduction.4" 3 However, this argument minimizes the
considerable differences between a man's single act of masturbation to
produce semen and a pregnant woman's nine-month process of gestation,
followed by childbirth and recovery.
The opposition to surrogacy takes many different forms. Some
commentators argue that surrogacy commercializes childbearing and
results in the view that children are consumer goods for those who can

478. See ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 22-42; Andrews, supra note 335, at 362-66; Note,
Reproductive Technology and the ProcreationRights ofthe Unmarried,98 HARV. L. REV. 669, 68283 (1985). Other strong support comes from contract doctrine. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 476, at
2320-25.
479. See SCOTT B. RAE, THE ETmIcs OF COMMERCIAL SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 54-55(1994).
480. See id. at 170-72.
481. See, e.g., Ann MacLean Massie, Regulating Choice: A Constitutional Law Response to
ProfessorJohn A. Robertson's Children of Choice, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 135 (1995). Professor
Massie's article is part of a symposium which further discusses this controversial issue. See
Symposium on John A. Robertson's Children of Choice, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 133 (1995).
482. See Comment, Surrogacy Contracts in the 1990's: The Controversy & Debate Continues,
33 DUQ. L. REV. 903, 918 (1995). But see Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth ex rel.

Armstrong, 704 SAV.2d 209, 212 (Ky. 1986) (noting that neither surrogacy nor AID violate the
state's prohibition on baby selling and suggesting that both are constitutionally protected as a choice
of whether to beget or bear a child); see also Hecht v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 226 (Ct.

App. 1996) (discussing procreative liberty as a "fundamental right").
483. See Hollandsworth, supra note 260, at 3.
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afford to buy them." Critics, including Professor Margaret Jane Radin,
describe surrogacy as degrading to women because it values them only
for their reproductive capacities. By creating "a market in reproductive
services," surrogate contracts treat people as "monetized units in a
marketplace" rather than as "intrinsically valuable.""
For critics of commercial surrogacy, unpaid surrogacy may be an
acceptable practice if effected through the same requirements as applied
to adoption.4" 6 Under this view, the surrogate may be paid her expenses. She would be irrebuttably presumed to be the child's legal mother
from the moment of birth, and she would be given a grace period after
birth to reconsider her agreement to relinquish custody of the child. The
state would be involved in supervising the process, just as it is in adoption,4" 7 for example, by requiring that a court approve the contract. This
family law model presumably recognizes the biological father's
paternity."' Although the surrogate may change her mind and decide
not to relinquish custody of the child,8 9 the contract will always be
enforceable against the contracting couple. If the surrogate relinquishes
custody of the child, the couple assumes parental responsibilities.4 0
Those who disagree with this description of surrogacy contracts
argue that the agreements cannot involve baby selling because the child
is genetically the child of the contracting male, or, in gestational
surrogacy, of the contracting couple. Thus, a child cannot be "sold" to
his or her own parent or parents, and the payments involved are for the

484. See ROTHMAN, supra note 272, at 232-34; Aila Collins & Judith Rodin, The New
Reproductive Technologies: What Have We Learned?, in WOMEN AND NEw REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES: MEDICAL, PSYCHOSOCIAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS 153, 156 (Judith Rodin
& Aila Collins eds., 1991); Joan Mahoney, Adoption as a Feminist Alternative to Reproductive
Technology, in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 35, 44 (Joan C.
Callahan ed., 1995); George J. Annas, Fairy Tales SurrogateMothers Tell, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH
CARE 27, 29 (1988); Judith Areen, Baby M Reconsidered, 76 GEO. L.J. 1741, 1741 (1988).
485. A.M. Capron & M.J. Radin, ChoosingFamily Law over ContractLaw as a Paradigmfor
SurrogateMotherhood, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 34, 36 (1988); see also Margaret Jane Radin,
Market-Inalienability,100 HARv. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (developing a theory for determining what
should or should not be eligible for purchase and sale in reproductive technology).

486. Professor Radin calls this a form of market inalienability. See Radin, supra note 485, at
1933. "Things that may be given away but not sold are market-inalienable." Id. at 1849 (emphasis

omitted).
487. See Annas, supra note 484, at 32; Capron & Radin, supra note 485, at 37.
488. Surrogacy arrangements should be governed by "the usual provisions of the parentage and
adoption laws." Capron & Radin, supra note 485, at 38.

489. Radin calls this "incomplete commodification." Radin, supra note 485, at 1934.
"[P]erformance of surrogacy agreements by willing parties should be permitted, but women who

change their minds should not be forced to perform." Id.
490. See id. at 1935.
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surrogate's expenses and time.49 Moreover, because a surrogate enters
into the agreement before she becomes pregnant, the agreement differs
from a pregnant woman's consent to adoption. The surrogate faces none
of the coercion involved in giving up a child that a pregnant woman may
face when she either cannot or does not wish to raise a child.
Nevertheless, some commentators disapprove of noncommercial or
"gift" surrogacy in addition to paid surrogacy, contending that this
practice may be as coercive and exploitative to the surrogate as childbirth
by commercial contract.49 For example, a woman may be coerced into
carrying a baby for a close relative. Gift surrogacy, not unlike commercial surrogacy, also may intrude into a woman's reproductive autonomy
and privacy by imposing conditions on the woman's pregnancy and
monitoring her lifestyle.493 Particularly vulnerable are low income
women and women from underdeveloped countries who use gestation to
escape poverty.494 The response to this argument employs a corresponding logic: surrogacy contracts enable low income women to earn money
without engaging in oppressive or difficult types of employment.495
Feminists disagree as to whether surrogacy contracts should be
enforced and whether surrogacy is empowering or disempowering.496
The contracts raise the issue of whether the state can "protect people
from the harmful effects of their own decisions., 497 Feminists disagree
about whether the contracts have harmful effects and whether surrogates'
decisions are, in fact, voluntary. Many feminists criticize surrogacy
contracts as demeaning to women because the contracts allow others to
exploit them and control their bodies.498 However, others contend that
refusal to enforce surrogacy contracts is demeaning to women because
491. This explanation has been criticized as presupposing that the baby is already the father's
property, and he need only purchase services to complete production of his child. See id. at 1929.
492. See Uma Narayan, The "Gift" of a Child: Commercial Surrogacy, Gift Surrogacy, and
Motherhood, in EXPECTING TROUBLE: SURROGACY, FETAL ABUSE, & NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 177, 178 (Patricia Boling ed., 1995); see also Goodwin, supra note 2, at 289-91
(discussing gift surrogacy in the context of intrafamily relationships).
493. See Narayan, supranote 492, at 179-80. Professor Uma Narayan's article explores gift and
commercial surrogacy "within the confines of patriarchal heterosexual relationships within and
outside of marriage." Id. at 178.
494. See id. at 180.
495. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. 1993) (en bane); cf.Michael Freeman, Is
SurrogacyExploitative?, in LEGAL ISSUES INHUMAN REPRODUCTION, supra note 6, at 164, 169.
496. For summaries of these arguments, see BLANK& MERRICK, supranote 101, at 118-20, and
Joan Mahoney, An Essay on Surrogacy and Feminist Thought, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD:
POLITICS AND PRIVACY, supra note 477, at 184-90.
497. GLOVER ET AL., supra note 180, at 19.
498. See Mahoney, supra note 496, at 185.
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nonenforcement denies women the right to enter contracts and make
decisions about their bodies.4 One response to this view is that all
female experience occurs within a generally patriarchal society, so that
none of those choices can be entirely voluntary and freely chosen."'
Those who hold this belief see surrogacy as imposing male control over
women in order to provide males with their biological children.
Consequently, women who think that they act altruistically or find selffulfillment from giving a child to others are instead being deceived.'
Feminists also disagree about the implications of elevating gestation
over other determinants of parenthood. Some feminists criticize those
who have not celebrated the gestational role, its duration, its health risks,
and the bonding effect it encourages with the gestating child. 2 They
criticize some court decisions which have determined parenthood by
genetics 0 3 as utilizing a male model of parenthood and ignoring the
uniquely female role of gestation."' However, others fear the "other
side of the gestational coin,"5' 5 which views women as limited to their
gestational role. They fear that this view would shackle them with special
responsibilities ofpregnancy, for example, unconsented Caesarean section
operations." 6 Moreover, there is disagreement over the potential
psychological harms of surrogacy: to the surrogate who has bonded with
the developing fetus over nine months of pregnancy and then must
relinquish the child; to the child who later learns of the circumstances of
its conception and birth; and to the contracting couple whose desire to
raise a child may be thwarted if the agreement is not enforced. 7

499. See id.
at 186.
500. See GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM
ARTCIAL INSEMINATION TO ARTIFICIAL WOMBs 3 (1985); Mary Lyndon Shanley, "Surrogate
Mothering" andWomen's Freedom:A CritiqueofContractsforHuman Reproduction,in EXPECTING
TROUBLE: SURROGACY, FETAL ABUSE, & NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 492, at
156, 169.
501. See Radin, supra note 485, at 1923.
502. See ROTHMAN, supranote 272, at 90-105; see also Mary Becker, MaternalFeelings:Myth,
Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN's STUD. 135, 139-40 (1992) (discussing
the emotional impact of women's reproductive work).
503. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc). For a discussion of
Johnson, see infra text accompanying notes 582-600.

504. See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 272, at 44; Goodwin, supra note 2, at 281-85.
505. Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challengefor Feminists, in SURROoATE
MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY, supra note 477, at 167, 179.

506. See id.
507. See id.
at 171-78.
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Surrogacy Statutes

Because of the profound disagreements over the issues involved in
surrogacy, the USCACA provides two alternative approaches to the
enforceability of surrogacy contracts. Alternative B of section 5 provides
that a surrogacy agreement is void, and that the surrogate is the mother
of the child whom she gestates. 8 If she is married and her husband
was a party to the surrogacy agreement, then her husband is classified as
the father.5" If her husband had not agreed to her surrogacy, the child's
paternity would be established by state law.510 In other words, the
surrogate is treated either as a woman who has conceived through AID,
with her husband's paternity dependent upon whether he consented to the
insemination, or as a woman who received a donated preembryo
fertilized from the contracting couple's gametes.
Under Alternative A, by contrast, a surrogacy contract is enforceable
if it is approved by a court before conception.5 If the agreement is
approved, the contracting couple is classified as the child's parents and
their names appear on the child's birth certificate." 2 If the agreement
is not approved, it is void with the same results as in Alternative B.5 3
The USCACA requires that the contracting couple be married, 1 4 the
surrogate be an adult, 1 5 and the intending contracting parents provide
one or both gametes.1 6 The USCACA does not address surrogacy
contracts involving couples or individuals who have no biological
connection to the planned child but who intend to raise a child conceived
from donated gametes and gestated by a surrogate.
In part, Alternative A employs an adoption model requiring that the
court order a home study of the couple and the surrogate. The parties
517
must meet the state's standards of fitness applied to adopting parents.
In addition, the parties must also undergo counseling.518 The model,
however, is unlike adoption in that the surrogate contracts before her

508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.

See USCACA, supra note 69, § 5 (Alternative B), 9B U.L.A. 174.
See id.
See id.
See id. § 5(b) (Alternative A), 9B U.L.A. 167.
See id. § 8(a)(1), (b), 9B U.L.A. 172.
See id. § 5(b) (Alternative A), 9B U.L.A. 167.
See id. § 1(3), 9B U.LA. 164.
See id. § 1(4).
See id. § 1(3).
See id. § 6(b)(3)-(4), 9B U.L.A. 168.
See id. § 6(b)(7), 9B U.L.A. 169.
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pregnancy to relinquish the child. Further, she has no grace period after
the child is born to change her mind. If the surrogate is a gestational
surrogate, she can terminate the agreement only before her pregnancy.5 19 A traditional surrogate, however, may terminate the contract
without liability to the couple if she files notice with the court within 180
days after the last insemination.520 The court must vacate its previous
order if it finds that the surrogate knowingly and voluntarily terminated
the contract.52'1 One of the two states that has adopted the USCACA has
adopted Alternative B and voids the surrogacy contract;
the other
enforces a surrogacy contract under terms similar to Alternative A, but
with some differences-including the requirement that the contract not
provide compensation to the surrogate."u
Other states' statutes exhibit the same lack of consensus as to how
surrogacy arrangements should be treated, although most statutes limit
surrogacy in some way. 4 Several jurisdictions prohibit surrogacy
contracts;" some impose criminal or civil sanction.5 26 However, most
of these statutes do not determine the parentage of a child who was born
as a result of the prohibited contract.5 27 Those that do name the surrogate as the legal mother and her husband as the father, if she is
married.528 The paternity of the surrogate's husband may be established
either as a rebuttable presumption 529 or as a result of his consent 3 to
the surrogacy. Unless the surrogate voluntarily relinquishes the child for

519. See id. § 7(a), 9B U.L.A. 171.
520. See id. § 7(b).
521. See id.
522. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1991).
523. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-162(A) (Michie 1995).
524. Statutory and judicial limits on surrogacy have been described as "fueled by a similar
interest in preserving the family in its traditional forms." Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial

Assumptions About Parenthood,40 UCLA L. REV. 637, 677 n.170 (1993). However, when a child
has been born and the contract is not enforced, the result is that the child is a nonmarital child of
the biological father and the surrogate, resulting in a nontraditional family.
525. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (West 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-1
(West Supp. 1996); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE

§ 14-18-05; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1995).
526. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-402(b) (1997); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123(2)(b)

(McKinney Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(l)(d).
527. But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(B) (establishing the surrogate as the legal mother

of a child born as a result of an illegal surrogacy contract).
528. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(3)(a).
529. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(C).
530. See N.D. CENt. CODE § 14-18-05.
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adoption, if either the presumption of the husband's paternity is
rebutted53' or the husband did not consent, the child is the nonmarital
child of the surrogate and the biological father. The court must then
determine custody based on the child's best interests.53 2 No statute
includes the genetic mother, if she is a different woman from the
surrogate, as a legal parent entitled to custody."'
A number of statutes invalidate only surrogacy contracts involving
compensation to the surrogate or to a facilitating agency,534 although
some statutes permit payment for expenses.535 A handful of other states
use an adoption model and impose restrictions, such as screening the
participants, requiring court approval, and permitting the surrogate to
change her mind. For example, under the New Hampshire statute, a
surrogacy contract is voidable by the surrogate up to seventy-two hours
after she gives birth, or up to one week if extenuating circumstances
require more time.36 However, the Virginia statute adopts the
USCACA terms that a gestational surrogate may terminate the contract
only before she becomes pregnant and after required court approval, but
a traditional surrogate may terminate the contract within 180 days of the
last performance of assisted conception 37
Only three states, Nevada, Florida, and Arkansas, enforce the
parties' contract to recognize the intended parents as the child's legal
parents. These statutes, however, each apply to only one type of
surrogacy. The Nevada statute enforces gestational surrogacy contracts
if the gametes are supplied by married intending parents and if the
contract contains certain terms. However, the statute does not apply to
traditional surrogacy.53 The Florida statute also enforces gestational

531. In Arizona, the presumption of paternity is rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence.
See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814(C) (West Supp. 1996).
532. See infra text accompanying note 545.
533. New York Domestic Relations Law "includes the genetic mother as a potential party," but
gives her no "standing to assert a custody claim." Alan D. Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries,
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 124 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
534. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (Michie 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713
(West 1991) (applying only to surrogacy using AID); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1995); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045(3) (Michie Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.240 (West

1997).
535. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045(3).
536. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:25(IV) (1994).
537. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-161(A)-(B) (1995).
538. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126-045(1), (4). The contract must specify the child's
parents, the child's custody in case of changed circumstances, and the parties' rights and
responsibilities. See id. § 126.045(1)(a)-(c).
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surrogacy contracts.5 39 A traditional surrogate, however, may rescind
her consent to adoption, 5' and any party may terminate the agreement." The Arkansas Code also enforces surrogacy contracts and
names the intended parents as the child's legal parents, regardless of
whether the intended parents are married. The statute, however, applies
only to surrogacy by AID.' Thus, no state will enforce all private
surrogacy agreements for which the surrogate is compensated.
If a child is born of a surrogacy agreement that cannot be enforced,
few statutes determine the child's legal parentage. With few exceptions,
the surrogate as the birth mother will always be the child's legal mother.
Subject to the state's rules regarding whether the presumption of
legitimacy is rebuttable, her husband would be the father, or if the
presumption was rebutted, the child would be the nonmarital child of the
surrogate and the biological father. If,
however, the state has an AID
statute and the surrogate conceived by AID,then paternity would depend
on whether her husband had consented to his wife's insemination.543
The child's paternal inheritance would be subject to those rules. Unless
the surrogate (or the father) were to voluntarily consent to the child's
adoption by the other parent and his or her spouse, a court would
determine custody and visitation issues based on the child's best
interests.'"
If a statute provides that the contract was voidable at the option of
the surrogate, and the surrogate died within the designated time period
after giving birth, the outcome as to the child's inheritance may depend
on specific statutory language. The New Hampshire statute, for example,
provides that the child is "[t]he child of the intended parents from the
moment of the child's birth unless the surrogate gives notice of her intent
to keep the child."545 Thus, the child would not inherit from the
surrogate's estate if she died before she relinquished the child for
adoption. Moreover, the child would not inherit from the intended
mother's estate if she died while the child was in gestation, and,
depending on proof of paternity, the child might not inherit from the

539. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1997).
540. See id. § 63.212(I)(i)(1)(b). These provisions are part of the Florida Adoption Code and
are called "preplanned adoption." Id. § 63.212(1)(i)(1).
541. See id. § 63.212(1)(i)(2)(i).
542. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1993).
543. See supra text accompanying notes 117-41.
544. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.861 (West 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.26.260 (West 1997).
545. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:9(II)(a) (1994).
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biological father's estate if he died while the child was in gestation. In
those states in which a gestational surrogate cannot terminate an
agreement, the child's legal parents would be the genetic parents. Under
the Florida statute, however, the gestational surrogate relinquishes
parental rights at the child's birth, and the contracting couple assumes
full parental rights at that time.'" It follows that if one or both of the
genetic parents died while the child was in utero, under that statute, the
child would not inherit from the decedent.
C. JudicialPrecedents
The judicial precedents distinguish between traditional surrogacy and
gestational surrogacy in terms of determining the child's legal mother.
According to the most recent decision of a California trial court,
however, under some surrogacy arrangements, a child may be born
without legal parents. 7
The most well-known surrogacy decision, In re Baby M,"
involved a traditional surrogacy contract between Mary Beth Whitehead
and William Stem. New Jersey had no surrogacy statute. 9 After she
bore the child and gave her to the Stems, Ms. Whitehead changed her
mind and retrieved the baby from the Stems. Mr. Stem then sought to
enforce their agreement and successfully gained permanent custody of the
child in the trial court. 5 0 The New Jersey Supreme Court held, however, that the surrogacy contract was void in New Jersey. It reasoned that
the agreement violated the state's adoption and child placement laws55 '
and violated the state's public policy regarding a child's best interests.552
The court held that the surrogacy contract violated the state's
adoption statutes on several grounds. The court classified the contractual

546. See FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 742.15(3)(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1997).

547. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
548. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
549. A New Jersey statute, however, may apply to surrogacy. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44

(,vest

1993). That statute applies to AI, but permits the sperm donor and the recipient woman to
agree that the donor will be treated in law as the father. Unless the drafters intended the term "sperm
donor" not to apply to the contracting male in a surrogacy arrangement, the section would extend
parental rights to the male. However, this would not extend to the second part of a surrogacy

contract, the surrogate's relinquishment of her parental rights and consent to the donor's wife
adopting the child.
550. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1237-38.
551. See id.at 1240.
552. See id. at 1246.
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payment to Ms. Whitehead, 5 3 although framed in terms of payment for
her services, as a prohibited payment in connection with the planned
adoption."' The court characterized the requirement that Ms. Whitehead
relinquish her parental rights as coercive555 and invalid, since New
Jersey law terminates a parent's rights only according to statutory
requirements for voluntary surrender of a child, or if a court finds the
parents were unfit or had abandoned the child. 6 Finally, the
surrogate's irrevocable consent to surrender the child conflicted with
New Jersey law that allows a mother to revoke her consent to her child's
adoption within a specified time. 7
The court also concluded that the surrogacy agreement violated the
New Jersey public policy which determines child custody according to
the child's best interests rather than a parental preconception agreement.55 The surrogacy contract also violated the New Jersey policy that
encourages both natural parents to raise their child by guaranteeing the
child would be completely separated from one of them.559 The court
declared that the surrogacy arrangement also ignored both Ms.
Whitehead's and her child's needs because it did not provide Ms.
Whitehead with independent psychological and legal counseling.56 In
addition, the agency had not investigated the adopting parents as an
adoption agency would have done. 6'
Thus, the New Jersey court viewed the surrogacy arrangement as the
"sale of a child,"562 not effectively mitigated by the fact that the
biological father was one of the purchasers, and as potentially degrading
to women. 63 It answered Mr. Stem's constitutional argument that the

553. See id. at 1241. In Anonymous v. Anonymous, No. P-8572/91, 1991 WL 228555 (N.Y.

Fam. Ct. Oct. 1, 1991), a New York family court refused to issue a filiation order to the contracting
male in a surrogacy agreement because the agreement included a fee to the surrogate payable at the
child's birth. The court held that the contract violated New York law forbidding compensation for
children, and that issuing an order of filiation would assist the parties' violation. See id. at *1; see
also In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Pam. Ct. 1990) (holding that contracts providing

for the termination of parental tights in exchange for payment are void).
554. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240-41.

555. See id. at 1240.
556. See id. at 1242-44.
557. See id. at 1245.

558. See id. at 1246.
559. See id. at 1246-47.
560. See id. at 1247-48. The agency psychologist had reported that Ms. Whitehead might have
difficulty surrendering the child. See id. at 1247.
561. See id.
at 1248.
562. Id.
563. See id. at 1250.
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contract was protected by his right to procreate by identifying that right
as one guaranteeing a person "the right to have natural children" either
coitally or by AI, which Mr. Stem had accomplished. 6
Finally, the court treated the case as a custody dispute between the
child's natural parents to be judicially determined by the child's best
interests. 65 Making such a judgment, the court awarded primary
custody to Mr. Stem based on the stability that his family could
provide566 and remanded the case to the lower court to evaluate Ms.
Whitehead's right to visitation. 67
The inheritance consequences of the Baby M decision are that the
child was a nonmarital child, born of a married woman by a man not her
husband, a classification not commented on by the court. The child's
parents, the birth mother and the genetic father, were identifiable at birth,
and the child, thus, could inherit from either parent, if one had died at
that time. Of course, this result would be contingent upon rebutting the
presumption of the paternity of Ms. Whitehead's husband and proving
Mr. Stem's paternity.
The Kentucky Supreme Court took a different approach to surrogacy
contracts, making them voidable rather than void,568 a decision with
interesting inheritance consequences. The court distinguished surrogacy
contracts from adoption, removing surrogacy contracts from the coverage
of the Kentucky statute, which forbids the purchase and sale of children
for the purpose of adoption. 69 The court explained that surrogacy
agreements are formed before, rather than after, the child is conceived.
Their purpose is to aid an infertile couple in their wish to raise a child
genetically related to at least one of them."' The purpose of the baby
selling statute, the court observed, is to protect a woman who is
undergoing an unwanted pregnancy and suffering the pressures of the
impending financial burdens.5 ' Despite this distinction, however, the
court held that the contract was not legally binding because it did not
comply with the statutory five-day period after the birth of the baby,
during which parental consent to adoption and voluntary termination of

564.
565.
566.
567.
568.

Id. at 1253.
See id. at 1256.
See id. at 1258.
See id. at 1261.
See Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209,

213 (Ky. 1986); In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817 (Sur. Ct. 1986).

569. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (Michie 1995).
570. See Surrogate ParentingAssocs., 704 S.W.2d at 211-12.
571. See id.
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parental rights are invalid.572 Until that time period has expired, the

surrogate may reconsider her decision to relinquish the child. Thus, her
previous consent to relinquish the child and any consent given within
those five days are not legally binding. 73

The inheritance implications of this decision are that if the genetic
father or the surrogate were to die during that five-day period, the child's
inheritance would be the same as under Baby M, that is, the child would
inherit from either of their estates. Unlike the consequences of Baby M,
the child would inherit from the father's wife if she died after the fiveday period and the surrogate had not renounced the contract. The fiveday period, rather than the child's adoption by the contracting couple,
would determine the child's maternal inheritance.574

Some case law, like some statutory law, distinguishes the situation
of a gestational surrogate from that of a traditional one. However, the
courts have had a difficult time resolving this problem, regardless of
whether a surrogacy statute was in force and whether the surrogate
refused to relinquish the child. Where the surrogate did relinquish the
child, but the statute did not afford the genetic mother the opportunity to

prove her maternity, an Arizona court, in Soos v. Superior Court,575

572. See id. at 212-13. A Kentucky statute now prohibits intermediaries from being a party to
a contract involving payment to a woman who becomes a surrogate by AID. See KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 199.590(4).
573. See SurrogateParentingAssocs., 704 S.W.2d at 212-13.
574. The reported cases that involve a contracting couple who successfully adopted a child
pursuant to a surrogacy agreement, in which the surrogate was artificially inseminated with the
contracting husband's sperm, are In re Adoption of K.F.H., 844 S.W.2d 343 (Ark. 1993), and In re
Adoption ofBaby A andBaby B, 877 P.2d 107 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). In BabyA, the trial court had
denied the couple's petition to adopt the baby because the contract provided payments to the
surrogate. See Baby A, 877 P.2d at 107-08. On appeal, the court held that the payments did not
violate Oregon's adoption statute, see id.at 108, which requires written disclosure and accounting
of payments relating to the adoption, and which forbids payments of fees for locating children or
adopters. See OR. REv. STAT § 109.311(l), (3) (1995). The couple's petition included the required
disclosures, and they had paid no fees for locating any of the parties, In addition, there were no
objections to the petition. The court also held that adoption was in the child's best interests. See
Baby A, 877 P.2d at 108. However, the court failed to mention a 1989 Opinion of the Oregon
Attorney General, which concluded that a surrogacy contract is not enforceable, inter alia, because
payment invalidates the surrogate's consent. See 8202 Op. Or. Att'y Gen. (1989).
K.F.H. involved a contested adoption. Although the surrogacy contract had previously been
held void under Michigan law by a Michigan court, the Arkansas court approved the adoption by
the child's father and his wife without the consent of the child's mother, the surrogate. See K.F.H.,
844 S.W.2d at 345-47. An Arkansas statute permitted adoption without a noncustodial parent's
consent if the parent had not communicated with the child for at least one year. See ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-9-207(a)(2) (Michie 1993).
575. 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
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declared the statute unconstitutional.576 The Arizona statute at issue
voided surrogacy contracts and declared that the surrogate was the child's
legal mother entitled to custody. The statute also contained a rebuttable
presumption that a married surrogate's husband was the child's legal father." In Soos, the husband and wife entered into a gestational
surrogacy agreement. During the surrogate's pregnancy, the wife filed for
divorce. After twins were born, the surrogate relinquished them to their
father who then filed for an adjudication of paternity. At that time, his
wife challenged the statute's constitutionality. The court held that the
statute denied her equal protection by denying her the ability to prove her
genetic maternity, although her husband, also genetically related to the
578
child, was given the opportunity to prove paternity.
By contrast, a New York court held constitutional the state's Family
Court Act, which granted jurisdiction to the family court to determine a
child's paternity but not maternity.5 79 Behind the court's decision may
have been the fact that the gestational surrogate had relinquished the
child so that the genetic mother could adopt the child.58 Thus, the child
would not have been without a mother. In addition, the New York
legislature
had recently enacted legislation voiding surrogacy con581
tracts.
The best known and most controversial case involving a gestational
surrogate is the California case of Johnson v. Calvert,"2 in which the
court held that the genetic mother, rather than the surrogate, was the
child's legal mother. The gestational surrogate had threatened to keep the
child she was still carrying, and the genetic parents (the contracting
couple) sued to be declared the child's legal parents.583 There was no
dispute over the paternity of the contracting husband. The novel issue,
instead, was whether the child's mother was the birth mother or the
genetic mother.5 California had no surrogacy statute, and the court

576. See id. at 1361.
577. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 25-218 (West 1991).

578. See Soos, 897 P.2d at 1359-61. These statutory presumptions have been suggested by
Annas, supra note 49, at 50.

579.
580.
581.
582.
583.
584.

See Andres A. v. Judith N., 591 N.Y.S.2d 946, 949-50 (Fam. Ct. 1992).
See id. at 950.
See N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
See id. at 778.
See id. at 777-78. The court did not accept the proposition that the child had two mothers

because "(t]o recognize parental rights in a third party with whom the Calvert family [the genetic

parents who had custody of the child] has had little contact since shortly after the child's birth would
diminish [the genetic mother's) role as mother." Id. at 781 n.8.
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purported to decide the case under California's UPA" 8
Under the court's interpretation of the state's UPA, both women had
proven their maternity. The UPA establishes maternity by proof that a
woman has given birth to the child,586 the traditional determinant of
maternity. However, it also permits a woman to establish maternity
otherwise under the UPA 87 The court interpreted this last phrase as
permitting a woman to establish maternity by the same means that a man
could establish paternity, including blood tests,588 which proved the
wife's genetic maternity. The court held that where both women could
prove their maternity under the UPA, "she who intended to procreate the
child-that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that
she intended to raise as her own-is the natural mother under California
5 89
law.
The Johnson court relied on several law review articles, whose
authors argue that the law should recognize as parents those people who,
before the child is conceived, intend to be the parents. 9" The court
recognized the couple's intent to establish their parentage, because but
for their arranging the steps leading to the child's birth, the child would
not have been born. The court also enforced the contract because the
parties had voluntarily bargained for that outcome. Lastly, the court
honored the couple's "mental concept" of the child, treating that mental
concept as a determinant of procreation. 9' The mental concept of a
child has been identified as "the desire to create a child" formed by the
initiating party or parties prior to conception."9 2 According to this view,
those persons' mental concepts entitle them to recognition as the

585. See id. at 778-79.
586. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 7003(1) (West 1983) (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(l)
(West 1994)).
587. See id.
588. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781.
589. Id. at 782.
590. See id. at 782-83; see also Hill, supra note 64, at 419; Marjorie Maguire Shultz,
Reproductive Technology and Intent-BasedParenthood:An Opportunityfor GenderNeutrality, 1990

Wis. L. REv. 297, 322-23; Andrea E. Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrixfor New
Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 192-208 (1986).

591. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783 (quoting Stumpf, supra note 590, at 196).
592. Stumpf, supra note 590, at 195.
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conceivers of the child593 and as the designated legal parents.594 Their
use of reproductive technology is "an unambiguous indicator" of their
intent.595
As a policy matter, the California court in Johnson disagreed with
several conclusions of the New Jersey court in Baby M. It distinguished
surrogacy contracts from adoption laws because the surrogate was paid
for her services, not for producing a baby, and the parties had entered
into the contract before the surrogate conceived the child.596 It also
rejected the New Jersey court's criticisms of surrogacy as exploiting
women, treating children as commodities, and oppressing lower class
5 97

women.
The single dissenting judge criticized the majority's intent-based
analysis as devaluing a pregnant woman's contributions and as more
suitable for determining tort liability, contract claims, and intellectual
property claims. 98 The dissent also criticized the majority decision
because it provided no protection to the surrogate. 99 This judge would
have applied the more traditional family law test which determines
maternity according to the best interests of the child." 0
In California, parenthood by intent has been limited to gestational
surrogacy agreements, and perhaps to agreements under which the child
would have no identifiable parent under the UPA. In In re Marriageof
Moschetta,0 ' the court held that a traditional surrogacy contract was
not enforceable because it did not comply with the state's adoption
law."02 The court did not apply the Johnson test of parenthood by intent
because in Moschetta there was no question that, under the UPA, the
child's only mother was the surrogate and the father was the contracting
husband.9 3 The surrogate began repudiating the agreement after the
baby was born when she learned that the Moschettas had separated. Mr.
Moschetta, however, had custody of the child, and the issue of parental
593. See id. at 196. Ms. Stumpf also characterizes the initiating parties' mental concept as
affording the child's existence. See id. at 205.
594. See id. at 207.
595. See idL at 196. Of course, the other parties to the assisted conception have also used
reproductive technology in order to conceive.
596. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784.
597. See id. at 785.
598. See id. at 795-96 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
599. See id. at 798.
600. See id. at 798-800.
601. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994).
602. See id. at 900-01.
603. See id. at 900.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

87

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1091

rights was litigated within the divorce litigation. The parties agreed that
the contract was unenforceable (this part of the litigation had occurred
before Johnson), and the trial court held that the surrogate and the
genetic father were the legal parents entitled to joint custody.' 4
On appeal, Mr. Moschetta argued that the contract was enforceable,
and that he and his soon-to-be ex-wife were the child's parents under the
UPA."5 His wife, however, seemingly did not want the child, so her
brief supported the lower court's decision. 6 The court held that only
the surrogate, and not Ms. Moschetta, was the mother under the
UPA.6 7 According to the court, the parties' intent to be parents is
irrelevant if the statute clearly designates the mother. 8 The court
interpreted Johnson as holding, not that surrogacy contracts were
enforceable, but only that the contracts did not offend public policy.'"
Because the surrogate had not formally consented to the child's adoption
by the means required in the adoption statute,6" ' the court said it could
not enforce the contract.61' It remanded the case for the lower court to
reevaluate its decision regarding custody and visitation.6 2
California law, thus, distinguishes between traditional and gestational surrogacy with respect to the determination of maternity. The
Moschetta court pointed out that the result of this distinction is that a
couple that can afford IVF, and the wife of whom ovulates "can be
reasonably assured of being judged the legal parents of the child, even
if the surrogate reneges on her agreement"; 61 those who use Al will
not necessarily both become parents if the surrogate reneges. 4 For
traditional surrogacy, in fact, the results are the same as those in Baby M.
The same court applied the intent analysis in Johnson to a recent
case in which a child was conceived by gametes from anonymous donors5
and gestated to term by a surrogate. In Jaycee B. v. Superior Court,0
the husband and wife contracted with a surrogate to gestate a fetus which

604.
605.
606.
607.

See id.
at 895.
See id.
See id. at 895-96.
See id. at 896-97.

608. See id.

609. See id. at 899.
610. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8814 (West Supp. 1997). That section requires the parent to
consent in the presence of a social worker.
611. See Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900-01.
612. See id. at 902-03.
613. Id. at 903.
614. See id.
615. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694 (Ct. App. 1996).
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had no genetic connection to any of the parties. Before the child was
born, the contracting couple separated and initiated divorce proceedings.
The wife, who was the intended mother and who, after the child's birth,
had taken custody of the child, sought child support. The husband argued
that the family court lacked jurisdiction to award even temporary support
because the child had not been a 'child of the marriage.' 6. 6 Although
it did not decide the issue, the court held that, for purposes of awarding
temporary support, the wife had made a sufficient showing that the child
would legally be a child of the marriage. 17
Interpreting the Johnson court's use of a surrogacy contract, the
court used the surrogacy contract, not as an enforceable document, but
as the 'basis on which to ascertain the [parties'] intent.""'61 The court
also analogized the case to a situation hypothesized in Johnson in which
neither of the biologically involved women, that is, the ovum provider
and the gestator, would take custody of the child.619 In Johnson, the
court's dictum stated that the child's parent would be determined by the
parties' intentions." At the time of this writing, however, the trial
court to which the case was remanded has held that the child was not the
child of the marriage, and that neither the husband, nor the wife was the
child's parent. The court thus placed the child in the status of a
nonmarital child under medieval law, filius nullius, or inheritance from
no one.
The Jaycee B. court extended the circumstances in which to
designate an intended parent as the legal parent to the situation in which
there is no known genetic parent. In Jaycee B., the appellate court
reasoned that, as a result of his express intent in the surrogacy contract,
the contracting husband would most likely be determined to be the
child's father.6 ' Under the UPA, this child's only legal parent would
have been the surrogate, since the identity of both genetic parents was
unknown.6" Although the surrogate was married and her husband was
a party to the contract, the court did not mention his possible paternity.
The most likely reason was that he would have been able to rebut that

616. Id. at 696 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 2010 (West Supp. 1994)).
617. See id. at 696-97.
618. Id. at 701 (quoting In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 900 (Ct. App. 1994)
(emphasis omitted)).

619. See id. at 701-02.
620. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (en bane). The court must have
meant preconception intent.
621. See Jaycee B., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 702.
622. See id. at 701.
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presumption."2 If the surrogate and her husband had been declared the
child's parents, the child would have been considered their heir, although
they likely would have put the child up for adoption. That decision also
would have disrupted the already-formed family unit of the contracting
woman and the child. The appellate court determined parenthood by the
terms of the contract rather than by biological parenthood. 24 The trial
court seems to have rejected intent as the means to determine parenthood.
Whether that court would have designated the surrogate as the child's
mother cannot be determined because the issue arose as a question of the
husband's child support. The court also could not have designated the
genetic progenitors as parents because their identities were not known.
Different results between gestational surrogacy and traditional
surrogacy could also occur under Ohio law. An Ohio court, in Belsito v.
Clark,"z held that the genetic parents in a gestational surrogacy
arrangement were the child's natural parents, 26 but on different grounds
from those used by the Johnson court. In Belsito, the genetic mother's
sister gestated the baby without a fee, and without contesting her sister's
and brother-in-law's parenthood. In order to ensure that the child's birth
certificate would identify the genetic parents as the child's mother and
father so that the child would not be identified as the nonmarital child of
the gestational sister and her brother-in-law, the genetic parents sought
a declaratory judgment of their parenthood.2 7
The Belsito court disagreed with the Johnson court's analysis, saying
that the Johnson court had ignored important public policies opposed to
parties privately contracting to surrender parental rights,628 as well as
policies underlying state regulation of adoptions. 29 The Belsito court
held, instead, that the genetic parents are the natural parents when a child
is conceived by IVF of a gestational surrogate. 3 The court evidently
reached its decision for the genetic parents, not because they intended to
be the parents, but seemingly as a result of the importance of genetics to

623. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612 (West Supp. 1997). California's AID statute would not have
applied because the surrogate did not undergo Al, but had received a donated embryo.
624. See Jaycee B., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 701-02.
625. 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994).

626.
627.
628.
629.
630.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at
id. at
id. at
id.at
id. at

767.
762.
765.
765-66.
766-67.
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a child's conception.63' Consequently, under Belsito, the child would
inherit from the genetic parents. This rationale can be problematic where
the parents might not be identifiable at the child's birth. For example, as
in the trial court's decision in Jaycee B., the child would have had no
known legal parents because the genetic progenitors' identities were not
known.
Thus, inheritance consequences of surrogacy vary depending upon
whether state law enforces the agreement, permits the surrogate to change
her mind and not relinquish the child, or declares the agreement void.
Where the agreement is enforced, the child should inherit from the
contracting couple if either died at the child's birth. If the contract is
void, the child should inherit from the surrogate and from either her
husband or the genetic father, depending upon whether the husband is the
presumed father and whether an AID statute applies. In In re Baby
M,632 for example, the court determined that the contract was unenforceable and that the child's parents were the surrogate and the genetic
father, rendering the child illegitimate and the subject of custody and
visitation litigation.633 If the surrogate is given a time period within
which to decide not to relinquish the child, the child's inheritance
depends upon how the particular state's law determines parental rights
during that interim period. In addition, some states' laws distinguish
between gestational and traditional surrogacy in determining parenthood
and between parents and biological parents. Where the child has both a
known genetic and a gestational mother, the genetic mother, who is the
wife of the genetic father and who, by contract, intends to raise the child,
has been recognized as the child's legal mother. However, the wife of the
genetic father who enters into a traditional surrogacy agreement has not
been so recognized, and a child conceived by donated gametes and born
to a gestational surrogate may have no legal parents at all. The existing
statutes and judicial decisions provide differing conclusions, and most
states have not clearly identified the child's parents at the child's birth,
making inheritance decisions difficult.

631. See id at 766. Although the rule in Belsito prevented the child from being born as a
nonmarital child, a child of traditional surrogacy would be illegitimate under that rule. See Goodwin,
supra note 2, at 291. Goodwin designates the gestational mother as the legal mother in intrafamily
surrogacy, "requiring the genetic parents to adopt the child." Id.

632. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
633. See id. at 1234-35.
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PARENTHOOD BY INTENT

One method put forward by several academicians and some courts
is to determine the parents of children born of reproductive technologies
based on their intent to be a parent. In this perspective, the child's legal
parents are those whose preconception intent was to raise the child, that
is, those who intended to be the child's social parent or parents. The
legal parents may have no biological connection to the child, either
genetically or gestationally, and they may not be married to a person
with a biological connection. Further, they need not establish themselves
as the child's social parents at the time that they are recognized as the
legal parents.
Intent clearly has important consequences in determining parenthood
when reproductive technology is involved. For example, a sperm donor
usually does not intend to be the legal father of a child conceived by
AID, but he does intend to be the father of a child conceived by AID
accompanied by a surrogacy contract. Similarly, the recipient of a
donated egg or embryo usually intends to be the legal and social mother
of the child born of those gametes, but usually does not intend to be
regarded as such if she gestated the child pursuant to a surrogacy
contract.
Intent-based theories of parenthood do not necessarily aim to
reshape the American family. Indeed, intent-based parenthood tends to
support the traditional family since the principal users of noncoital
reproduction are married couples who want to raise a child genetically
related to at least one of them." Moreover, commentators argue that
intent-based parenthood serves the resulting child's best interests by
placing the child with adults who clearly want to raise him or her.635
A.

Rights-Based Theories

Some theories of parenthood by intent are rights-based. Professor
John Robertson is probably the best known advocate of a right of
procreative liberty, which includes the right of access to reproductive
technology. Robertson's concept of procreative liberty includes the
decision to have offspring,636 the freedom to rear offspring,3 7 and

634. See ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 144-45.

635. See Shultz, supra note 590, at 343.
636. See ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 16; see also Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1253 ("The right
to procreate... is the right to have natural children, whether through sexual intercourse or artificial
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"the freedom to enlist the assistance of willing donors and surrogates. 638 He identifies this right as an important component of individual self-determination and well-being.639 In his view, noncoital reproduction deserves protection where its use implicates the same core
procreative values as does coital reproduction.6' Robertson assigns a
strong "presumptive priority""' to the right of procreation and concludes that government cannot regulate or ban reproductive technologies
without strong justification based on a technology's harmful effects. 2
However, he does not identify any harms to any of the participants
involved in the procreative process that would justify limiting a person's
access to, or use of reproductive technologies and concludes that the
harms that others have identified are symbolic and speculative. 3
Robertson includes within procreative liberty AIH, AID, IVF, egg
and embryo donation where a rearing parent gestates the child, and
surrogacy where a rearing parent is a genetic progenitor of the child.6'
One challenge to Robertson's approach is that the more novel uses of
reproductive technologies stray from core values of coital reproduction.' 4 For example, where neither intended parent has a biological tie
to the child, but instead has orchestrated the child's procreation by
enlisting sperm and egg donors and a gestational surrogate, Robertson
might not enforce the parties' preconception intentions on the grounds of
procreative liberty.' Although Robertson recognizes the logic in the

insemination."); Andrews, supra note 335, at 360 (arguing that the ability to employ modem
techniques for procreation should be regarded as a fundamental right); Stumpf, supra note 590, at
198-99 (discussing the fundamental nature of the right to obtain the assistance necessary to overcome
an inability to procreate).
637. See ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 119.
638. Id. at 126.
639. Thus, he does not extend the right to procreate to posthumous reproduction. See Robertson,
supra note 3, at 1031-32.
640. See ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 32-33; John A. Robertson, Liberalismand the Limits
of ProcreativeLiberty: A Response to My Critics, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233, 237 (1995).
641. ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 16.
642. See id.
643. See id. at 17. Robertson identifies and dismisses possible harms to the resulting child as
being reared by a genetically unrelated parent, see id. at 121, or as being commodified by commercial surrogacy, see id. at 140. For another discussion and evaluation of concerns regarding
reproductive technologies, see Andrews & Douglass, supra note 195. "Participants in legislative
hearings [argue against reproductive technologies] not on the basis of fact, but on the basis of
symbols and pejorative language." Id. at 625.
644. See ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 32-34.
645. See Robertson, supra note 640, at 238-40.
646. See id. at 240, 243. There, Robertson suggests that the right to rear a child who is not
biologically related may be a fundamental liberty. See id.at 243.
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position that the orchestrating parties who intend to raise the child should
be the child's legal parents, he never has committed himself to that
conclusion. 7 More recently, he has written that his theory of procreative liberty requires a biological tie to the child. He characterizes his
earlier discussion as one in which he "note[s] speculatively the possible
lessening of the importance of genetic connections, but do[es] not
recommend immediate legal change.""4
Further, Robertson's view of procreative liberty does not encompass
an unmarried man or woman's intent to raise a child where that person
orchestrates conception and gestation by others, because that situation is
too different from current "understandings of why reproduction is
valuable and protected." 9 Procreation is "something more than a
means to obtain children for rearing.""65 There is further uncertainty as
to whether Robertson limits procreative liberty to married couples, even
where an unmarried intended parent has biologically contributed to the
child.65 He describes the core values of procreative liberty as those
involving a decision by a couple whether to produce a child,652 and
most of his discussion involves married couples. Yet, he also describes
procreative liberty as an individual right to choose whether to procreate.653 Ultimately, he concludes that procreative liberty is often realized
by a couple, but "it is first and foremost an individual interest."654
Professor John Hill's somewhat different approach also identifies a
right to procreate, which he defines as "the right to bring a child into the
world in an effort to have a family."655 Unlike Robertson, Hill clearly
separates the right of procreation from biological capacity. Professor Hill
also describes it as a right enjoyed by individuals as well as married
couples.656 The right to procreate is a "normative safeguard to protect

647. See ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 143-44. Within his discussion of procreative liberty

in this context, Robertson was commenting on the views of Professor John Hill, whose work is cited
supra note 64.
648. Robertson, supra note 640, at 237 n.13.

649. Id. at 240.
650. Id.
651. This issue is discussed in Symposium on John A. Robertson's Children of Choice, supra

note 481.
652. See ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 18.

653. See id.
654. Id. at 22. Robertson later wrote that although there may not yet be a constitutional right
for unmarried people to conceive, "legally or morally... a procreative liberty interest is implicated

in unmarried reproduction." Robertson, supra note 640, at 239.
655. Hill, supra note 64, at 385.

656. See id.
at 385-86.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss4/3

94

Shapo: Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of Reproducti
1997]

INHERITANCE CONSEQUENCES OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES

1185

the intention to create and raise a child,"65 encompassing the decision
of how and with whom to procreate. Where procreation is by noncoital
means, the legal parents of the resulting child are the child's "intended
parents," that is, "the person or couple who initially intended to raise the
'
child,"658
and who caused the child to be born.6 59 That person, or
couple, must have made preconception plans to "have" a child. They
must have taken "morally permissible measures, not limited to biological
procreation, to bring a child into the world," and they "must meet certain
minimally adequate conditions" to ensure that they are able to
raise a
child. This classification includes those who orchestrate a child's
conception and birth using the gametes and gestational capacity of
others. 61' Thus, Professor Hill appears to advocate an intended parent's
absolute right to procreate rather than a strong presumption of an
intended parent's parenthood. In this view, once a person exercises his
or her right to procreation, the law should deem that person the legal
parent of the child from the time of the child's birth. 62
B.

Contractual Theories

Other commentators have employed a contractual, rather than
constitutional, approach to assign parenthood to those who intended to
be parents. They would enforce preconception private agreements in
which the parties to the conception determine who will be the child's
parents. Parenthood by contract emphasizes the importance of planning,
negotiating, and protecting a person's expectations in becoming a legal
parent and in raising a child. 63 For example, Professor Marjorie Shultz,
a proponent of private ordering to determine parenthood, has written that
"[w]here [a person's] intentions are deliberate, explicit and bargained for,
where they are the catalyst for reliance and expectations, as is the case
in technologically-assisted reproductive arrangements, they should be
honored."' Private ordering and protection of an individual's expectations are not absolute." 5 Indeed, Professor Shultz recognizes the need
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.

Id. at 385-86.
Id. at 356 n.12.
See id. at 357.
Id. at 356 n.12.
See id. at 419.
See id. at 387.

663. See Anne Reichman Schiff, FrustratedIntentions and Binding Biology: Seeking AID in
the Law, 44 DUKE L.J. 524, 527 (1994).
664. Shultz, supra note 590, at 302-03.
665. See id. at 325-71.
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for certain restrictions, such as a state ban of commercial entrepreneurs
that promote reproductive technology.'
Professor Anne Schiff also proposes a contract-based legal theory
to determine parentage for children conceived by AID and by egg
donation. 7 Schiff defines a parent as the person who manifested a
commitment to raise the child: the mental or psychological conceiver
whose efforts initiated the process of conception." 8 Schiff explains that
when a husband and wife each consent to the wife's AID, that couple
should be the resulting child's legal parents because they have mentally
conceived the child."9 If a woman is not married but inseminates with
sperm from a known donor and plans to raise the child herself, that
woman is the sole mental conceiver and parent because the woman's
intent and efforts brought about the child's conception. Schiff criticizes
the case law as imposing a model of coital reproduction on reproduction
by means of AID.67 A prime concern of Schiff is to ensure a legal
regime that recognizes a single woman who conceives by AID as the
child's sole parent.67 In order to protect an unmarried woman's
reliance on that result, and in order to enforce the parties' preconception
intent, Schiff proposes a registration system for gametic donation, in
which the parties would register their agreement with a state agency
which designates who will have the rights and responsibilities of
parenting the child. 7 A married couple using AID would also be
required to register, as would their sperm donor if known. 73 Sperm
banks and IVF clinics would have to inform anonymous donors of their

666. See id. at 370.
667. See, e.g., Schiff, supra note 93; Schiff, supra note 663; see also Sheila M. O'Rourke,
Family Law in a Brave New World: Private Orderingof ParentalRights and Responsibilitiesfor
Donor Insemination, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J 140, 142 (1985) (discussing increased private
ordering as the 'most workable model" for the determination of parental rights and obligations).
668. See Schiff, supra note 663, at 552. Andrea Stumpf first referred to the intended parent as
the person whose "mental conception" initiated procreation. See Stumpf, supranote 590, at 194. She
used this concept with regard to determining the parent of a child born of a surrogacy contract. See
id. at 195-97; see also Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (en bane) ("(A] woman
...who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own-is the
natural mother under California law."). For a discussion of Johnson, see supra text accompanying
notes 582-600.
669. See Schiff, supra note 663, at 552. The wife, of course, has also biologically conceived
the child.
670. See id. at 540-41.
671. See id. at 556.
672. See id. at 559-61.
673. See id. at 559 n.128.
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legal positions and would file their signed acknowledgements with the
state.674
Professor Schiff argues that in order to allow an inseminated woman
or the recipient of egg donation to plan a family and rely on preconception agreements, once a gamete donor signs a preinsemination agreement
not to assume a parental role, that donor may not later change his or her
mind.675 Professor Schiff dismisses arguments that a donor is entitled
to a waiting period before deciding whether to relinquish the child, and
that the donor should be able to renegotiate the agreement if the donor's
emotional responses regarding parenthood change during the woman's
pregnancy. 6 Moreover, she rejects the argument that the law should
encourage sperm donors to take responsibility for the children whom they
have fathered.' Although Schiff recognizes that anonymous sperm
donation fosters biological parenthood without responsibility, she views
financial support from a second parent as less important than protecting
a woman's autonomy to shape her future.678 She maintains that a proper
and sufficient response to that problem is not to recognize donors'
parenthood but, instead, for society to recognize "that donating genetic
material is an act with important personal, moral, and societal implications."679
Thus, Professor Schiff would allow children born of AID to have
access to information regarding the identity of their biological fathers."' The donor, however, would have no obligations, including
financial ones, to the child.' The parties' agreement could be modified
only if the child suffers emotionally or psychologically from lack of
contact with the missing biological parent or if the child encounters
financial difficulties." A court could then rewrite the agreement,
6 3 Even then, the
requiring an "extremely high standard of evidence.""
egg or sperm donor would be given only limited rights to the child and
would not be recognized as the legal parent.'
674. See id.
675. See id. at 552-53.
676. See id. at 553.
677. See id.
678. See id. at 553-54.
679. Id. at 562.
680. See id. at 564-65.
681. See id. at 567.
682. See id. at 558.
683. Id. According to Schiff, the burden of proof should be highest if a party seeks to modify
the contract on the ground of financial distress. See i.
684. See Id.
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The courts of two states have used intent to determine parenthood.
6
In Johnson v. Calvert,"
the California Supreme Court adopted an
intent-based analysis of parenthood, holding that "the parties' intentions
as manifested in the surrogacy agreement" determined legal maternity of
a child born of gestational surrogacy. 86 The court, citing three of the
articles discussed above,687 held that the genetic mother, rather than the
gestational surrogate, was the legal mother because the genetic mother
"intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as
688
her own."
California courts' embrace of parenthood by intent, however, may
be limited to cases involving gestational surrogacy in which two women
can establish maternity under California law,689 and perhaps to surrogacy in which neither biological mother claims the child. 9 Another
California court determined maternity based on the state's UPA, rather
than on the basis of the parties' intent where the child was born of a
traditional surrogacy.69' Finally, a New York court determined that a
gestational mother was a child's intended and, thus, legal mother where
the biological mother was an anonymous egg donor. 92
C. Inheritance Consequences of Intent-Based Theories
For purposes of inheritance law, intent-based theories should make
it relatively easy to identify the child's legal parents during the gestator's
pregnancy and at the child's birth69 and, thus, to identify immediately
from whom the child should inherit. The parents are those who, before

685. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en bane).
686. Id. at 782.
687. See id. at 782-83 (citing Hill, supra note 64; Shultz, supra note 590; and Stumpf, supra
note 590).
688. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
689. See id.
690. See Jaycee B. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694 (Ct. App. 1996). On remand,
however, the trial court decided that the intended rearing mother, who is not the child's genetic or
gestational mother, is not the child's legal mother. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
691. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994).
692. See McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1994); see also Janet L.
Dolgin, The "Intent" of Reproduction:Reproductive Technologies and the Parent-ChildBond, 26
CoNN. L. REv. 1261, 1309 (1994). Professor Dolgin describes courts as attempting to use the
concept of intent to "mediate" between conflicting views of family as based on status and as based
on contract, thereby allowing families to be defined by contract and choice. See id.
693. Professor Hill, however, has identified the intended parent as the parent from the time of
the child's birth, not while the child is in utero or is extracorporeal. See Hill, supra note 64, at 387;
see also Stumpf, supra note 590, at 204 (suggesting that intended parents' rights vest at the birth
of the child).
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the child was conceived, intended to be the child's social parents; they
need not necessarily be the biological progenitors of the child. Their
parental claims rest on a cluster of facts and principles underlying intentbased parenthood: (1) the fact that, but for the intended parents' efforts,
the child would not have been conceived; (2) the contractual view that
parties should be held to their promises because of the importance of
enforcing those promises, and the fact that the intended parents have
relied on them; (3) the practical imperative that people need certainty to
plan their family arrangements; and (4) the importance of ensuring that
the child's parents are always identifiable.694
The determination of legal parenthood by intent, however, presents
an irony. It seems to complicate some of the simpler inheritance
situations under present law. It also creates a lens through which to view
more simply some of the more difficult policy problems. This section
examines how a theory of intent-based parenthood might influence
rulings in the procreative situations already discussed: AID, IVF, and
surrogacy.
1. Artificial Insemination by Donor
Advocates of intent-based parenthood presumably would approve the
statutes that designate the consenting husband and wife as the legal
parents of a child conceived by AID and relieve the sperm donor, whose
intent is only to supply sperm, of legal obligation to the child.69 If the
husband dies during the inseminated woman's pregnancy, or if the
husband or inseminated woman die soon after the child's birth, for
inheritance purposes, the child should be considered their child. If the
donor dies during that period, the child would not be his heir. These
statutes, however, may not require adequate manifestation of intent.
Although the inseminated woman and her husband must execute written
consent to the insemination, the statutes do not require the contracting
couple to specifically consent to be parents and to raise the child.696
Because the statutes require only that the couple consent to insemination,
and not to raising the child, the statutory consent may not satisfy the
contract-based definitions of parenthood, for example, that the party's

694.
695.
696.
(Michie

See Hill, supra note 64, at 413-18.
See ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 126-27.
See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(a) (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN.
1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050(1) (WVest 1997).
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intent be "explicit and bargained for 697 or that they have manifested
commitment to raise the child. 98
A problem is that evidence of a specific bargain may simply not be
available, and it may be difficult to determine who intended to raise the
child. Under these intent-based proposals, the inseminated woman must
prove that she intended to gestate and raise the child rather than to
relinquish the child to another person; her pregnancy alone should not
establish her as the legal parent as it would at common law or under the
AID statutes.6' If she dies just before or after childbirth without clear
written proof of her intent, and the child is born alive, the situation may
require litigation for the child to prove heirship from the mother. The
same would hold true with respect to her husband. At common law he
would have been presumed the father of a child born in wedlock, and
under the AID statutes, his consent to AID would establish him as the
father.' °° However, his consent to AID, without consent to raise the
child, may not be sufficient to establish his parenthood. Thus, if the
husband dies, the child should have to prove that the husband agreed not
only to the child's procreation, but that he had also intended to raise the
child.
These statutes do not require the couple to register their intentions
with the state or require sperm banks to file the donor's acknowledgement."0 A failure to register, in Professor Schiff's view, would remit
them to existing laws governing coital reproduction.7 2 Under that body
of law, if the husband rebuts the presumption of legitimacy with proof
of his sterility, the child would be illegitimate and would inherit from the
mother and biological father, if his identity could be determined. If the
child could not establish paternity, he would inherit only from his
mother.
If an inseminated woman is not married and the donor is known
(and the parties had not registered their agreement), the result under
intent-based proposals should be similar to most of the present case law.

697. Shultz, supra note 590, at 302. Professor Robertson, however, argues that the husband's
required consent will yield the correct results. See ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 127.

698. See Schiff, supra note 663, at 552.
699. See, e.g., id. at 551.
700. See Schiff, supra note 95, at 285.
701. See Schiff, supra note 663, at 559; supra note 696. Professor Robertson suggests, in some
cases, a contract model of enforcement with review by the judiciary or an administrative panel in
order to "assure intelligent, noncoerced contract formation." ROBERTSON, supranote 266, at 126 &
256 n.17.
702. See Schiff, supra note 663, at 560.
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That is, if the sperm donor donates sperm, intends to be the child's
parent, and has manifested that intent, then he and the inseminated
woman would be the child's legal parents. Some case law, however,
supports the result that the parties' preconception intent will not, by
itself, cut off the donor's paternity. In Thomas S. v. Robin .,7°3 for
example, the court issued a filiation order based, in some part, upon the
donor's post-birth relationship with the child where there was no written
evidence of the parties' preconception agreement. 7" This decision is
anathema to those who believe that the courts should enforce the parties'
preconception intent, written or otherwise, regarding their negotiated
roles in conceiving and raising a child-where such enforcement is
needed in order to protect reliance and arguably ensure predictability and
autonomous choice.0 5
2. In Vitro Fertilization
In egg or embryo donation, the legal maternal parent under intentbased parenthood would be the same as in the common law: the woman
who gives birth to the child is the legal mother if she gestated the child
and intended to raise him or her.7' However, proof would be required
as to whether the gestational woman intended to act as a surrogate or
whether she received the egg or embryo in order to bear a child whom
she would raise. In the case of egg donation, if the woman is married
and her husband provided the sperm for IVF, her husband should be the
father, if he intended to rear the child. Paralleling the case of consent to
AID, the husband's consent may require his explicit consent to rear the
child. 7 If that proof is not available, the child could be the illegitimate
child of the gestating woman and have no legal father. If the wife
gestates a donated embryo, then her husband's paternity should depend
upon his consent to the procedure and to be the child's father, since he
did not supply the sperm.
It would seem that the fact that the gestational woman was
unmarried should make no difference to intent. Professor Robertson,
however, appears to distinguish between the consequences of egg

703. 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994). For a more in-depth discussion of this case, see supra
text accompanying notes 222-29.
704. See Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
705. See, e.g., Schiff, supra note 663, at 552-54; Shultz, supra note 590, at 377-78.
706. See McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477,480 (App. Div. 1994); ROBERTSON, supra

note 266, at 129; Schiff, supra note 95, at 283.
707. See supra notes 696-98 and accompanying text.
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donation and embryo donation, and those of sperm donation where the
donation is to an unmarried woman. As to egg donation, he would
enforce an egg donor's preconception agreement not to be a parent
because the recipient gestator would also be a woman, and the child
would already have a mother.708 This result avoids the complications of
recognizing that a child has two mothers, but it prevents the child from
having two parents from whom to inherit. With respect to embryo
donation, Professor Robertson also would enforce an agreement to
exclude the egg and sperm donors as legal parents." 9 He notes,
however, that an agreement between donors and the recipient to that
effect could be overridden if the embryo were donated to an unmarried
woman in a jurisdiction that recognizes a sperm donor's paternity.710 It
is not clear, however, whether the legal parent would be the embryo's
sperm donor only, or both the egg and sperm donors. Given that both
donors made the same genetic contribution, equal treatment of them
would have the result that the child at birth would have three parents and
could inherit from either donor, in addition to the gestational mother, if
either died at that time.
3. Surrogate Contracts
Under an intent-based analysis, legal parentage in a surrogacy
situation is easily determined simply by enforcing the surrogacy contract,
resulting in consequences that differ from current law. For example, in
the Baby M case, Mr. Stem's right to be the child's legal parent would
be superior to that of Ms. Whitehead, the gestational and genetic mother.
This is not because Mr. Stem is biologically more closely related to the
child, which he is not, but because he had initiated the process that
brought about Ms. Whitehead's pregnancy, and the parties had agreed
that he would rear the child. 1 On those grounds, Ms. Stem's claim
would also be superior to that of Ms. Whitehead and equal to that of Mr.
Stem. A wife in Ms. Stem's position should be recognized as the child's
legal mother even before she adopts the child.' Under intent-based
parenthood, her claim would be superior to Ms. Whitehead's, even if Ms.

708.
709.
710.
711.

See ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 129.
See id. at 130.
See id.
See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1235-36 (NJ. 1988).

712. Professor Robertson analogizes the infertile wife's procreative rights to those of the
infertile husband whose wife conceives by AID. See ROBERTSON, supranote 266, at 40. Where the

wife is the genetic mother, her claim is stronger because the child's procreation more closely
approximates core coital procreation.
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Whitehead had been artificially inseminated with donated sperm of
another man, or if the Stems had orchestrated IVF with donated gametes
followed by implantation in Ms. Whitehead. 13 In those cases, if one or
both of the Stems had died before the child was born, or before the
surrogate relinquished the child, the child would be their heir even
though the child was not related genetically and had no social ties to
either of the Stems. Furthermore, if Ms. Whitehead had died during her
pregnancy and the child were born alive, the child would not inherit from
her estate. 14
The logic of this position further requires that if a surrogate
contracts with an unmarried man, the resulting child should have only
that male parent, even if the man was infertile and the child was
conceived with sperm of another man."5 Thus, if the contracting man
died during the pregnancy or before the baby was relinquished, that child
would inherit from his estate although he had no genetic, marital, or
social tie to the child. However, this type of surrogacy arrangement
significantly departs from a coital reproduction model and would not
come within Professor Robertson's definition of procreative liberty.
In an area where the desire for predictability is especially intense,
intent-based theories leave significant areas of uncertainty. First, as
explained above, if parenthood is determined on the basis of a constitutionally protected right to procreate, it is not always clear how far the
right extends, and whether that right outweighs any identifiable harm that
a prebirth contract may have imposed on the child. 16 Second, it is not
clear under the case law whether a court will determine parenthood by
intent, and if it does so, under what circumstances.717 Third, conception
by contract may well be subject to contract defenses. Therefore, it may
not be possible to identify a child's parents without litigation and
interpretation of the contract. For example, a surrogate may interpose a
defense of excused performance which, if successful, would permit the

713. See Schiff, supra note 95, at 284-85.
714. But see supra text accompanying note 572 (noting a five-day waiting period, rather than
the child's adoption by contracting couple, as determinative of the child's maternal inheritance).
Professor John Hill, however, locates the intending parents' parenthood at the time of the child's
birth. See Hill, supra note 64, at 387.
715. See Schiff, supra note 95, at 285-86. Professor Schiff predicts that a court would declare
the egg donor as the child's legal mother, however, in order to strengthen the conventional family
model that a child should have one parent of each sex. See id. at 286.
716. See ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 125-26.
717. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,781-82 (Cal. 1993) (en bane); Jaycee B. v. Superior
Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 702 (Ct. App. 1996).
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surrogate to retain and raise the child. Professor Shultz argues that one
situation where this could potentially arise is if a surrogate's own
children died during her pregnancy." 8 However, she argues that if a
surrogate wants to keep the baby only because she had become
emotionally committed to the child during pregnancy and childbirth, her
contractual obligation should not be excused since the contract imposes
on her the risk of changed feelings. 9
Other potential contract defenses are those of unconscionability and
duress.72 Doe v. Kelley' t provides an example of a contract that
could be challenged under either defense by a surrogate who wanted to
keep a baby. In Doe, the husband of the married couple entered into a
surrogacy contract with his secretary. Their contract provided that the
secretary would receive $5,000 plus expenses, time off from work, and
company pregnancy disability and health insurance.7' Clearly, this
situation presented ample opportunity for overreaching by an employer
that may have invalidated the contract. Thus, where contract defenses are
available,7' the designation of a child's legal parents, and thus the
child's inheritance rights, may not be known until those issues have been
litigated.
VIII.

MoRE THAN Two PARENTS

Another cluster of tests to determine parenthood recognizes that a
child could have more than two legal parents or could have more than
one legal parent of the same sex. This result should not be precluded
718. See Shultz, supra note 590, at 349.
719. See id. at 349-50.
720. See id. at 353-54; see also Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining
Motherhood in the Era of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDozo L. REv. 497 (1996).
Professor Coleman proposes a "system of rules" to protect the parties' intent, but also to protect the
surrogate against an unconscionable contract. See id. at 529-30. She suggests legislation that requires
specific procedures "which guarantee to the greatest extent possible that the decision to contribute
one's reproductive function was freely made after careful deliberation on the part of all the
individuals involved." Id. at 529. Contracts that comply with these requirements are conscionable
and will be enforced. See id.
721. 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
722. See id. at 440. The issue in Doe was whether the Michigan Adoption Code, prohibiting
payment in connection with adoption, which the parties assumed applied to the surrogacy
arrangement, was an unconstitutional infringement on the parties' right to privacy. See id.
723. Professor Schiff, however, would not permit the parties to modify their contract once they
had registered their intent as to who will be the child's legal parents, nor would she permit contract
defenses or any other defenses, such as conduct and estoppel, to determine legal parentage. That
agreement could be changed only by court order under a high burden of proof, and only on grounds
of the child's best interests. See Schiff, supra note 95, at 282.
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because under intent-based theories, the criterion for parenthood is a
person's preconception intent to rear a child. If more than two people, or
more than one person of the same sex, intend to conceive and raise a
child, by contributing genetically or gestationally to the child, or by
orchestrating its conception by others, then all parties involved could be
recognized as the legal parents of that child."2 Thus far, however, most
proposals for legal recognition of more than two parents have been
concerned with ensuring ongoing custody or visitation arrangements for
those who have become a child's social parents, rather than with
identifying parental arrangements at the child's birth. Where more than
two people claim to be the legal parents of a child born from artificial
reproduction, society's concepts of legal parenthood would have to
become more flexible than they currently are in order to recognize all of
them as the child's parents.
The question of whether a child can have more than two parents has
an analogue in adoption law, and those states that have changed from
secret adoption to open adoption have modified this traditional rule. In
secret adoption, the child's birth and adoption records are sealed in order
to transplant the child into the adopting family.7' The biological and
adopting families do not know each other's identity."6 In open adoption, the families know each other's identity, and the child and his or her
adopting parents may maintain some relationship with the biological
parents.727 Open adoption, however, is not joint parenting.728 The child
has only one set of legal parents, the adopting couple or unmarried
person. Adoption extinguishes the parental rights of the child's biological
parents.729 Thus, in almost every state, the adopted child cannot inherit
as a child from or through the biological parents, nor can the biological
parents inherit from the child." °
One of the reasons many states have changed to a policy of open
adoption is the importance to adopted children of knowing their genetic
724. See Gillian Douglas, The Intention to Be a Parentand the Making of Mothers, 57 MOD.
L. REv. 636, 639 (1994). However, because the experience of a nonbiological parent who

coordinates the gamete donors and gestator to produce a child differs significantly from parenting
initiated by coitus, Professor Robertson might not recognize the liberty interest of those who
coordinate donation and gestation by others. See supra text accompanying notes 638-54.
725. See supra text accompanying notes 182-84.
726. The secret adoption paradigm has never fit adoptions within a family, such as stepparent
adoptions or adoption of a child by relatives.

727.
728.
729.
730.

See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
See Appell, supra note 188, at 1020.
See id. at 1001.
See supra text accompanying notes 243-45.
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heritage."3 Another basis for the change is that nontraditional extended
families have become more accepted. Changing demographics have
produced families created from divorce and remarriage, families headed
by a close relative, families headed by a single parent, and families that
include informal "para-parents," close friends who act as a child's social
parents.732 Like these family and nonfamily situations, open adoption
also has the potential to provide the child with an extended family.
Another basis for nontraditional parenting in adoption law comes
from the small number of states that have recognized that a child may
have two parents of the same sex. These states have permitted a
nonbiological social parent in a lesbian relationship to adopt the partner's
biological child.733 For example, in Adoption of Tammy,734 the child
was conceived by AID of a lesbian woman using semen from a known
donor, the nonbiological mother's cousin, who had given written consent
to the adoption.735 If the cousin had intended to play a parental role,
however, the child could have had three adults seeking legal protection
of their parenthood, two mothers and a father.736 Because of reproductive technology, pressure for the law to recognize this type of parental
arrangement has now increased.737 Professor Judith Younger has
characterized this outcome as "an idea whose time has come."738 Other
authorities, however, recognize that family harmony may be at stake.
Some limited judicial and statutory authority exists for multiple
parenthood. First, Louisiana courts recognize dual paternity where a child
is born to a married woman fathered by a man other than her husband.3 9 The Louisiana Code applies a presumption of legitimacy that
the mother's husband is "the father of all children ... conceived during

731. See Appell, supra note 188, at 1009.
732. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthoodto
Meet the Needs ofChildrenin Lesbian-Motherand OtherNontraditionalFamilies, 78 GEo. L.J. 459,
474-82 (1990); Pepper Schwartz, New Bonds: Para-Dads,Para-Moms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1995,
at Cl.

733. See supra text accompanying notes 246-60; see also Pamess, supra note 49, at 586 (stating
that a "two-parent setting need not inevitably involve at least one man").

734. 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993).
735. See id. at 319.
736. The Massachusetts AI statute applies only to married women and would not have cut off
the cousin's parental status. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 4B (West 1994).
737. See Younger, supra note 19, at 913-14.

738. Id. at 913.
739. See Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 849-54 (La. 1989); Smith v. Jones, 566 So. 2d 408,
413 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Finnerty v. Boyett, 469 So. 2d 287, 292-93 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Durr v.
Blue, 454 So. 2d 315, 318-19 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
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the marriage." 7' The husband can disavow paternity if he does so within
180 days of learning of the child's birth."4 Louisiana courts, however,
also permit a child to establish biological paternity742 and permit a
biological father743 and the child's mother7' to establish the biological
father's paternity. These filiation actions do not change the child's status
as the legitimate child of the mother's husband.74 Instead, the child, in
effect, has two fathers who, in addition to the mother, share responsibility
for the child. The case law, however, does not settle whether the fathers
also share support obligations7' and whether the child inherits from
both fathers. Although the court in Durr v. Durr stated that Louisiana
courts have recognized the child's right to inherit from their biological
father,747 Morrison v. Griffn,748 a precedent to which the Durr court
referred, involved children born to their biological parents when the
mother was still married to another man whose whereabouts had not been
known for years.749 After the mother divorced her absentee husband,
she married the children's biological father. The court held that the
children were the heirs of their deceased biological father for purposes
of inheriting from his sister.75 The decision was based upon the
Louisiana Civil Code, which legitimizes the acknowledged children of
parents who married subsequent to the children's birth.' The Morrison

court interpreted the statute as also legitimizing children born out of
marriage if their biological parents later married.752 Without this section
of the Code, and with a legal father whose whereabouts were known,
however, it is unclear whether Louisiana courts would permit a child to
inherit from both fathers. The Durr court also analogized the situation of
a child with two fathers to an adopted child who inherits from the

740.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 184 (West 1993).

741. See id. art. 189.
742. See, e.g., Warren v. Richard, 296 So. 2d 813, 815-17 (La. 1974) (allowing a child to
recover for the wrongful death of its biological father).
743. See Jones, 566 So. 2d at 409-13; Finnerty, 469 So. 2d at 292; Durr, 454 So. 2d at 319.
744. See Cole, 553 So. 2d at 855.
745. See id. at 854.
746. See id. at 855. The court imposed a support obligation on the biological father, but said
that it would defer determining whether the legal father (the mother's husband) was also subject to
the duty to support the child. See id.
747. See Durr, 454 So. 2d at 318.
748. 323 So. 2d 451 (La. 1975).
749. See id. at 452.
750. See id. at 457.
751. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 198 (West 1993).
752. See Morrison, 323 So. 2d at 455.
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biological parents as well as from the adopting parents," 3 which is still
the law in Louisiana."
The conceptual foundation of these decisions is the Louisiana
courts' view of fathers of children from adulterous conceptions as being
equivalent to unwed fathers of children conceived with unmarried
women, whose parental rights under Supreme Court precedents may be
accorded protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.755 The Louisiana
Supreme Court interpreted those Supreme Court cases as requiring that
it recognize the biological father's paternity when the biological father
had established a relationship with his children.756 The court thus
equated men who had fathered nonmarital children with married women
to those who had fathered nonmarital children with unmarried wom757
en.
Explicit statutory provisions for inheritance from two fathers exist
in Michigan inheritance law, which provides that a child born of a
married woman and a man not her husband may inherit from an intestate
biological father as well as from the presumed legal father, the mother's
husband.758 The argument in favor of the Michigan statute, to
"destigmatize and normalize the status of 'illegitimate' children" and
treat them equitably, did not explain the decision to recognize the two
factors.759
The United States Supreme Court, although not declaring that a state
cannot recognize more than one legal father, held in Michael H. v.
GeraldD.7' that the Constitution does not require that the state do so.
Michael H. involved a biological father's claim to paternity of a child
conceived coitally where the child was born to a woman married to

753. See Durr v. Blue, 454 So. 2d 315, 318 (La. Ct. App. 1984).

754. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 214(c) (West Supp. 1997).
755. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.

380,391-94 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,255 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
658 (1972).
756. See Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 851 (La. 1989).
757. See id. at 851-54.
758. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(7) (West Supp. 1997). This section does not
apply to children born of AID to a married woman with the consent of her husband. An AID child
is considered the child of the married couple "for all purposes of intestate succession." Id.
§ 700.111(2). Subsection (7), however, would apply to children such as those conceived by IVF

using donated sperm.
759. House Legislative Analysis Section, H.B. 4561, Second Analysis (Mich. Apr. 21, 1994)
(on file with the Hofstra Law Review).

760. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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another man."' A plurality of the Court held constitutional California's
statutory presumption, rebuttable only by the husband or wife, that a
child born to a married woman living with her husband is a child of the
marriage. 62 In an often quoted line, Justice Scalia said, "California law,
'
The
like nature itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood."763
plurality also held that the child had no due process right to "maintain
filial relationships with both [men]."'7 The child asserted that she had
two psychological fathers and had a right to have both legally recognized
dismissed the child's claim as one that
as her father. Justice Scalia
"merits little discussion" 765 and was without "support in the history or
traditions of this country."'7"
The facts of Michael H. highlight the practical difficulties of a
divided authority and a disrupted family unit that may result from more
than two legal parents. The child in Michael H. had not had very
extensive long-term contact with her biological father. She and her
mother "visited" him for three months when the child was about seven
months old and then alternated living with the husband and another
man.767 When the child was two years old, she and her mother lived
with the biological father for eight months when he was not out of the
country on business. 7" By this time, he had filed a filiation action.
From the time the child was three years of age and throughout litigation,
however, the mother and child were again living with the mother's
husband.769
Had the biological father succeeded in establishing paternity and
visitation, the mother's husband would have been, in essence, a stepfather
to an illegitimate child and not a second legal father. If, however, as is
the case with Louisiana law, the presumption of the husband's paternity
would not have been rebutted by Michael H.'s filiation order, then the
child would have had two legal fathers. Although Justice Scalia may
have looked favorably on the financial resources that the fathers would
provide to the child, these arrangements most likely would not comport

761. Seeid, at 113-14.
762. See id. at 129-30. The California code has since been amended to permit other parties to
rebut the presumption of legitimacy. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(b) (West 1994).
763. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 118.
764. Id. at 130.

765. Id.
766. Id. at 131.
767. See id.

768. See id. at 114.
769. See i. at 115.
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with his view of the family described in Michael H.77 Three parents
would have decisionmaking authority for the child with little prospect of
agreement and greater prospect of hostility and injury to the mother's
7
marriage.
Although Michigan and Louisiana law recognize dual fatherhood,
the former only for purposes of inheritance, dual motherhood has yet to
77 the California Supreme
be legally recognized. In Johnson v. Calvert,
Court rejected the ACLU amicus argument that a child had two mothers
when the child was conceived by IVF of a married couple's gametes and
gestated by a surrogate." The court recognized that each woman could
prove her maternity, but it decided that only one of them could be
considered the legal mother. The court explained its decision not to
recognize the surrogate as a third parent on grounds of family harmony:
the child's genetic parents were married and could provide a stable home,
whereas the surrogate was an unrelated "third party."774 The court
added that "[e]ven though rising divorce rates have made multiple parent
arrangements common in our society, we see no compelling reason to
recognize such a situation here. 775
In an institutional contribution to the dialogue, the New York State
Bar Association also rejected the concept of two legal mothers, which
had been recommended by its Special Committee on Biotechnology and
the Law. In 1993, the Committee recommended that the New York
Domestic Relations Law define "parent" of a child born of IVF using
embryo implantation to include both the genetic and gestational
mothers. 7' In response to Johnson, the Committee had first recommended in 1992 that a child born as a result of AI or IVF "shall be
deemed" the child of the gestational mother.777 The Bar Association
voted against the report, and the New York legislature passed surrogacy
legislation declaring surrogacy contracts unenforceable and classifying
the birth mother as the child's legal mother.
770. See id. at 123 n.3.
771. See Schneider, supranote 19, at 527 (stating that the married couple would have to "share
child-rearing with the wife's former lover").

772. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc). For further discussion of this case, see supra text
accompanying notes 582-600.
773. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781 n.8.
774. Id.
775. Id.
776. See Palmer, supra note 292, at 26. Professor Palmer was chair of that committee. See id.
at 18.
777. Id. at 23.
778. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121-124 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
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The Committee then considered the genetic mother's status and
whether bifurcated gestation and egg donation had created a new
category of children.779 The Committee concluded that a child born to
a married woman by AI or IVF, with her husband's consent and with the
services of a physician, should be considered the legitimate child of that
married couple for all purposes.78 In other situations, however, when
a woman gestates a child conceived from another woman's egg, the child
would be deemed the child of both women.' The report does not
explain how, or if, the two mothers would share parental responsibilities.782 For example, questions of who must consent to the child's
medical treatment, or who would have custody of the child remained
unresolved by the proposal. The drafters may have assumed that the dual
motherhood status would not continue, and that the parties would
determine who would adopt the child. The proposed legislation would
give each woman standing to assert her claim. 83
The Committee, however, recommended that for maternal inheritance purposes the child be deemed the child of the genetic mother
only.7" The Committee decided in favor of inheritance from only the
genetic mother so as to provide a clear rule for planning estates and for
interpreting private donative instruments.785 The Committee, instead,
could have proposed a rule for class gifts that would interpret instruments
executed before the effective date of the recommended legislation
differently from those executed after that date.786 The latter could be
interpreted to provide inheritance from and through both mothers.
Academicians who argue for more than two parents view parenthood
as more of a social concept than a biological or financial one. The best
known academic suggestion to rethink the exclusive nature of legal
parenthood is that of Professor Katharine Bartlett. She urges states to
recognize parenting alternatives so that adults who have become a child's
psychological parents would be able to maintain a relationship with that
779. See Palmer, supra note 292, at 23.

780. See id. at 26.
781. See id.
782. See Daniel S. Strouse, Egg Donation,Motherhoodand State Law Reform: A Commentary
on ProfessorPalmer's Proposals,35 JURiMETRICs J. 31, 38-39 (1994).

783. See id. at 38. In addition, the report did not recognize the parenthood of contracting parties
who were not biologically related to the child, but who, nonetheless, intended to raise the child.

784. See Palmer, supranote 292, at 26-27. The genetic mother could disinherit the child or give
the child up for adoption by the gestational mother to avoid this consequence. See Id.
785. See id. at 27. Of course, maternal lineage has traditionally been presumed from the woman
who gave birth, who would traditionally also have supplied the maternal genetic lineage.
786. See Thies, supra note 435, at 923.
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child outside the nuclear family." 7 Professor Bartlett, however, does not
advocate designating those psychological parents as the child's legal
parents. She focuses on a child's need for continuity in relationships with
parental figures when the traditional nuclear family has failed and the
child has formed relationships with other adults, such as a stepparent.
She argues that the law should protect that relationship for purposes of
custody and visitation.
Professor Bartlett's concept of multiple parenting first requires that
the child's relationship with her legal parent has been interrupted and that
the adult petitioning for protected status has been either the child's legal,
natural, or psychological parent."' She defines psychological parent as
an adult who has had physical custody of the child for at least six
months in a relationship based on mutuality (the adult feels care and
concern for the child, and the child perceives the adult as a parent) which
"began with the consent of the child's legal parent or under court
order."7 9 Professor Bartlett admits that the contours of this proposal for
nonexclusive parenting are not precise.79 One lacuna is the apparent
lack of a requirement that the psychological parent assume financial
responsibility for the child. Professor Bartlett proposes that a noncustodial parent's visitation access to a child should not depend upon that
parent's financial contributions for child support."'
Professor Nancy Polikoff's similar proposal also expands the
definition of parenthood to include those who maintain functional
parental relationships with a child "when a legally recognized parent
created that relationship with the intent that the relationship be parental
in nature."' Professor Polikoff's proposal differs from that of Professor Bartlett in that Professor Polikoff advocates the recognition of the
psychological parents as additional legal parents. 3 Thus, a particular
child could have more than two legal parents of either gender, and a
court would determine custody based on the best interests of the
child.9
Both Professors Bartlett and Polikoff are concerned with protecting

787. See Bartlett, supra note 52, at 882-83.
788. See id. at 946.
789. Id. at 946-47; see also Minow, supra note 22, at 284-85 & n.52 (proposing a defimition
for "parent' that would take into account "psychological evidence and theories").
790. See Bartlett, supra note 52, at 961.
791. See i. at 950.
792. Polikoff, supra note 732, at 464.
793. See id. at 473 n.51.
794. See id.
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an already developed relationship between a child and adults other than
the child's legal parents. Neither of these proposals for multiple parenting
discusses parenthood for purposes of inheritance, although Professor
Polikoff explains that she would redefine legal parenthood to confer "all
parental rights and responsibilities on those who meet the definition.""
Neither proposal is intended to determine legal parenthood at the time of
the child's birth. Indeed, Professor Bartlett says that the child's "natural"
parents should have "unequivocal and undivided parental authority" at
the child's birth.796
If the child was conceived through reproductive technology,
however, the unanswered question is who is deemed the "natural"
parents. One commentator, Professor R. Alta Charo, who is also
concerned with protecting a child's ongoing relationship with an adult,
has linked the concept of identifying multiple biological parents with
children of reproductive technologies. 797 However, Professor Charo has
not delineated how and when those parents would be identified. She
notes that "[s]ome children have three biological parents, not two. Some
children have two biological mothers, not one,"798 and some children
also have parents by declaration at the time of their birth. Professor
Charo would create "a new category... somewhere between custodial
parent and legal stranger, that captures those relationships.""7 Professor
Charo's special-category parent, like Professor Bartlett's custodial parent
who has no financial responsibility toward the child, is a limited-purpose
parenthood where the combined duties and rights of parenthood are
shared among more than two people. However, specifics about that
category need to be determined, such as when the child's legal parent or
parents will be determined, how to distinguish legal parents and specialcategory parents, if and how they will share decisionmaking authority,
and which ones will be financially responsible for the child."'0

795. Id. at 471 (emphasis omitted).
796.

Bartlett, supra note 52, at 882.

797. See Charo, supra note 279, at 305-06.
798. Id. at 305; see also George J.Annas, Using Genes to Define Motherhood-The California

Solution, 326 NE-V ENG. J.MEID. 417, 420 (1992) (stating that the realities of surrogaoy demand that
"[slociety should acknowledge [that the child has two mothers] and take it into account").
799. Charo, supra note 279, at 306.
800. Professor Charo does explain that courts and legislatures may have to determine who will
have primary authority to raise the child. See id. Professor Annas also suggested what appears to be
a limited-purpose parent when he wrote that the two mothers should be allocated different "rights

and responsibilities of parenthood." Annas, supra note 798, at 420. For Annas, however, the
gestational mother is the presumed and custodial mother who may choose to relinquish the child to
the contracting couple. The egg donor would have visitation rights. See id. He does not say if the
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One potential special-category parent might be a sperm donor who
wants to be recognized as a parent and will accept financial responsibility
for that child,8"' although not as the child's primary rearing parent of
that sex. Those donors could donate under a separately identified
category for married couples who wished to involve a third adult in what
later could be worked out as a special-category parent in an extended
family."2 This outcome is currently possible under statutes of three
states that permit a sperm donor to contract for parental status. The New
Jersey,0 3 New Mexico," and Washington. 5 AI statutes provide
exceptions that permit a sperm donor and the recipient to agree in writing
to treat the donor as the natural father. None of these statutes limit the
exception to sperm donation to unmarried recipients, although they may
have been intended for that purpose.
Except for the report of the Committee of the New York State Bar
Association, the proposals summarized here have not addressed
inheritance consequences, despite the importance of inheritance as a
component of parenthood. The Committee recommended dual maternity
at the child's birth, but not for purposes of ongoing psychological
parenting, and also recommended that the child's maternal inheritance at
that time be from the genetic parent only.8"'
There exist some obstacles in inheritance law to recognizing more
than two parents. A child who is the heir of a biological father and
mother and a gestational mother may be thought of as entitled to dual
inheritance in the sense of potentially receiving an inheritance from two
mothers. A child who is the heir of a sperm donor and a presumed father
may inherit from two fathers. To add the "intended parents" who
orchestrated the child's conception and birth to that list may create dual
or triple inheritance. However, there is some precedent in intestacy law
against dual inheritance, illustrated in the situation of inheritance by an
adopted child.0 7 For adopted children, however, dual inheritance issues
father would be the gestational woman's husband or the sperm donor (the male of the contracting
couple), or both.

801. One example, although not involving a birth by noncoital reproduction, is the biological
father in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).

802. It has been suggested that, in order to avoid confusion in decisionmaking authority, the
sperm donor should fill a role more like the child's "uncle" or "godfather." See GLOVER ET AL.,
supra note 180, at 57.

803. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
804. See N.M. STAT. ANN.

§ 9:17-44(b) (West 1993).
§ 40-11-6(B)

(Michie 1994).

805. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050(2) (Vest 1997).
806. See supra text accompanying notes 784-85.
807. See Billings v. Head, 111 N.E. 177, 177 (Ind. 1916).
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arose in situations different from those involving more than two
collaborating parents in noncoital reproduction.
First, in some older cases, an issue arose when an adopted child
claimed a double share from the same estate in jurisdictions where the
adopted child continued to inherit from or through the natural parents.
For example, where a grandparent had adopted a grandchild whose parent
was deceased, at the grandparent's death the adopted child could claim
one share of the estate as the adopted child and a second share as a
representative of the deceased parent. Courts were divided as to whether
the adopted child could take these two shares."' Similarly, with respect
to reproductive technology, this situation could occur where a woman
carries an embryo conceived from the gametes of her daughter (or
daughter-in-law) and son-in-law (or son). The woman is the gestational
mother of the child and its genetic grandparent. At her death, if her child
(the grandchild's genetic parent) had predeceased her, the grandchild/child could be entitled to two shares. The UPC may provide the
best answer to this situation because it now permits only a single
inheritance "based on the relationship that would entitle the individual to
the larger share." ' 9
The label of dual inheritance has also prevented a child from
inheriting from different estates through two parents in the same
relationship to the child."' For example, if a child whose parent has
died is adopted by a stepparent in a state where the statute does not
clearly save the child's inheritance through the deceased parent, this issue
may arise at the death of an ancestor of the deceased parent, for example,
the child's intestate grandparent. If the child inherits from the grandparent through the deceased parent, the adoption statute would, in a sense,
confer potential inheritance rights on the adopted child superior to those
held by a natural child, because the adopted child would also be able to
inherit through the adopting stepparent." Yet, unlike inheritance of
two shares from one estate described above, the adopted child in this
situation would not take more than one share from any one estate.
Moreover, the child already has additional rights of inheritance in that
she may potentially inherit from three parents, the deceased natural

808. Compare Billings, 111 N.E. at 177 (holding that a child is not permitted to inherit both as
a grandchild and as an adopted child), with In re Bartram's Estate, 198 P. 192, 193 (Kan. 1921)
(holding that an adopted child can inherit in a dual capacity).
809. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-113, 8 U.L.A. 107 (Supp. 1996).
810. See Hall v. Vallandingham, 540 A.2d 1162 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
811. See id. at 1164.
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parent, the other natural parent, and the adopting stepparent. Because the
child would still be known to the deceased parent's family (family
adoptions are usually not secret) and would likely become part of three
extended families, inheritance from the deceased parent's intestate
relatives may not be inappropriate. As long as the child does not inherit
more than one share from any one estate, precedents against dual
inheritance for adopted children need not prevent inheritance by a child
conceived by reproductive technology from inheriting from more than
two parents on grounds of unfairness.
If a state were to recognize that a child of noncoital reproduction
could have more than one legal parent of each sex, it would have to
determine the designated multiple parents at birth for inheritance
purposes. None of these proposals offers the necessary criteria to do so,
except the New York Bar Committee report, which designated only the
genetic mother as the child's maternal parent for inheritance."' As is
the case with parenting agreements in open adoption, the multiple
parenting possibilities that have been proposed are initially consensual
and contractual, that is, they recognize as parents those who want to be
the child's parents." 3 To accommodate these relationships, they have
suggested some form of special status parenthood for purposes of custody
and visitation only. Applied to the circumstances of reproductive
technology, special status parenthood may enable those who have
participated in conceiving and gestating the child to play a role in the
child's upbringing, allowing the child to know those who made its birth
possible. The state would have to assign the primary parental role in
order to identify the child's parents at birth, perhaps enacting the
traditional presumptions of the gestational woman as the child's mother
and her husband as the father or, if she is unmarried, the sperm donor,
the child's biological father, as the father. The child's inheritance could
initially be limited to those primary parents.
The other parties might petition the court for special status
parenthood, or the state may enable them to contract for enforceable
parental rights, as sperm donors have been able to do with unmarried

812. See Palmer, supra note 292, at 26-27.

813. A recently proposed statute, the Parentage of Children of Assisted Conception Act,
recognizes three parents when the child is born to a gestational surrogate. See McAllister, supra note

298, at 101, 107-08. Under this proposal, the birth mother is always the child's legal mother until
she relinquishes the child for adoption under the contract or by judicial decree. The genetic parents
are also the legal parents if the parties expressly agreed to that arrangement. Therefore, until
relinquishment, the child has three parents. See id. at 107-08.
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women to whom they have donated sperm." 4 Once the child custody
and visitation issues have been determined, however, the court would
have to determine all the consequences of special status parenthood. It
might decide to designate only two parents as parents for inheritance
purposes regardless of custody, as in the New York Bar Committee
proposal,"i' or it might designate the child's custodial parents as its
parents for inheritance. However, the state may treat all the participants
as, in effect, holding themselves out as parents, even for purposes of
inheritance. As long as the child does not inherit more than one share
from a single estate, inheritance consequences of multiple parenthood
should present fewer difficulties than do the social consequences of
custody and visitation rights, which may disrupt the custodial family unit.
For inheritance purposes, the state would not be engaged in ongoing
supervision and adjustments among the parties.
IX.

FOSTERING RESPONSIBILITY

A final approach to determining parenthood would be to determine
it in ways that foster responsibility on the part of those who participate
in the conception and gestation of the child. Whereas most proposals
previously discussed were concerned with parental rights for those who
wish to assume a parental role towards a child with whom they had
established a social relationship, the proposals discussed here are more
concerned with identifying those adults on whom parental obligations
should be imposed because of their roles in conceiving and gestating the
child. This part examines the work of commentators who take this
position, all of whom implicitly or explicitly criticize rights doctrines,
especially as they are applied to families and parenthood. These authors
often express more communitarian goals, stressing that individual rights
must be balanced with social responsibility. Professor Younger, for
example, has criticized Supreme Court cases delineating a right to
procreate and state cases determining divorce and custody, all of which
send the message "that personal interests of the parents take precedence
over those of the family."8 '6 She suggests changes in the law in order
to encourage stable families" 7 and to treat couples who have children

814.
815.
816.
817.

See discussion supra Part III.C.3.
See Palmer, supra note 292, at 26-27.
Younger, supra note 19, at 900.
See id. at 898.
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differently from those who do not. 8 '
The concept of responsibility has always been an important one in
determining the boundaries of parenthood. For example, a state may
terminate a person's parental rights if he does not "demonstrate a
reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility" toward his child
in the first thirty days of the child's life." 9 The Supreme Court has also
required a biological father to demonstrate responsibility towards his
child in order to maintain parental status. In comparing the legal
parenthood of unwed biological fathers with that of unwed mothers for
equal protection purposes, Justice Potter Stewart explained that the law
recognizes the legal maternity of an unwed mother, not just because the
birth mother is easily identifiable as the legal mother, but because she
has already established a relationship and connection with the child.82
By contrast, Supreme Court precedent require a biological father to
affirmatively establish a parent-child relationship, either by marriage to
the child's mother, or by accepting "some measure of responsibility for
the child's future."82' Inheritance is, of course, linked with responsibility.8" By the mechanism of inheritance, individuals provide for their
families after their death. 823
A.

Responsibility and ParenthoodUsing Reproductive Technologies

The notion of parental responsibility has also been important in
litigation involving reproductive technologies. The Tennessee Supreme
Court, in Davis v. Davis,"' concerned itself with parental responsibility,
although the court did not use this term. When the court decided that
Junior Davis's interest in avoiding unwanted parenthood outweighed the
interest of his former wife in the frozen embryos of which they were the

818. See id. at 901. In 1981, Professor Younger proposed a category of "marriage for minor
children," a special status for couples who had children for which she would impose different marital
property rules and more stringent conditions for divorce. Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A
Story of Compromise and Demoralization,Together with Criticism and Suggestionsfor Reform, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 45, 90-102 (1981).
819. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(D)() (West Supp. 1997); see also In re Adoption of
A.S.V., 644 N.E.2d 500, 505 (I11.App. Ct. 1994) (quoting same).
820. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice
Stewart's analysis was cited by the Court in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 (1983).
821. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
822. "[G]iving and bequeathing not only express but beget affection, or at least responsibility."
Halbach, supra note 16, at 5.
823. See id,
824. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
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genetic procreators, the court accorded heavy weight to his argument that
he did not want genetic children to whom he could not be a responsible
parent.8" The ex-Ms. Davis's claim to the embryos was weakened
because she did not plan to be a responsible parent. Instead, she intended
to donate the frozen embryos to another couple, rather than bear and
raise the children herselfY6 Thus, the court awarded the embryos to
Junior Davis.
In a frozen sperm case, Hall v. Fertility Institute,27 a Louisiana
court remanded the issue of whether the decedent had made an authentic
donation of his frozen sperm by written instrument to a woman in order
that she might bear his posthumous child. The court enumerated several
facts that were relevant to the decedent's lack of donative intent, one of
which was that he had not accepted any responsibility for the financial
welfare of his potential future child. He had neither bequeathed property
to the purported mother under his will to raise a child nor had he
provided for the child's welfare by any inter vivos transfer.828
Two academic commentators, Professor Katharine Bartlett and
Professor Vicki Jackson, would resolve conflicts between disputing
potential parents over a child conceived noncoitally on the basis of
responsible parenthood.829 Professor Bartlett's thesis is that the law
should promote responsible parenthood instead of promoting a view of
parenthood grounded in exchange and individual rights.83 Professor
Bartlett describes responsible parenthood as based on generosity,
obligation,83' and the "cycle of gift rather than the cycle of ex' To resolve custody disputes over parenthood, she proposes
change."832
that courts utilize a broad rule imposing a "responsibility-based

825. See id. at 603-04.
826. See id. at 604.
827. 647 So. 2d 1348 (La. Ct. App. 1994).

828. See id. at 1351-52.
829. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-ExpressingParenthood,98 YALE L.J. 293,294 (1988); Vicki
C. Jackson, Baby M and the Question ofParenthood,76 GEO. L.J. 1811, 1822 (1988).
830. See Bartlett, supra note 829, at 294. Neither Bartlett nor Jackson reject values based in
rights. Rather, each recognizes the importance of both community values and individual choice.
831. See id. at 300.

832. Id. at 295. Professor Bartlett describes responsibility as "a certain type of connection that
persons may experience in their relationships with one another. That connection is one of identification.... [seeking] what is good for the other person." Id. at 299; see also Dolgin, supra note 692
(chronicling the change in family relations from a hierarchical structure that fostered a sense of

commitment and responsibility among its members to a family made up of equal autonomous
individuals connected through contractual negotiations similar to those of the marketplace).
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standard" 3 ' that measures a potential parent's responsible decisionmaking and employs presumptions or burdens of proof to reduce judicial
discretion. 34 Professor Bartlett suggests a presumption that a mother's
pregnancy and childbirth establish the mother's responsible relationship
with the child.835
Professor Bartlett illustrates her proposal with the example of an
unmarried woman who conceives a child using AID, intending to be the
child's sole legal parent.836 First, Professor Bartlett values the woman's
intentional unmarried motherhood because it affirms the mother's
deliberate choice and her plan to be a parent, which Bartlett labels as
responsible conduct."3 However, she labels recognition of the donor as
a legal parent only in order to ensure his rights and his financial support
8 38
of the child as parenthood based on "exchange" and "entitlement."
39
Thus, Professor Bartlett would protect the woman's sole custody
against a claim by the sperm donor where the donor originally agreed not
to assume a parental role towards the child but then changed his mind
and sought custody or visitation after the baby's birth. 4 Her preference
for the unmarried mother rests on two grounds. First, she "prefer[s] a
planned relationship over one that was not only unplanned, but affirmatively unwanted." ' Second, she distinguishes the woman's relationship
with the child from that of the donor's on the ground that the woman has
already developed a relationship of responsibility with the child through
nine months of pregnancy and childbirth. 2 Because the donor had no
relationship with the child at that point, the woman's more responsible
parenthood should be recognized over the donor's claim. Of course, at
that point, the donor could not have developed a relationship with the

833. Bartlett, supra note 829, at 324.

834. See id. at 324-25.
835. See id. at 325. For.criticism of Professor Bartlett's reliance on a woman's biological
connection to a child as encouraging oppression of women, see Janet L. Dolgin, Statusand Contract
in FeministLegal Theory ofthe Family: A Reply to Bartlett, 12 WoMEN's RTS. L. REP. 103 (1990).
836. See Bartlett, supra note 829, at 314-15.
837. See id. at 314.
838. Id. at 315.
839. She would also presumably deny the biological father's claim to be a legal parent.

840. See Bartlett, supra note 829, at 314-15; see also Leckie v. Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521, 522
(Or. Ct. App. 1994) (denying a sperm donor's petition to establish paternity because of the donor's

written preconception waiver of paternity). But see Jhordan C.v. Mary K, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 536
(Ct. App. 1986) (suggesting that a preconception agreement of a man who donated sperm to an
unmarried woman who self-inseminates may not be binding, at least where the man plays a parental
role after the child is born).
841. Bartlett, supra note 829, at 315.

842. See id.
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child, although he could have demonstrated responsibility by supportive
conduct towards the pregnant mother.
If, however, the sperm donor had planned to play a parental role and
the mother then contests his claim to paternity, Professor Bartlett's
reasoning may not decide the issue. On the one hand, the donor planned
his relationship which he affirmatively wanted. On the other hand, he has
not yet formed a relationship with the child, whereas the mother has.
Each wants to participate in a "cycle of gift," 43 but the donor has not
yet been given the opportunity. It would seem that the proper decision
is to recognize each as a parent because, unless the presumption of
pregnancy always controls, each has acted responsibly, and the law
should encourage both to take responsibility for a child they brought into
the world.
If a woman who signed a surrogate contract changes her mind and
decides not to relinquish custody of the child to the biological father,
Professor Bartlett would not enforce the contract. The child's parentage
would instead be decided, not on fairness to the parties, but on broad
rules affirming parental responsibility.' Because Professor Bartlett's
priority rule is one that recognizes the relationship already formed
between the gestational mother and the child, the surrogate should prevail
each time unless the biological father has somehow demonstrated greater
responsibility and commitment to the child during the woman's
845
pregnancy.
Professor Bartlett reasons that a rule not enforcing surrogacy
contracts will affirm that parents do not want to give up their children,
and that changing one's mind to keep a child one had agreed to
relinquish is a defensible position.' However, in surrogacy, the issue
is which biological parent who refuses to give up the child should be
protected.'I After all, by virtue of his contract and sperm donation, the
father has, in her terms, also engaged in responsible family planning.
Professor Bartlett also does not explain why she would penalize a sperm
donor in an AID situation who changes his mind and decides that he
wants to play a part in raising the child but would not penalize a
843. Id. at 295.
844. See id. at 335-36.
845. See id.;see alsoPAUL LAURrrzEN, PURSUING PARENTHOOD 109-10 (1993) (acknowledging

the importance of the gestational mother as the first person to care for the child by rearing it in her
body).
846. See Bartlett, supra note 829, at 335.
847. Bartlett refers only to a traditional surrogate who is also the genetic mother. See id. at 326
n.144.
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surrogate mother who changes her mind about relinquishing the child.
Here again, the explanation must be the woman's nine months of
pregnancy and childbirth. On these grounds, Professor Bartlett most
likely would award custody to a gestational surrogate rather than to the
contracting couple, even if the child had been conceived with the
contracting wife's egg and the husband's sperm. Although the wife had
demonstrated commitment by undergoing egg retrieval, the gestational
surrogate had already formed a relationship with the child during
pregnancy, a relationship to which Professor Bartlett gives priority."
One difficulty in applying Professor Bartlett's theory to these
situations is that her proposal does not offer a conclusive rule to
determine legal parenthood at the birth of the baby. Instead, she analyzes
responsibility in the context of choosing between conflicting claims to
rear a child. If her rules applied to determine parenthood at birth, then in
most cases the child would inherit only from the birth mother. If the
biological father died at that time, he could not have established
parenthood by a "cycle of gift'" 9 unless he had acted responsibly
towards the birth mother during her pregnancy. Thus, in surrogacy, if the
biological father became unable or unwilling to take the child at its birth,
Professor Bartlett's rules would compel the surrogate, even an unwilling
one, to accept the child because she is the participant best situated to
assume parental duties."' Moreover, if the father died at that time, the
child would not inherit from him because he had not yet established a
responsible parental relationship with the child.
Like Professor Bartlett, Professor Jackson also analyzes the issue of
whether to enforce a preconception surrogacy agreement against the
surrogate in terms of a rule that best furthers "a social sense of
responsibility."85 ' Professor Jackson, however, reaches a different
conclusion as how to best further that goal. Her proposal is a rule that
recognizes as parents all the people who were responsible for bringing
a particular life into being.852 At the time of the child's birth, the
parents are all those who caused the child's birth through their own
bodies or through a commitment to rear the child.853 Thus, the child
born of a surrogacy arrangement would have more than two parents at

848.
849.
850.
851.
852.
853.

See id. at 325.
Id. at 295.
See id. at 336.
Jackson, supra note 829, at 1822.
See id. at 1824.
See id. at 1824-25.
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his or her birth. After the child is born, Professor Jackson would not
enforce the contract against an unwilling surrogate, but, instead, would
give the surrogate the option to voluntarily relinquish custody to the
contracting couple so that it could adopt the child. If she does not
relinquish custody, a court would determine custody between or among
the parents. 54
One reason Professor Jackson puts forward for not enforcing a
surrogacy contract is that enforcement would discourage a surrogate from
acting responsibly towards the fetus while she is pregnant.855 Professor
Jackson criticizes a rule that enforces a surrogacy contract and denies the
motherhood of the gestational woman as "inconsistent with enhancing a
moral sense of responsibility to the life one creates .... A rule that
would make a prebirth surrender clause specifically enforceable is one
that psychologically encourages and permits the birth mother to disclaim
all responsibility for the child during pregnancy and upon birth. 856
Indeed, the point has been raised successfully in surrogacy litigation that
a woman lacks a maternal tie to the child if she has contracted to
relinquish custody of the child whom she has borne.
B. Responsibility and Sperm Donation
Daniel Callahan has also defined parenting in terms of relationships
and the responsibilities imposed by those relationships, rather than in
terms of parents' and children's rights and separate needs.857 Callahan,
however, has focused on the social importance of encouraging more
responsible fatherhood."' 8 Thus, Callahan disagrees with intent-based
theories regarding AID. In order to encourage men to donate sperm,
intent-based theorists would relieve a sperm donor of all responsibilities
of fatherhood unless the sperm donor contracted otherwise. However,
they recognize that the biological father of a child conceived coitally
bears legal responsibility for the child.859 In the intent-based calculus,
the interest in facilitating sperm donation to enable the recipients to

854. See id. at 1827.
855. See id at 1825 n.34; see also LAuRrrZEN, supranote 845, at 111 (questioning a surrogate

mother's commitment to properly care for the fetus).
856. Jackson, supra note 829, at 1822.

857. See Daniel Callahan, Bioethics and Fatherhood, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 735 [hereinafter
Callahan, Bioethics]; Daniel Callahan, Opening the Debate?: A Response to the Wilders, 69
MILBANK Q. 41 (1991) [hereinafter Callahan, Opening the Debate].
858. See Callahan, Bioethics, supra note 857, at 738.
859. See supra Part VII.
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exercise their procreational rights outweighs the social interest in
enforcing a parent's fiscal responsibility to his children.86 However,
inquiring, "[w]hat could society have been thinking about?" 86' Callahan
has criticized AID and anonymous sperm donation as "an organized and
sanctioned way of allowing men to be biological fathers and still bear no
' He observes that current AID
responsibility for their children."862

practice is a symbol of the more general social problem of "male

procreational irresponsibility."863
Callahan advocates treating a sperm donor the same as a man who
impregnates a woman coitally.8 His criticisms of AID, however, are
difficult to reconcile with the current practice of anonymous sperm
donation to a married woman. 6 In fact, the law now treats similarly

a sperm donor whose sperm is used for Al of a married woman and a
man who fathers a child coitally with a woman married to another man.

In both situations, the law presumes that the husband is the father.866
Unless the husband rebuts the presumption, he is the parent responsible
for that child, even to the extent of providing child support if the couple
divorces. The consenting husband of a recipient of AID assumes the

same legal status.
Callahan may be referring only to donations to unmarried women,
but he has not suggested how he would treat sperm donation differently

in order to impose paternal responsibility in that situation. Under current
law, without a statute determining otherwise, the sperm donor should be
the legal father of a child born of AID.867 In only a few states do
current AI statutes terminating a donor's parental rights apply to the use

860. See ROBERTSON, supra note 266, at 128. Professor Robertson would balance these interests
differently to account for the risk of the mother's need for welfare, but he concludes, without
support, that the risk is slight. See id.; see also Schiff, supra note 663, at 553 (arguing that allowing
a sperm donor to avoid his agreement not to play a parental role violates a woman's autonomy).
861. Callahan, Bioethics,supra note 857, at 739.
862. Callahan, Opening the Debate, supra note 857, at 43.
863. Id.
864. See Callahan, Bioethics, supra note 857, at 739.
865. One commentator has criticized theories of procreational liberty because they fail to
recognize the importance of individual responsibility. See George P. Smith II, Children of Choice:
Freedom and the New Reproductive Technology, 36 JURIMvEICS J. 115, 118 (1995) (book review).
Even Smith, however, does not criticize the participants in AID to a consenting married couple on
these grounds. See GEORGE P. SMITH II, THE NEW BIOLOGY: LAW, ETHICS, AND BIOTECHNOLOGY
82 (1989); Smith, supra note 106, at 145.
866. See Nicole Miller Healy, Beyond Surrogacy: Gestational ParentingAgreements Under
CaliforniaLaw, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.L 89, 124 (1991).
867. See supra text accompanying notes 164-68 and note 164.
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of AID by unmarried women."' Even in those states, a donor may be
the legal father because donors to unmarried women have litigated
successfully for the opportunity to establish paternity over their biological
children. 69 Indeed, two courts have held that their states' AID statutes
7
would be unconstitutional if applied to deny donors that opportunity.
Some courts have approved, on policy grounds, a biological father's
socially responsible act of assuming fiscal responsibility for his
nonmarital child in terms of support and inheritance."7 ' Moreover, if a
donor had agreed with the mother that he would not establish his
paternity and had abided by that agreement, but the mother required
public assistance to support the child, she most likely would not receive
that assistance without revealing the father's name for purposes of
imposing a duty of support on the donor. 2
In order to equate sperm donation with fatherhood by coitus, it is
likely that Callahan would assign legal paternity only to a donor who
gave his sperm to an unmarried woman. Thus, a man who donated sperm
to a sperm bank would have to specify the marital status of the female
recipient. If he donates to an unmarried woman, he would have to agree
to undertake the responsibilities of fatherhood. The sperm bank would
then be required to reveal the names of the donors to unmarried women
and keep accurate records of each donation and recipient. These records
would become public. In addition, the sperm bank would have to limit
the number of unmarried recipients of one man's sperm so that the man
would not father an unmanageable number of children whom he could
not support financially.
A more workable distinction, however, might be between men who
donate anonymously to sperm banks and clinics, and those whose sperm

868. See supra note 202.
869. See, eg., Jhordan C. v. Mary K, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986); In re R.C., 775 P.2d
27 (Colo. 1989); C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821 (NJ. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977); Thomas S. v. Robin
Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994).
870. See C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 525 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994); McIntyre v. Crouch, 780
P.2d 239, 244-45 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
871. See C.O., 639 N.E.2d at 525. A few states, by statute, provide for enforcement of a written
agreement by a sperm donor and a woman in which they agree that the donor will be the child's
natural father. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:17.44(b) (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6(B)
(Michie 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050(2) (West 1997). None of these statutes limits
the agreement to one with an unmarried woman. However, one court has upheld a written agreement
in which the donor specifically relinquished a paternal role, but then changed his mind. See Leckie
v. Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521, 522 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
872. See 45 C.F.R. § 232.12(a) (1995).
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is used in order to conceive a particular child at a particular time." 3
Only in the latter situation should the man undertake the responsibility
of fatherhood.874 Anonymous donation of gametes to a clinic is sufficiently unlike traditional parenthood by coitus875 so that this status
should relieve the donor of parental responsibility for the resulting child.
C. Responsibility and Postmortem Children
Responsible parenthood is also at issue when a man bequeaths his
frozen sperm to be used after his death in order for the recipient to
conceive his child. Yet, the California court's decision in Hecht 1876
would allow posthumous biological fatherhood without responsibility
towards the child. Hecht I permits a man to devise his frozen sperm to
be used by the beneficiary for Al to continue his genetic line, yet it does
not subject his estate to the child's claims.877 Consequently, Hecht I has
been criticized on these grounds because the posthumously conceived
child could not prove paternity under California law, and the decedent
bequeathed sperm without any financial responsibility for the consequences of that act. 78
One commentator proposes an amendment to the California Family
Code which would require a man who devises sperm or who leaves
directions with a sperm bank to give the sperm to a particular recipient
to be treated as the legal father of his children conceived and born after
his death. The proposal requires a man who deposits sperm with a sperm
bank for freezing and who wants to father a child after his death to sign
a written declaration of his intention to do so and accepting paternity for
that child.879 The depositor would also agree, in writing, to subject his
testamentary dispositions of property to an obligation to support the

873. See Jackson, supra note 829, at 1825 n.35.

874. See id.; see also Chester, supra note 57, at 995 ("[L]egislation should require that any
offspring resulting from [sperm donated to a specific woman should] take by intestacy from [the
donor] if born alive within two years plus 300 days of [the donor's] death").
875. See Estes v. Albers, 504 N.W.2d 607, 609 (S.D. 1993).
876. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993). For further discussion of Hecht I, see supra text
accompanying notes 392-402.
877. See Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290.
878. See Lisa M. Burkdall, Note, A DeadMan's Tale: Regulating the Right to Bequeath Sperm

in California,46 HASTINGS LJ. 875, 898-99 (1995). Similarly, "any right of the male to procreate
posthumously subsumes the responsibility to support the resulting offspring by inheritance" Chester,
supra note 57, at 994; see also USCACA, supranote 69, § 4(b), 9B U.L.A. 166 (providing the same
result).
879. See Burkdall, supra note 878, at 904-05.
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child.88 The support obligation to the postmortem child would override
all other testamentary gifts. 81 Under the proposal, the decedent's estate
would be kept open pending the child's conception until the earliest to
occur of "two years after the date of [the decedent's] death; the death or
(re)marriage of the woman to whom he bequeathed or contractually
conveyed his sperm; and the woman's... statement" that she does not
intend to inseminate with the sperm.8 2 The probate court would have
discretion to determine and set aside the amount necessary for the child's
support. Only if there is additional property in the estate would any
property go to other beneficiaries.8 3 The child would also inherit from
an intestate estate as an heir, or from a testate estate as a pretermitted
child, and would be a member of a class of children for purposes of gifts
in written instruments made by others, unless the donor had specifically
excluded posthumous children."'
This proposal ensures that the biological father bears financial
responsibility for his postmortem children, but at the same time it
imposes significant burdens on the father's estate. One consequence is
that it treats a posthumous child differently and more favorably than the
decedent's other children who may also be in need of support from their
inheritance. A more equitable solution may be that the postmortem child
inherits from the decedent but be treated the same as the decedent's other
children. That is, the child would take whatever testamentary gift the
decedent had bequeathed or would share as a pretermitted heir or in an
intestate estate. Of course, if a decedent has provided specifically for a
postmortem child in his or her will, differently from other children, the
gift should be enforced.
The argument against the child's inheritance is that enforcement
would require keeping a portion of the estate open until the child's birth.
The decedent who leaves frozen gametes for a designated recipient,
however, manifests his intent to biologically parent a child, rather than

880. See id. at 905.
881. See id.
882. Id.
883. The support provisions would not apply if the sperm donor leaves all or the bulk of the

estate to the woman who is the recipient of the sperm. See id.
884. See id. at 906. It is not clear whether the decedent's support obligation to the postmortem
child is in addition to the child's inheritance. But see Thies, supra note 435, at 923 (proposing a rule

that would exclude postmortem children as issue of decedent from class gifts in instruments of others
existing before date of proposed rule becoming effective).
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to achieve finality by closing the estate before the child's birth."8 5 To
provide finality, the decedent's will or a state statute could specify a time
limit before which the child must be either born or in utero.
D. Responsibility and Inheritance
The inheritance issues in Hecht I arose in the context of a known
donor who wished to be involved in the conception of a particular child.
As Professor Jackson has suggested, a donor who gives genetic material
to create a specific child, and not simply to give or sell gametes to a
sperm or egg bank, should be treated initially as a parent to that child
until the child's legal parents are determined by adoption or relinquish86
ment, or until custody is otherwise determined among claimants."
Most state law is unclear as to the parental status of donors and other
participants in a child's procreation by reproductive technology. This
Article suggests that where state law does not determine parenthood at
the child's birth, if any of those people who participated in procreating
a specific child died before the child's legal parents were determined, the
child should inherit from that person's estate.
An inheritance law that allows a child to inherit from all those
whom society identifies as responsible for the child's birth will fulfill a
protective function s 7 by making financial provisions for the child. It
may also fulfill a channelling function8 8 by requiring that those people
take responsibility for the child unless countervailing interests outweigh
that policy. For example, one such countervailing interest might exist
when a married couple receives gamete donation and their child is
conceived by AID or IVF. In this situation, if the donor were a male who
had contributed to a sperm bank and had died at the child's birth, a
policy of paternal responsibility might be outweighed by the state interest
in upholding the family unit against disruption by strangers to that unit,
and by whatever continuing interest is furthered by the presumption of
legitimacy. Those policies remain important, even though the stranger to
the family unit had died because the donor could not have donated

885. Professor Chester agrees with the distinction between a donor who designates a particular
woman to bear his child after his death and one who wishes to be an anonymous donor and suggests
legislation to that effect, requiring the man to choose at the time he deposits his sperm. See Chester,
supra note 57, at 995. Under Professor Chester's proposal, the legislation would also name the child
as an intestate heir or pretermitted heir if the man died testate. See id.
886. See Jackson, supra note 829, at 1824-25.
887. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
888. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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anonymously if such a rule existed."8 9 If the recipients were known to
the donor, the donor could intrude on the marital unit during pregnancy
and after the child was born. Moreover, a rule that allowed a child to
inherit from a donor's estate when the gametes were obtained from a
gamete bank could subject the estate to the claims of numerous children,
complicating property titles and probate and splintering the estate into
small shares.
In comparison, gamete donation for AID by a known donor to a
known unmarried recipient will not involve as strongly the policies of not
interfering with a family unit890 or of illegitimizing a child who might
otherwise be presumed legitimate.
In other reproductive situations, a person who has frozen gametes
for postmortem conception or has frozen an embryo for postmortem
gestation by a specified individual is also a donor who intends to create
a specific child. In turn, that person should be understood to have
subjected his or her estate to the child's inheritance. In surrogacy
arrangements, all parties to the contract, whether the gametic donor(s)
(unless they donated anonymously to a clinic), the gestational mother, the
wife of the contracting sperm donor, or the orchestrators of those gametic
and gestational services by others would have parental responsibilities
because they brought about the birth of a particular child."' This rule
would prevent the spectacle of the child in the Jaycee B. litigation from
being declared filius nullius.92 The rule would consider them all as
parents for inheritance purposes. A rule allowing the resulting child to
inherit from those parties until the child's parents are legally determined
promotes communitarian goals by offering financial protection to the
child. This rule also impresses the consequences of their reproductive
activity upon the parties to the conception and birth. Although the child
might inherit from more than two "parents," this result is appropriate to
the new means of conception. In Jaycee B., five people were involved in
the child's conception and birth. Moreover, this result may occur
whenever a child's parent dies and the child is adopted by the surviving
parent's new spouse. This rule would neither decimate a single estate nor
would it unduly disrupt estate administration because the child would

889. In order to effectuate their child's inheritance from a donor's estate, the recipients must
know the donor's identity at the time of the insemination or IVF.
890. A donor, however, may "interfere" with the unit of an unmarried woman or women and
the child. However, the child's custody would still be determined.

891. See Jackson, supra note 829, at 1824-25.
892. See supra notes 615-24 and accompanying text.
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inherit from known contributors only.
Inheritance law thus may allow a child to reconstitute the seemingly
shattered pieces of its origins and may help transmit to the contributors
' for the life they helped create.
"the moral message of responsibility"893

893. Id. at 1828.
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